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Chapter 1 An overview of the dissertation 
 
1.1   Introduction 
This dissertation contains two empirical studies on auditor professional skepticism. 
According to the glossary of the IAASB Handbook (2008), professional skepticism is ‘an 
attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of evidence’. The primary 
objective of the two studies in this dissertation is to examine the association between auditors’ 
skeptical characteristics and auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions.  
It is important to study professional skepticism because if there would have been more 
skepticism on the side of the auditor this could have reduced the effects of major recent 
business ‘improprieties’ (cf., Bell et al., 2005). For example, the Enron-scandal is considered 
to be an audit failure as a result of not applying a suitable level of professional skepticism 
(e.g., Benston and Hartgraves, 2002, p. 122). Furthermore, Beasley et al., (2001, p. 65) found 
the lack of an appropriate level of professional skepticism to be number 3 (60% of the cases) 
among the top 10 list of audit deficiencies associated with fraud-related SEC cases. Number 1 
on the list was gathering insufficient audit evidence (80% of the cases), which may also 
considered to be an element of professional skepticism (cf., Hurtt, 1999, 2007; and Hurtt et 
al., 2003, 2008). Also in the report of the Panel on Audit Effectiveness, an analysis of SEC 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases concludes that auditors appeared to have 
demonstrated a lack of sufficient professional skepticism in many of the situations studied 
(POB, 2000, p. 227). Such situations are harmful to the quality of audits and the reputation of 
auditors (cf., Carpenter et al., 2002, p.1).  
There is widespread agreement on the importance of professional skepticism in audit 
practice (see e.g., Hurtt et al., 2003, p.2; Nelson, 2009; Bell et al., 2005). Society trusts 
financial auditors to exercise professional skepticism in conducting the audit (e.g., Kadous, 
2000; Kopp et al., 2003). Therefore, professional skepticism is an essential feature of 
contemporary audits.  
Despite its importance, there exists no consensus on the definition and measurement of 
professional skepticism (e.g., Hurtt et al., 2003; Nelson, 2009). Also there is criticism that 
auditing standards need to provide better guidance on how to implement the concept of 
professional skepticism (POB, 2000, p. 85; Pany and Whittington, 2001, p. 404). The 
recognized importance of professional skepticism, the lack of clarity concerning definitions 
and the need for more guidance warrant the need for research that explores the concept of 
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professional skepticism in depth. However, only limited research on this topic has been 
conducted to date (Hurtt et al., 2003).  
The first study of the dissertation involves an exploratory comparison of three 
skeptical characteristics of auditors (and a comprehensive professional skepticism scale) and 
how these are related to auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions (e.g., suspend judgment 
and engage in more substantive testing). This study also examines the impact of client risk on 
the hypothesized relationship between auditors’ skeptical characteristics and auditors’ 
skeptical judgments and decisions.  
The second study entails a more detailed examination of the relationship between 
auditors’ level of interpersonal trust and auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions. It uses a 
subset of the dataset used in the first study and extends the analyses of the first study. 
Interpersonal trust (or more precisely: its antithesis) is found to be the most significant 
predictor of skeptical judgments and decisions in the first empirical study of the dissertation. 
A factor analysis leads to the identification of three factors comprising the interpersonal trust 
variable: ‘Honesty and Integrity’, ‘Institutional Trust’ and ‘Exploitation’. In addition, as an 
additional analysis, this study examines how auditors’ level of interpersonal trust differs 
between auditor ranks and the extent to which auditors’ professional rank is associated with 
skeptical judgments and decisions. 
  The findings show that interpersonal trust has the highest significance in predicting 
skeptical judgments and decisions. Furthermore, there appear to be significant interaction 
effects of the client control environment, an important client risk factor, on the relationships 
between skeptical characteristics and skeptical planning judgments and decisions. In addition, 
the results show that the general construct measuring interpersonal trust appears to be a better 
predictor of skeptical judgments and decisions than the individual factors comprising it. 
Additional findings show that auditor rank is positively associated with interpersonal trust 
(i.e., suggesting skeptical disposition decreases with rank). Partners, nonetheless, exhibit the 
most skeptical judgments and decisions, suggesting they compensate for higher interpersonal 
trust level. 
This overview chapter is organized as follows. The broad construct of skepticism is 
briefly discussed from a philosophical perspective in Section 1.2. Other perspectives on 
skepticism are presented in Section 1.3, while auditor professional skepticism is defined in 
Section 1.4. An overview of the two studies in the dissertation is given in Section 1.5. Finally, 
the organization of the dissertation is described in Section 1.6. Note that the purpose of the 
dissertation is to present two self contained research papers that are in the form that is suitable 
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for submission to a research journal. Therefore, the papers can be read independently. As a 
result, to provide appropriate background in terms of the motivation for the research and 
relevant literature there is some overlap between the dissertation chapters in general and 
between the two empirical papers in particular. 
 
1.2  Skepticism from a philosophical perspective 
As will be discussed later, there exists opacity in the definitions of professional 
skepticism (see e.g., Hurtt, 2007; Hurtt et al., 2003; and Nelson, 2009). In this respect, it is 
illuminating to briefly consider the philosophical treatment of skepticism.  
The first mention of skeptics can be found in ancient philosophical writings. The word 
‘skeptics’ in this literature referred to people who cultivated doubt and suspension of 
judgment (see e.g., Kurtz, 1992). The Concise Oxford Dictionary (tenth edition, 1999) defines 
a skeptic as ‘a person inclined to question or doubt accepted opinions’. In a review of the 
philosophical literature, Kurtz (1992, p. 21-22) summarizes:  
 
‘... skeptikos means ‘to consider, examine’; skepsis means ‘inquiry’ and ‘doubt’. ... 
Skeptics always bid those overwhelmed by Absolute Truth or Special Virtue to pause. 
They ask, “What do you mean?”- seeking clarification and definition – and “Why do 
you believe what you do?”- demanding reasons, evidence, justification, or proof. ... 
they say, “Show me.” ... Skeptics wish to examine all sides of a question; and for 
every argument in favor of a thesis, they can usually find one or more arguments 
opposed to it.’ 
 
Several skeptical schools of thought have emerged.1 These schools can be roughly 
divided into two basic types of skepticism (see e.g., Bunge, 1991; Hurtt, 1999, Hurtt et al., 
2003): (1) systematic skepticism, which states that absolute knowledge acquisition is 
impossible, since people cannot observe or experience causation; and (2) methodological 
skepticism, which accepts that knowledge acquisition is possible. This distinction is important 
since only the second form is useful in aiding inquiry, knowledge acquisition and decision 
making. 
One form of systematic skepticism is ‘neutral skepticism’ of which Pyrrho of Elis was 
a proponent. Kurtz (1992, p. 36) summarizes Pyrrho’s philosophy as follows: (1) we can 
know nothing as to the nature of things; (2) hence the right attitude towards them is to 
withhold judgment; and (3) the necessary result of suspending judgment is ‘imperturbability’ 
                                                 
1
 Please refer to overview works of philosophical skepticism for a more in depth treatment (see e.g., Burnyeat 
and Frede, 1998; Popkin, 2003; Kurtz, 1992). 
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(i.e., calmness). This type of skepticism leads to a complete neutral stance and its adherents 
will neither affirm nor deny anything. 
  Methodological skepticism is more constructive (Bunge, 1991). The focus is on 
inquiry rather than on doubt. Under this view, skepticism is an essential phase of the process 
of inquiry.2 According to Hurtt (1999) a methodological skeptic is ‘one who uses doubt and 
questioning to aid in the search for knowledge, while the dogmatic skeptic … uses doubt and 
questioning to demonstrate the inability to obtain knowledge.’ Or as Kurtz (1992, p. 22) puts 
it: [e]xtreme skepticism cannot consistently serve our practical interests, for insofar as it sires 
doubt, it inhibits actions.’  
Kurtz (1992, p. 29) notes that:  
 
‘[s]kepticism, as a method of doubt that demands evidence and reasons for 
hypotheses, is essential to the process of scientific research, philosophical dialogue, 
and critical intelligence. It is also vital in ordinary life, where the demands of common 
sense are always a challenge to us to develop and act upon the most reliable 
hypotheses and beliefs available. It is the foe of absolute certainty and dogmatic 
finality. It appreciates the snares and pitfalls of all kinds of human knowledge and the 
importance of the principles of fallibilism and probabilism in regard to the degrees of 
certainty of our knowledge.’  
 
Of great importance for a skeptical inquirer is that ‘doubt is not simply a theoretical state but 
an actual behavioral expression that he or she seeks to resolve’ (Kurtz, 1992, p. 67). 
 
1.3  Other perspectives on skepticism 
 Unlike the substantial body of philosophical literature on skepticism, there exist no 
comprehensive theories on skepticism in other academic disciplines. However, Hurtt (1999; 
2007) provides an overview of four academic areas in which the term skepticism is used.3 
First, she describes skepticism of psychiatric professionals in diagnosing multiple personality 
disorder (see e.g., Cormier and Thelen, 1998; Dell, 1988; Dunn, 1992; Hayes and Mitchell, 
1994). Second, skepticism in a legal context is distinguished, which is related to the 
examination of the effect of expert testimony on jurors’ belief in eyewitness evidence (e.g., 
Cutler et al., 1989; Cutler et al., 1988). Third, there is research in the consumer behavior area 
concerning skepticism about advertising (see e.g., Ford et al., 1990; Mangleburg and Bristol, 
1998; Koslow, 2000). Finally, there are studies on media skepticism, which examine the 
                                                 
2
 This is also asserted by the literature on critical thinking (see e.g., Brookfield, 1987), in which skepticism is 
referred to as reflective skepticism. This will be discussed in the next section. 
3
 See Hurtt (1999, 2007) for a detailed account of these studies. 
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extent to which individuals disbelieve or discount the information provided by the mass media 
(e.g., Cozzens and Contractor, 1987; Irving and Berel, 2001; Irving et al., 1998). Hurtt (2007) 
concludes that these disciplines are concerned with more narrowly defined aspects of 
skepticism or with the skepticism of clients or customers and that their concept of skepticism 
is not particularly useful in an auditing context.  
 Furthermore, other studies on consumer and news media skepticism do define 
skepticism as distrust (e.g., Forehand and Grier, 2003, p. 350) and a subjective feeling of 
mistrust (e.g., Tsfati and Cappella, 2003, p. 506; Tsfati, 2003). Personality researchers and 
social psychologists view mistrust/distrust and trust as opposite ends of a single continuum 
(cf., Lewicky et al., 1998, p. 440; Webb and Worchel, 1986, pp. 214-215). This view will be 
discussed more in Chapter 2 and 3 of this dissertation. 
 Another related, and more elaborate, body of literature is on critical thinking. The 
concept of critical thinking is particularly developed in the field of education (see e.g., 
Brookfield, 1987; Browne and Keeley, 2007; Facione et al., 1995; Facione et al., 2000). 
Brookfield (1987, pp. 7-9), for example, postulates four components of critical thinking: (1) 
identifying and challenging assumptions is central to critical thinking; (2) challenging the 
importance of context is crucial to critical thinking; (3) critical thinkers try to imagine and 
explore alternatives; and (4) imagining and exploring alternatives leads to reflective 
skepticism. In particular the fourth component appears to be of importance. Brookfield (1987, 
p. 9) notes: ‘[w]hen we realize that alternatives to supposedly fixed belief systems, habitual 
behaviors, and entrenched social structures always exist, we become skeptical of claims to 
universal truth or to ultimate explanations. In short, we exhibit what might be called reflective 
skepticism.’  
Hence, strictly speaking, according to theory on critical thinking, skepticism is only 
part of critical thinking. This view on critical thinking is also exhibited by the accounting 
literature on critical thinking (see e.g., Nelson et al., 2003; Baril et al., 1998). For example, 
Nelson et al. (2003, p. 216) conclude that  
 
‘[t]he accounting education literature is replete with references to ‘critical thinking’, 
including calls for the improvement of critical thinking skills in accounting students 
… and pedagogical techniques purported to improve those skills … many definitions 
of ‘critical thinking’ have been proffered … The definitions are generally quite broad, 
encompassing a wide range of competencies, including both cognitive and non-
cognitive skills, attributes, attitudes and behaviors. Common components of these 
various definitions include reasoned judgment, ability to identify and solve 
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unstructured problems, professional skepticism, ability to distinguish between facts 
and claims, lack of bias etc.’ 
 
Also here, skepticism is said to be a common component of critical thinking. 
 
1.4   Auditor professional skepticism 
The adjective ‘professional’ 
  Before further defining skepticism in the auditing context, first the adjective 
‘professional’ will be briefly considered. Professions are occupations enjoying a unique 
position in the labor force of industrial countries (Collins, 1979; Rothman, 1987). These 
occupations have been able to ‘establish exclusive jurisdiction over certain kinds of services 
and to negotiate freedom from external intervention and control over the conditions and 
content of their work’ (Freidson, 1977). The core characteristics of a profession are autonomy 
and monopoly (Rothman, 1987). Or as Freidson (1996) puts it: ‘professionalism is 
occupational control of work’. 
  Although an auditor is a member of the auditing profession, the profession itself 
cannot make judgments and decisions while conducting an audit. Auditing is a profession 
whose principal function rests largely on the judgments of trained experts (e.g., 
Abdolmohammadi and Wright, 1987). For example, SAS 1 states that due professional care 
requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism by using ‘the knowledge, skill, and 
ability called for by the profession of public accounting …’ (AU Section 230.07). Therefore, 
the adjective ‘professional’ in ‘professional skepticism’ refers to the fact that auditors have 
been, and are continuously being, educated to be professionals and that they should judge and 
decide according to professional standards.4  
 
Professional skepticism in the auditing standards 
Professional skepticism is an important term that appears throughout auditing 
standards. The detailed genesis of the concept of ‘professional skepticism’ in auditing 
standards is not determinable.5 It appears to have been first used in SAS No. 16 (1977, the 
predecessor standard to SAS No. 53), was reinforced by SAS 82 in 1997 (Cushing, 2000, p. 
                                                 
4
 Note that the auditing profession is the only profession with an explicit legal requirement for and codified 
emphasis on (professional) skepticism (Hurtt, 2003, p. 1).  
5
 The technical managers of the Audit and Attest Standards of the AICPA checked the archives but were unable 
to find information on this issue. However, discussion in the 1970s regarding the lack of auditor independence 
and the lack of auditors’ ability to prevent fraud have probably been one of the causes of introducing the 
professional skepticism terminology into auditing standards (cf., Carmichael, 1975). 
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1) and superseded by SAS 99 in 2002.6 The focus of all these standards is on considering 
fraud in a financial statement audit. As an alleged consequence of the US standards, IFAC 
introduced the concept of professional skepticism into ISA 240 at the start of this century. The 
apparent rationale behind the changes in the auditing pronouncements is the conjecture that 
the exercise of professional skepticism during the auditing process will improve the 
effectiveness of audits with respect to prevention and detection of fraudulent financial 
reporting (Cushing, 2000, p.1).  
According to the standards (IFAC, 2008), the auditor should obtain sufficient 
appropriate evidence about whether the subject matter information is free of material 
misstatement (Framework, Section 39). In doing so, the auditor should plan and perform an 
audit with an attitude of professional skepticism, recognizing that circumstances may exist 
that cause the financial statements to be materially misstated (ISA 200:15). More specifically: 
an attitude of professional skepticism means that the auditor makes a critical assessment, with 
a questioning mind, of the validity of evidence obtained and is alert to evidence that 
contradicts or brings into question the reliability of documents and responses to inquiries and 
other information obtained from management and those charged with governance (ISA 
200:16). When making inquiries and performing other audit procedures, the auditor is not 
satisfied with less-than-persuasive audit evidence based on a belief that management and 
those charged with governance are honest and have integrity. Accordingly, representations 
from management are not a substitute for obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence to be 
able to draw reasonable conclusions on which to base the auditor’s opinion (ISA 200:16).  
 ISA 240:24 states that an auditor should recognize the possibility that a material 
misstatement due to fraud could exist, notwithstanding the auditor’s past experience with the 
entity indicating the honesty and integrity of management and those charged with governance. 
ISA 240:23 stresses that due to the characteristics of fraud, the auditor’s attitude of 
professional skepticism is particularly important when considering the risks of material 
misstatement due to fraud. Furthermore, with respect to those charged with governance,7 
maintaining an attitude of professional skepticism means that the auditor carefully considers 
the reasonableness of responses to inquiries of those charged with governance, and other 
information obtained from them, in light of all other evidence obtained during the audit (ISA 
240:25). When evaluating management’s responses to inquiries, the auditor maintains an 
                                                 
6
 Analogously, the term ‘healthy skepticism’ appeared in a report by The Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities (1977). 
7
 Such as the board of directors and the audit committee. 
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attitude of professional skepticism recognizing that management is often in the best position 
to perpetrate fraud. Therefore, the auditor uses professional judgment in deciding when it is 
necessary to corroborate responses to inquiries with other information. When responses to 
inquiries are inconsistent, the auditor seeks to resolve the inconsistencies (ISA 240:42). 
 
Academic ‘definitions’ of professional skepticism 
There is no consensus in the academic literature on the definition and measurement of 
professional skepticism (e.g., Hurtt et al., 2003; Nelson, 2009).8 For example, as will be 
discussed in more depth in the remainder of this dissertation, the predominant focus of the 
academic literature on professional skepticism considers auditors’ skeptical disposition as the 
antithesis of trust (see e.g., Cushing, 2000; Choo and Tan, 2000; Payne and Ramsay, 2005, p. 
324; Shaub, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 1999). However, some 
studies describe trust as only one facet of an auditors’ skeptical disposition, along with other 
facets such as locus of control and need for closure (e.g., Hurtt, 1999; Hurtt et al., 2003; 2008; 
Rose, 2007).9  
Based on a review of the literature on professional skepticism, Nelson (2009, p. 9) 
defines professional skepticism as ‘indicated by auditor judgments and decisions that reflect a 
heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is incorrect, conditional on the 
information available to the auditor’. This definition refers to the concept of skepticism by its 
associated phenomena (i.e., judgments and decisions), but is actually not a definition of the 
concept of skepticism. This can be illustrated by an example. Assume that a person has an evil 
attitude. This attitude can be related to behavior of that person that is associated with an evil 
attitude (e.g., setting public schools on fire). However, that behavior is not the definition of an 
evil person, it is only exemplary behavior for an evil person. A definition of evil is 
‘profoundly immoral and malevolent’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, tenth edition, 1999). So an 
evil person is someone who is profoundly immoral and malevolent. 
Interestingly, Nelson (2009, p. 9) states that, under his definition of professional 
skepticism, an auditor with higher professional skepticism ‘needs relatively more convincing 
(in the form of a more persuasive set of evidence) before concluding that an assertion is 
correct’. Instead of judgments and decisions associated with professional skepticism this latter 
                                                 
8
 See e.g., Hurtt (2003), Hurtt et al. (2003a) and Nelson (2007) for a more detailed discussion on defining 
professional skepticism. 
9
 Furthermore, several authors argue that while trust and professional skepticism might be different constructs, 
they are potentially related (e.g., Popova, 2006; Kopp et al., 2003). 
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definition more directly identifies what it means to be a skeptical person: they have a higher 
need for evidence (cf., Quadackers, 2008).  
 
Direction of professional skepticism 
The literature and auditing standards are equivocal on whether professional skepticism 
entails a ‘neutral’ stance or mirrors ‘presumptive doubt’ (see e.g., Nelson, 2009). A neutral 
stance refers to the fact that the auditor assumes no bias in management’s representations ex 
ante (Nelson, 2009). For example, Cushing (2000, p. 2) states that skeptical auditors should 
attempt to be unbiased in forming their beliefs; there should be no bias in either a positive 
(‘trusting’) or negative (‘suspicion’) direction. Nelson (2009) argues that this is the basic idea 
underlying auditing standards.10 In contrast, presumptive doubt takes a different view as used 
by forensic experts (e.g., POB, 2000, p. 88; Bell et al., 2005). Bell et al. (2005) assert that an 
auditor assumes some level of dishonesty by management unless evidence indicates 
otherwise. This view is consistent with that of forensic auditors who generally assume 
dishonesty unless there is evidence to the contrary (POB, 2000, p. 76). The Panel on Audit 
Effectiveness recommends that auditors adapt the view used by forensic experts (POB, 2000, 
p. 88) and proposes a ‘forensic-type fieldwork’ phase of the audit. Similarly, McMillan and 
White (1993) state that professional skepticism entails ‘conservative bias’ and ‘conservative 
behavior’ in audit judgments, implying that skeptical auditors will focus on error-related 
evidence (cf., Smith and Kida, 1991).11 This presumptive doubt perspective is visible in the 
auditing standards concerning fraud (e.g., ISA 240), since those standards focus on the 
possibility of an intentional material misstatement due to fraud.  
In sum, there appear to be two directions of skepticism. However, according to Bell et 
al. (2005) there is a societal shift from the neutral stance perspective towards the presumptive 
doubt perspective of professional skepticism. They argue that this shift is caused by economic 
down turns and major business ‘improprieties’.  
 
A model of auditor’s professional skepticism 
Several models of auditor’s professional skepticism have been developed (e.g., Hurtt, 
1999; 2007; Hurtt et al., 2003; Shaub, 1996; Nelson; 2009). Nelson (2009) presents a model 
                                                 
10
 This viewpoint is explicitly expressed in the American SAS 1 (AU 230.07-09) since it states that an auditor 
neither assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty. This quote was also an 
explicit part of the ISA’s until 2005 (i.e. ISA 240), but has been removed, perhaps indicating a societal shift 
more towards the presumptive doubt perspective (Bell et al., 2005). However, it still is stated in IAPS 1005:18. 
11
 This definition is an analogue to the definition of Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) who defines a skeptic as a 
person being highly sensitive to negative evidence and disregards positive evidence. 
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based on a literature review of professional skepticism, including the models by Hurtt (1999; 
2007) and Shaub (1996). In general, the Nelson model identifies determinants of professional 
skepticism in audit performance. The focal point in the model is skeptical judgments and 
decisions.12 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Research model of the determinants of skeptical judgments and decisions. 
 
Nelson stipulates that skeptical judgments and decisions are directly determined by 
dispositional characteristics13, incentives, knowledge and indirectly by audit experience and 
training (via knowledge).14 Based on the Nelson model, the research model that will be 
                                                 
12
 Nelson differentiates between skeptical judgment and skeptical action, since skepticism must reach some 
threshold before action is taken (e.g., Shaub, 1996). Although the relationship between skeptical judgments and 
actions is very important, it is not the focal point of this dissertation. For reasons of brevity, skeptical judgments 
and actions are combined into one node of the model. Furthermore, the term ‘decisions’ is used rather than 
‘actions’ since it better reflects the previous auditing literature on judgment and decision-making (see e.g., 
Bonner, 2008). 
13
 Nelson (2009) refers to traits rather than dispositional characteristics. However, the term dispositional 
characteristics will be used to avoid confusion as a result of terminology. 
14
 Nelson (2009) also considers evidential input and outcome in his model. The evidential input includes any 
information collected and considered during the course of the audit (Nelson, 2009, p. 10) and is an important 
input to the judgment and decision making process. Since evidential outcomes as a result of skeptical judgments 
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Interpersonal trust
Need for closure
Locus of control
Professional skepticism
Client Risk
Control environment 
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Skeptical Judgments & Decisions
Likelihood that management explanation is right
Likelihood of fraud
Number of alternative explanations
Number of error explanations
Weight of error explanations
Number of budgeted hours
Task Specific Experience
(control variable)
1
2
3
4
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examined in this dissertation is depicted in Figure 1.1. The specific interpretation of the 
variables in the model and links studied in this dissertation are discussed next. 
 
The relationship between skeptical characteristics and skeptical judgments and decisions 
(link 1) 
Prior research in psychology has found that dispositional characteristics influence 
judgments and decisions (cf., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; 2005; Ajzen, 2005, pp 34-37). A 
disposition is defined as ‘a person’s inherent qualities of mind and character; an inclination or 
tendency’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, tenth edition, 1999). In the research model, 
dispositional skeptical characteristics are studied as an input to skeptical judgments and 
decisions.  
Professional skepticism requires auditors to evaluate the reliability of management 
assertions and to develop an audit program (Shaub and Lawrence, 1999, p. 62). According to 
the research model it is posited that this will be dependent upon an auditor’s skeptical 
characteristics. Prior empirical auditing literature provides some evidence of a main effect of 
auditors’ skeptical disposition on skeptical behaviors (e.g., Hurtt et al., 2008; Shaub, 1996).15 
In this dissertation, three widely recognized skeptical characteristics will be studied: (1) 
interpersonal trust (and factor analyzed interpersonal trust factors); (2) suspension of 
judgment16; and (3) locus of control. Furthermore, the strength of association between 
skeptical disposition and skeptical judgments and decisions is compared for a comprehensive 
professional auditor skepticism scale developed by Hurtt (1999; 2007) and the three 
constructs.  
 
The relationship between client risk and skeptical judgments and decisions (links 2 and 3) 
  Although judgments and decisions are expected to be related to dispositional 
characteristics (see e.g., Rotter, 1971), judgments and decisions are also related to situational 
characteristics, such as decision setting (see e.g., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; 2005; Ajzen, 
2005; Kee and Knox, 1970; Rotter, 1980; Webb and Worchel, 1986, p. 228). Accordingly, it 
is likely that skeptical judgments and decisions are situation and person specific 
(Bhattacharya et al., 1998, p. 461). 
                                                                                                                                                        
and decisions are new evidential input via an auditor’s experience and knowledge, the model is recursive. For 
simplicity, the evidential input and outcome are not explicitly considered in this dissertation. 
15
 For detailed reviews of research on professional skepticism please consult Hurtt (1999), Hurtt et al. (2003) and 
Nelson (2009). Subsequent chapters will provide a review of studies most relevant to the dissertation. 
16
 As will be discussed in Chapter 2, suspension of judgment is measured as the reverse of need for closure. 
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An auditor experiences numerous incentives which may increase (e.g., potential 
litigation) or decrease (e.g., client pressure) professional skepticism (see Nelson, 2009, for an 
overview). One of the important incentives is client risk, which is expected to increase 
skeptical judgments and decisions (see e.g., Johnstone et al., 2001; 2002; Nelson, 2009). 
Client risk is a client characteristic that increases the risk of a material misstatement. In this 
dissertation, a particular client risk, the strength of a client’s control environment, will be 
studied as an incentive for auditor skepticism. 
In addition, previous auditing studies suggest that an interactive effect exists between 
risk and skeptical characteristics in explaining judgments and decisions (see e.g., Popova, 
2006; Hurtt et al, 2008). The rationale for the interaction is that the relationship between 
skeptical characteristics and skeptical judgments and decisions might be dependent on the 
situation. However, there is not a strong theory to guide the nature of the potential interaction. 
ISA 240.63 states that engagements with a higher risk of material misstatement due to fraud 
should be audited with increased professional skepticism (IFAC, 2008). This directive may 
result in auditors exhibiting skeptical judgments and decisions in a high risk situation 
regardless of skeptical disposition. Skeptical judgments and decisions may then differ 
according to skeptical characteristics only in a low risk setting. Alternatively, auditors may 
show similar levels of low skeptical judgments and decisions in the low risk setting 
(regardless of skeptical disposition), since they may judge the situation as having little 
exposure for users and the auditing firm. However, then skeptical judgments and decisions 
might be dependent on skeptical characteristics in high risk settings with auditors exercising a 
high level of skepticism particularly attuned to the situation and thereby taking highly 
cautious actions. To extend the literature, this dissertation also examines the existence and 
nature of the interaction between skeptical characteristics and client risk. 
 
The relationship between task specific experience and skeptical judgments and decisions (link 
4) 
Skeptical auditors must understand the directional implications of evidence of client 
risk and should be able to apply their knowledge of evidential patterns and error/non-error 
frequencies to determine whether a given set of evidence suggests heightened risk (see e.g., 
Nelson, 2009, p. 12). Nelson (2009) follows the Libby and Luft (1993) model by viewing an 
auditor’s knowledge as being a result of traits (i.e., dispositional characteristics) and prior 
experience (including training). See, for example, Bonner (2008) for a review of the literature. 
Prior task specific experience is often used as a proxy for knowledge since knowledge is not 
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directly observable (see e.g., Tan, 2001; Barrick and Spilker, 2003). Therefore, task specific 
experience will be used as a control variable in this dissertation.  
 
1.5  An abstract of the two studies 
  In this section an abstract of the two empirical studies in the dissertation is provided. 
 
Study 1: Auditors’ skeptical characteristics and their relationship to skeptical 
judgments and decisions 
  The purpose of the first, exploratory study is to examine how auditors’ skeptical 
characteristics are related to auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions.17 Despite the 
importance of auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions, there is a lack of consensus and 
empirical data on the nature of an auditor’s skeptical characteristics, how they are measured 
and the extent to which skeptical characteristics map with auditors’ skeptical judgments and 
decisions. Gaining insight on this issue is important as a basis for auditor recruitment and 
training, guidance in audit tools, and future research.  
  Three widely recognized constructs from the psychology and auditing literatures are 
compared: (1) interpersonal trust; (2) suspension of judgment; and (3) locus of control. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive professional skepticism scale developed for the field of 
auditing is compared with the three constructs. Finally, to extend prior research and gain 
knowledge on how the relationship between auditors’ skeptical characteristics and skeptical 
judgments and decisions is dependent on control environment strength, this study examines 
the existence and nature of the interaction effect of this important client risk. Hence the first 
study examines link numbers 1, 2 and 3 of the model in Figure 1.1. 
  An experimental study is conducted to address these issues involving a sample of 376 
auditors from offices of the Big Four auditing firms in The Netherlands with experience 
ranging from staff to partner. The results show that the strength of the effects on skeptical 
judgments and decisions is different across skeptical characteristics. Overall, interpersonal 
trust displays the highest significance in predicting skeptical judgments and decisions.  
  
 
 
                                                 
17
 This study is also presented in a working paper by Quadackers et al. (2009), but will be referred to in this 
dissertation as ‘Chapter 2’. 
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Study 2: The relationship between auditors’ interpersonal trust factors and skeptical 
judgments and decisions 
  Prior research has primarily viewed professional skepticism as being the antithesis of 
trust. Further, the findings of the first study indicate that this measure is most closely 
associated with skeptical judgments and decisions among the four measures examined. 
Therefore, using a subset of the dataset used in the first study, the purpose of the second study 
is to examine Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967) in more depth by exploring the 
association between individual interpersonal trust factors and skeptical judgments and 
decisions.18 Hence, this study also examines links 1, 2 and 3 of the model in Figure 1.1. 
However, it should be noted that the interpersonal trust variable is factor analyzed and for the 
resulting factors links 1 and 3 are also subsequently studied. As additional analyses, this study 
also looks at the relationship between auditor rank and interpersonal trust and skeptical 
judgments and decisions. 
  The sample includes 291 auditors from offices of three of the Big Four auditing firms in 
The Netherlands, with experience ranging from staff to partner. The results suggest that the 
general construct measuring interpersonal trust across a set of social objects and situations 
appears to be a better predictor of skeptical judgments and decisions than the individual 
factors comprising it. 
  Furthermore, additional analyses show that rank is positively associated with both 
skeptical judgments and decisions (also across control environment strength settings) and 
interpersonal trust. Apparently organizational rank appears to compensate for higher 
interpersonal trust levels. Auditors at higher ranks, thus, learn to adopt conservative evidence 
gathering approaches to deal with enhanced risk. 
 
1.6 Organization of the dissertation 
 The remainder of the dissertation contains three chapters. In Chapter 2 the first study 
is described, while the second study is described in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 the two studies 
will be summarized and synthesized along with a discussion of the implications of the 
findings for future research and audit practice. The limitations of the research are also 
identified.  
                                                 
18
 This study is also presented in a working paper by Quadackers (2009), but will be referred to in this 
dissertation as ‘Chapter 3’. 
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Chapter 2 Auditors’ skeptical characteristics and their relationship to skeptical  
judgments and decisions19 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this exploratory study is to examine how auditors’ skeptical 
characteristics are related to skeptical judgments and decisions and to assess what skeptical 
characteristic is most significantly related to auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions. 
Despite the importance of auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions, there is a lack of 
consensus and empirical data on what an auditor’s skeptical characteristics are, how they are 
measured and the extent to which skeptical characteristics map with auditors’ skeptical 
judgments and decisions in specific settings. As will be discussed more fully, gaining insight 
on this issue has important implications for auditor recruitment and training, guidance to 
provide in audit tools, and future research.  
Three widely recognized skeptical characteristics from the psychology and auditing 
literatures are compared: (1) interpersonal trust; (2) suspension of judgment; and (3) locus of 
control. Furthermore, a comprehensive professional skepticism scale developed for the field 
of auditing is also compared with the three constructs. Finally, to examine the effect of client 
risks, the influence of control environment strength on the relationship between skeptical 
characteristics and auditors’ judgments and decisions is studied.  
An experimental study is conducted to address these issues involving a sample of 376 
auditors from offices of the Big Four auditing firms in The Netherlands with experience 
ranging from staff to partner. The results show that the strength of the relationship between 
the alternative skeptical characteristics and skeptical judgments and decisions varies 
significantly. Overall, interpersonal trust displays the highest significance in predicting 
skeptical judgments and decisions.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Professional skepticism is considered to be an essential ingredient of the financial 
statement audit, as reflected in professional auditing standards (e.g., IFAC, 2008) and the 
                                                 
19
 We are indebted to the Big Four auditing firms that participated in this study. Furthermore, we are grateful for 
the comments received at the ARNN Accounting Symposium 2007 in Leuven, the EAA Annual Congress 2008 
in Rotterdam and the International Symposium on Audit Research 2008 in Pasadena. In particular we would like 
to thank the discussants Joël Branson (ARNN) and Peter Moizer (EAA). In addition we would like to thank the 
participants at the research seminars at Bentley College, Northeastern University and the Universiteit Maastricht. 
We would like to thank all people who have helped in developing the research materials, coding and analyzing 
the results. 
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audit methodologies of international audit firms.20 Furthermore, the academic and 
professional auditing literatures emphasize the importance of the use of professional 
skepticism (see e.g., Hurtt et al., 2003a, p.2; Kadous, 2000; Nelson, 2009). In addition, 
analyses of fraud related SEC cases conclude that a lack of sufficient professional skepticism 
is often the reason auditors fail to detect material misstatements (e.g., Beasley et al., 2001; 
Public Oversight Board, 2000; Benston and Hartgraves, 2002, p. 122). Hence, studying 
professional skepticism is important.  
Dispositional skeptical characteristics of auditors may be predictive of auditors’ 
skeptical judgments and decisions (e.g., Nelson, 2009; cf., Ajzen, 2005).21 For example, if an 
auditor in general has a suspicious nature, this may lead to more skeptical judgments and 
decisions in specific situations (e.g., Shaub, 1996). This study looks at whether auditors differ 
in their skeptical characteristics, and how such characteristics are related to skeptical 
judgments and decisions. Auditor skepticism is studied based on the relationships between 
four skeptical characteristics, a situational factor (control environment strength) and auditors’ 
skeptical planning judgments and decisions in an analytical procedures task.22 Knowing what 
characteristics are related to skeptical judgments and decisions provides important insights. 
This work can lead to a definition of the key attributes of skepticism for incorporation in audit 
manuals and training. To enhance skepticism, audit firms may consider other actions such as 
stressing the importance of professional skepticism traits when hiring new auditors and when 
marketing the audit profession in ‘the hopes of discouraging’ people with low professional 
skepticism traits from applying (Nelson, 2009). Firms may also administer personality tests to 
their personnel in order to assess the skepticism characteristics (e.g., Nelson, 2009). 
Furthermore, knowing auditors’ scores on key attributes of skepticism may be used to balance 
skepticism within audit teams. 
Moreover, the insights gained from this study will also help in focusing future auditing 
research, since it provides evidence on what skeptical characteristics are most closely related 
to skeptical judgments and decisions. 
                                                 
20
 The detailed genesis of the concept of ‘professional skepticism’ in the auditing standards is not determinable. 
The technical managers of the Audit and Attest Standards of the AICPA checked the archives but were unable to 
find information on this issue. However, it appears to have been first used in SAS No. 16 (1977, the predecessor 
standard to SAS No. 53). 
21
 A disposition is defined as ‘a person’s inherent qualities of mind and character; an inclination or tendency’ 
(Concise Oxford Dictionary, tenth edition, 1999). 
22
 For reasons of brevity, the comprehensive professional scepticism scale studied is also referred to as a 
‘characteristic’ although it actually is a combination of several characteristics. 
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Three hundred and seventy-six auditors participated in an experiment in which they 
considered an analytical procedures task and completed questions on how they would respond 
in terms of risk and audit planning. In addition, they completed instruments measuring 
skeptical characteristics. 
In total, four skeptical characteristics are studied: (1) interpersonal trust (as measured 
by the Interpersonal Trust Scale, Rotter, 1967); (2) suspension of judgment (as measured by 
the reverse of the Need for Closure Scale, Webster and Kruglanski, 1994); (3) locus of control 
(as measured by the Locus of Control Scale, Rotter, 1966); and (4) a comprehensive 
professional skepticism scale (i.e., the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale, Hurtt, 2007). 
These scales are widely recognized and cited in the decision science and/or auditing 
literatures and will be described in depth in the next section. 
The findings show that interpersonal trust has the highest significance in predicting 
skeptical judgments and decisions. Furthermore, there appear to be significant interaction 
effects of the client control environment on the relationships between skeptical characteristics 
and skeptical planning judgments and decisions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the theory, 
literature and hypotheses are described. The research method will be discussed in Section 2.3 
and the results are presented in Section 2.4. The final section provides a discussion of the 
findings and their implications for future research.  
 
2.2 Theory, literature and hypotheses 
 
Auditors’ skeptical characteristics 
  There is no universally accepted definition of professional skepticism (see e.g., Hurtt, 
2007; Nelson, 2009; Doucet and Doucet, 1996). Considering various skeptical characteristics 
enables a careful identification of factors that engender skeptical judgments and decisions. 
This study examines four skeptical characteristics which are of particular importance for 
auditors. These characteristics are discussed next along with the associated findings of prior 
empirical auditing studies. 
 
Interpersonal trust 
  Prior auditing research has predominantly considered auditors’ skeptical disposition as 
the antithesis of trust (see e.g., Cushing, 2000; Choo and Tan, 2000; Payne and Ramsay, 
2005, p. 324; Shaub, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 1999). 
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However, some studies describe trust as only one facet of an auditors’ skeptical disposition 
(e.g., Hurtt, 1999; Hurtt et al., 2003a; 2008; Rose, 2007).23  
  Interpersonal trust can be defined as ‘a generalized expectancy held by an individual 
or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individual or group 
can be relied upon’ (Rotter, 1967, p. 651; Rotter, 1980, p. 1). The basic thought is that if an 
auditor has a lower level of interpersonal trust he is assumed to be more skeptical (e.g., 
Shaub, 1996; Hurtt, 2007). To measure trust, Shaub (1996) used the trustworthiness and 
independence parts of the Wrightsman Philosophies of Human Nature scale (Wrightsman, 
1964, 1974). Furthermore Shaub (1996) used a self-developed Client Trust scale. Rose (2007) 
also used the trustworthiness part of the Wrightsman Philosophies of Human Nature scale 
(Wrightsman, 1964, 1974). Choo and Tan (2000) used a modified version of the Rempel et al. 
Trust Scale (1985), originally measuring trust in the relationship with a person’s life partner. 
To a limited extent these scales showed significant main and/or interaction effects in 
explaining skeptical judgments and decisions. The trustworthiness and independence parts of 
the Wrightsman Philosophies of Human Nature Scale do not significantly relate to the auditor 
decision to trust a client in the Shaub (1996) study. However, the trustworthiness part of the 
Wrightsman Philosophies of Human Nature scale (Wrightsman, 1964, 1974) is significantly 
related to skeptical judgments in the Rose (2007) study. More particularly, less trusting 
auditors pay more attention to evidence of aggressive reporting and increase the belief that 
intentional misstatement has occurred. Hence, the results of using the Wrightsman subscale 
are inconclusive. Furthermore, Shaub’s Client Trust Scale only shows significant results in 
two of the 18 regressions tested. In those two instances there was an incentive present to 
overstate sales. The Rempel et al. Trust Scale showed some significant results: class room 
instruction interacted with skeptical attitude (as measured by the trust scale) in affecting the 
ability to detect frauds. Overall, none of the scales yield strong results. 
  Importantly, this study extends prior auditing research by using the Rotter 
Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967) which has not been considered previously, despite the fact 
that this scale is widely accepted in other fields (see e.g., Hoell, 2004; Johnson-George and 
Swap, 1982; Stack, 1978; Webb and Worchel, 1986). The Interpersonal Trust Scale covers a 
wider range of situations, involving a number of different social agents including parents, 
salespeople, the judiciary, people in general, political figures, as well as news media. In non-
auditing studies Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale has been associated more strongly with 
                                                 
23
 Furthermore, several authors argue that while trust and professional skepticism might be different constructs, 
they are potentially related (e.g., Popova, 2006; Kopp et al., 2003). 
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actual behaviors than other interpersonal trust scales, such as the trustworthiness part of 
Wrightsman’s Philosophies of Human Nature Scale (Stack, 1978, p. 569; Rotter, 1980, p.2).  
 
Suspension of judgment and need for closure 
Suspension of judgment is noted by many as one of the main characteristics of 
skeptics (e.g., Bunge, 1991; Kurtz, 1992; Hurtt et al., 2003a). Suspension of judgment is 
assumed to be negatively correlated with need for cognitive closure, as will be explained later. 
Kurtz states that ‘suspension of judgments ... is a necessary ingredient of skeptical inquiry’ 
(1992, p. 41). According to Bunge (1991, p. 131) ‘[s]keptics do not accept naively the first 
things they perceive or think; they are not gullible. Nor are they neophobic. They are just 
critical; they want to see evidence before believing.’ Skeptics particularly suspend judgment 
concerning whatever has not been checked (Bunge, 1991, p. 132). Skeptics keep on gathering 
evidence until no reasonable person would doubt the claim stated (Kurtz, 1992, p. 132). 
Consistent with this approach, auditing standards (IFAC, 2008) state that the auditor 
should gather sufficient and competent audit evidence to the point that reasonable conclusions 
can be drawn on which to base the audit opinion (ISA 200.16). In, particular, when there is a 
risk of material misstatement due to fraud, the auditor’s professional skepticism can be 
affected in two ways (ISA 240.64). First, it may increase the auditor’s assessment of the risk 
of material misstatement and sensitivity in the selection of the nature and extent of 
documentation. Second, it may increase the auditor’s recognition of the need to corroborate 
management explanations or representations concerning material matters. This action leads to 
a suspension of judgment. 
The construct used in this study to measure suspension of judgment is need for 
cognitive closure. Need for cognitive closure is one of the important dispositional constructs 
affecting the knowledge acquisition process (e.g., Kruglanski and Ajzen, 1983). If a person 
has a higher need for closure then it might hinder that person’s hypothesis-generation process 
because conflicting hypotheses would threaten an existing or ‘inherited’ conclusion (Bailey et 
al., 2006). Research evidence suggests that the need for quickly reaching a decision leads to 
the tendency to seek cognitive closure and to refrain from critical probing of a given 
seemingly adequate solution to a problem (Kruglanski and Freund, 1983, p. 450). 
The Need for Cognitive Closure Scale measures the desire for an answer on a given 
topic, any answer, as compared to confusion and ambiguity (see e.g., Kruglanski, 1990, p. 
337; Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). The proposition is that a skeptical person will suspend 
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judgment until he or she knows more about an ambiguous situation (i.e., there is no need for 
an immediate answer) and hence will have a lower score on this scale. 
Thus an auditor with a higher need for closure is expected to be less willing to suspend 
judgment when confronted with a management explanation (i.e., he will be more eager to 
accept the explanation) and hence will behave less skeptically. Improper consideration of 
initial hypotheses may cause problems by affecting auditors’ subsequent evidence evaluation 
and judgment (see e.g., Bailey et al., 2006). 
The only auditing study to examine the need for closure was conducted by Bailey et 
al. (2006). They report that the need for closure is significantly less for auditors at higher 
ranks than at lower ranks. Furthermore, a series of experiments show that need for closure 
affects judgment and decision making in professional settings. For example, auditors with a 
higher need for cognitive closure spend less time on tasks. This study extends existing 
research by integrating the need for closure measure and by relating it to a more elaborate set 
of auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions. 
 
Locus of control 
An external locus of control indicates a pervasive belief that outcomes cannot be 
influenced by one’s personal efforts, while an internal locus of control implies the belief that 
outcomes are contingent upon personal actions (Lefcourt, 1991, p. 414). Persons with a more 
external locus of control are referred to as ‘externals’ and persons with a more internal locus 
of control are referred to as ‘internals’.  
The importance of locus of control has been widely recognized (Phares, 1978, p. 276). 
Previous research shows that externals can be persuaded more easily and are more confirming 
and accepting of information from others than internals (see e.g., Phares, 1978 for an 
overview). Internals are associated with a more active pursuit of valued goals, information 
seeking (e.g., they have better learning skills in identifying and searching for task relevant 
cues) and autonomous decision making, and are better able to cope with stress (e.g., Lefcourt, 
1991, p. 414; Phares, 1978). Internals generally appear to be more competent and personally 
effective than externals (e.g., Phares, 1978, p. 278) and they approach situations with a more 
directive and alert posture than externals (Phares, 1978, p. 276). Although acceptance by an 
internal of the control of another does happen, it will most certainly be thoughtful and analytic 
rather than blind and unthinking (Phares, 1978, p. 279).  
The characteristics of internals mentioned above appear to be highly relevant for 
auditors’ professional skepticism. For example, in terms of accepting management assertions, 
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internals are likely to be more critical than externals, which is considered to be important by 
auditing standards and an aspect of professional skepticism (e.g., ISA 240, par. 42, IFAC, 
2008). Hurtt (2007) used locus of control facets in developing a comprehensive professional 
skepticism scale. 
Furthermore, in auditing surveys, several potential reasons for practicing a low level 
of professional skepticism in auditing have been identified. Pasewark et al. (1992) find that 
auditors may not take skeptical action because of intimidation or concerns about clients’ 
reactions. In addition, Behn et al. (1997) found a negative relationship between professional 
skepticism and client satisfaction (i.e., the more skeptical the auditor was, the unhappier the 
client became). This is also noted by Nelson (2009). These situations may result in pleasing 
the client but at the same time reducing skepticism. Therefore, skeptical judgments and 
decisions in such situations may benefit from auditors with an internal locus of control. 
The locus of control construct has not been extensively used in prior research on 
auditor skepticism. However, some studies are of importance. Bernardi (1994) examines the 
link between locus of control and auditor’s fraud detection. The detection rate for fraud was 
not significantly higher for internal locus of control auditors than externals. However, high-
moral-development, internal-locus-of control managers are more sensitive to information 
concerning client integrity and competence and have higher detection rates than low-moral-
development, external locus-of-control managers. Tsui and Gul (1996) find a main effect of 
locus of control on auditor’s judgments and decisions in an audit conflict situation. Externals 
were more likely to ignore unrecorded liabilities as wanted by management. Donnelly et al. 
(2003) find that externals are more accepting of dysfunctional audit behavior (e.g., premature 
sign-off, gathering of insufficient evidence). This study extends existing research by including 
Rotter’s Locus of Control scale (1966) in explaining a more refined set of skeptical judgments 
and decisions. 
 
A comprehensive professional skepticism scale 
The need for development of a specific professional skepticism scale for auditing has 
been stressed by several authors (e.g., Choo and Tan, 2000; Hurtt, 2007). Hurtt (2007) 
developed such an instrument, deriving three sets of skeptical characteristics from 
philosophical literature, auditing standards and existing literature on skepticism in auditing: 
(1) examination of evidence; (2) understanding evidence-providers; and (3) acting on the 
evidence. These three sets together determine an individual’s overall level of professional 
skepticism. 
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The characteristics related to the examination of evidence consist of ‘a questioning 
mind’, ‘suspension of judgment’ and ‘search for knowledge’. A questioning mind is 
demonstrated by a requirement for reasons, evidence, justification or proof. Suspension of 
judgment is a characteristic indicating that a skeptic is slow to form judgments, requiring 
deliberation and additional supporting information to reach that judgment. Search for 
knowledge is equated with curiosity.  
The characteristics related to understanding evidence-providers consist of 
‘interpersonal understanding’ of the motivation and integrity of evidence-providers.  
The characteristics to act on the evidence comprise ‘self confidence’ and ‘self-
determination’. Self confidence means the professional courage to act on the evidence that has 
been obtained. Self-determination is the individual’s conclusions regarding the sufficiency of 
evidential matter. 
These three sets of characteristics determine the individual’s overall level of 
professional skepticism, which in turn is posited to drive skeptical behavior (Hurtt et al., 
2003a). There is some empirical evidence that the scores on the Hurtt Professional Skepticism 
Scale are related to skeptical behavior (Hurtt et al., 2008; Popova, 2006; Fullerton and 
Durtschi, 2004). Hurtt et al. (2008) find that scores on this scale are significantly related to 
contradictions detected in the working papers and that auditors with higher levels of 
professional skepticism generate a moderately higher number of alternatives. However, these 
auditors detect fewer mechanical errors. Popova (2006) studied the relationship between the 
scores on the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale and the generation of initial hypotheses 
regarding potential misstatements. The findings show that more skeptical auditors judge fraud 
evidence to be of greater relevance in generating initial hypotheses. Fullerton and Durtschi 
(2004) find that internal auditors with a higher score on the Hurtt Professional Skepticism 
Scale require greater evidence search in the presence of fraud symptoms. Fraud training 
appears to somewhat reduce the differences between high and low skeptical auditors, 
indicating that professional skepticism can be influenced by training. To corroborate and 
extend prior research, we examine whether the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale improves 
upon the individual measures examined in explaining auditors’ skeptical judgments and 
decisions. 
 
Hypothesis concerning the four skeptical characteristics 
  Prior research in psychology has found that dispositional characteristics influence 
judgments and decisions (cf., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; 2005; Ajzen, 2005, pp 34-37). In the 
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setting of professional skepticism, Hurtt et al. (2003a; 2008) theorize that an auditor’s 
skeptical characteristics (such as a questioning mind) drive skeptical judgments and decisions. 
Hence, theory implies that auditors with a more skeptical disposition exhibit more skeptical 
judgments and decisions (e.g., suspend judgment and engage in more substantive testing) than 
auditors with a less skeptical disposition. Furthermore, the empirical studies concerning the 
four characteristics, as described above, suggest that more skeptical characteristics lead to 
more skeptical judgments and decisions. This discussion leads to our first hypothesis. 
 
H1: Skeptical characteristics are positively associated with auditors’ skeptical judgments and 
decisions. 
 
The influence of situational factors: client risk 
  Although skeptical judgments and decisions are hypothesized to be related to skeptical 
characteristics, judgments and decisions are also expected to be related to situational 
characteristics (see e.g., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; 2005; Ajzen, 2005; Kee and Knox, 1970; 
Bhattacharya et al., 1998, p. 461). In particular, greater auditor skeptical judgments and 
decisions appear necessary in high risk situations. This is important because such situations 
expose the individual auditor and the firm to increased reputation and other risks (e.g., 
litigation). Therefore, for instance, professional standards dictate that engagements with a 
higher risk of material misstatement due to fraud should be audited with increased 
professional skepticism (IFAC, 2008, ISA 240.63). Furthermore, clients’ explanations of 
unexpected fluctuations should be corroborated by the auditor more fully if the risk related to 
the areas of explanation is high (cf., Hirst and Koonce, 1996, p. 473).  
One of the most pervasive client risks is the client’s control environment (e.g., 
Haskins, 1987; Bernardi, 1994). Financial reporting problems of companies have been found 
to be more pervasive when there is a weak control environment (see e.g., COSO, 1992). 
Cohen and Hanno (2000) report that audit planning judgments are responsive to the control 
environment. Hence, the second hypothesis is stated as follows. 
 
H2: Auditors will show more skeptical judgments and decisions when the control 
environment is weak than when it is strong. 
 
  There is not a strong theory to guide the nature of the potential interaction effect 
between skeptical disposition, skeptical judgments and decisions, and client risk. ISA 240.63 
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states that engagements with a higher risk of material misstatement due to fraud should be 
audited with increased professional skepticism (IFAC, 2008). This directive may result in 
auditors exhibiting skeptical judgments and decisions in a high risk situation regardless of 
their skeptical disposition. Skeptical judgments and decisions may then differ according to 
skeptical characteristics only in the low risk setting.  
  Alternatively, auditors may show similar levels of low skeptical judgments and 
decisions in the low risk setting (regardless of their skeptical disposition), since they may 
judge the situation as having little exposure to users and the firm. However, then skeptical 
judgments and decisions might be dependent on skeptical characteristics in high risk settings 
with auditors having a high skeptical position particularly attuned to the situation and thereby 
taking highly cautious actions. 
Previous auditing studies suggest that an interaction effect exists between risk and 
skeptical characteristics in explaining judgments and decisions (see e.g., Hurtt et al, 2008; 
Popova, 2006). Hurtt et al. (2008) found evidence that auditors with higher scores on the 
Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale show mixed evidence for a greater increase in skeptical 
behaviors when confronted with a skepticism-inducing situation (i.e., a new client). Popova 
(2006) generally found that the auditors who are less skeptical in terms of the Hurtt scale are 
guided more by risk (i.e., questionable transactions in the past) when they assess initial 
hypothesis regarding possible misstatements. These findings imply that the relationship 
between skeptical characteristics and skeptical judgments and decisions are dependent upon 
risk setting.  
To gain further knowledge on how the relationship between auditors’ skeptical 
characteristics and skeptical judgments and decisions is dependent on control environment 
strength, this study examines the existence and nature of the interaction effect of client risk. 
Given the lack of strong theory, this issue is addressed as a research question. 
 
RQ1: Is the relationship between auditors’ skeptical characteristics and skeptical judgments 
and decisions dependent on control environment strength? And if so, what is the 
nature of this relationship? 
 
2.3 Method 
Research setting 
The study utilizes an experimental case, adapted from Peecher (1996), which is 
embedded in a planning stage analytical procedures setting. This setting is chosen because 
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analytical procedures affect audit risk assessments and consequentially the audit work 
conducted which can have important ramifications on audit efficiency and effectiveness (see 
e.g., Cohen and Kida, 1989; Hirst and Koonce, 1996, p. 461, 464; Peecher, 1996, p. 125-126; 
Koonce et al., 1995, p. 369). Furthermore, analytical procedures have been identified as an 
effective means of detecting errors (see e.g., Wright and Ashton, 1989) and financial reporting 
frauds (cf., Erickson et al., 2000).  
 
Strong control environment: 
The management of MAEdic can be described as being conservative in business practices and makes decisions 
only after considering all risks and possibilities. If necessary, external consultants are asked for advice in making 
important decisions. Top management and lower management meet on a regular basis, formally as well as 
informally. The IT department consists of experienced people. The information system is viewed as the 
instrument to control business activities. Management wants the financial reports to be accurate and reliable and 
avoids focusing on reporting short term results. Apart from occasional disputes between management and the 
external auditor, in general they cooperate harmoniously in order to come to adequate financial reporting. There 
is a strict policy for following all established internal control-procedures. Top-management emphasizes several 
performance measures in evaluating the employees. In addition to short term measures from the financial 
information system, there is elaborate attention for long term developments and qualitative factors. Ethics and 
integrity are criteria in performance assessment. Directors receive a fixed salary with a bonus of about 20% of 
the fixed salary depending on achieving specified personal or activity-targets. Because compensation is only 
indirectly based on profitability, management has little drive to manipulate short term results. 
 
Weak control environment: 
The management of MAEdic can be described as being aggressive in business practices and emphasizes speed 
and efficiency when implementing decisions. Management rarely hires external consultants because they are of 
the opinion that consultants are expensive and often follow a too conservative approach. Top management and 
lower management meet during monthly production-meetings. Management views the IT department as a 
necessary evil and considers the accountants and bookkeepers who work there to be bean counters. Because 
management has a clear preference for reporting methods that enable earnings management, management has 
frequent disputes with the external auditor. Although there are a large number of internal control procedures in 
place, they are sometimes less strictly applied if the progress of the work is suffering from them. Top-
management mainly focuses on achieving short-term accounting-based performance measures when determining 
compensation and making promotion decisions. Productivity is the most important criterion in performance 
assessment. Directors receive a small base-salary and a bonus that is based on the profitability of the department 
in question. Management is convinced that this compensation system encourages healthy competition and 
personal initiatives. 
Exhibit 2.1 Scenarios related to strong versus weak control environment 
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The case contains an unexpected material increase in gross margin. Since the audit 
client is the most common source of explanations concerning unexpected fluctuations while 
conducting analytical procedures (see e.g., Hirst and Koonce, 1996, p. 463; Trompeter and 
Wright, 2007), a client explanation is provided. The CFO gives a non-error explanation 
stating that the increase in gross margin is caused by a change in the sales-mix. In view of the 
fact that management may lack independence, auditors should evaluate client explanations 
with professional skepticism (cf., Bedard and Biggs, 1991, pp. 77-79; Glover et al., 2000, p. 
29; ISA 240, par. 42). In the experiment, strength of the control environment was manipulated 
as strong or weak by using two vignettes based on Cohen and Hanno (2000). The 
manipulation of the control environment is shown in Exhibit 2.1. 
 
Research variables 
Dependent variables 
Given the broad range of actions an auditor may take to resolve a contentious matter, 
based on prior research, six proxies for auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions are used 
as dependent variables. They are discussed below. 
  An auditor should reflect on the information that is provided by a client. Particularly 
for a skeptical auditor it is common to ponder over the incentives a client might have in 
furnishing information (e.g., Hurtt et al. 2003a). Auditors concerned about management 
veracity are assumed to show more skeptical judgments and decisions. The variables studied 
to address this matter are the likelihood that management’s explanation (i.e., a change in sales 
mix) accounts for substantially all of the increase in gross margin (>85%) (represented by the 
likelihood attached to the CFO’s explanation in Task 1 of the case) as well as the likelihood of 
fraud (which is requested in the second part of the questionnaire) (cf., Peecher, 1996; Shaub, 
1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 1996; Payne and Ramsay, 2005; Choo and Tan, 2000; Knapp and 
Knapp, 2001). 
 Furthermore, skeptical auditors are expected to build explanations, hypotheses, or 
scenarios that can function as alternative interpretations for the information that they examine 
(e.g., Hurtt et al. 2003a). Auditors are assumed to exhibit more skeptical judgments and 
decisions when they: (1) are able to generate a greater number of plausible alternative 
explanations; (2) provide more error-explanations (since these are counter-explanations to that 
provided by the client and entail greater risks to users and the auditor); and (3) assess higher 
probabilities of the accuracy of error explanations. As a result, the variables studied in this 
respect are the number of alternative explanations (counted as the number of error and non-
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error explanations provided in addition to the CFO’s non-error explanation in the case), the 
number of (intentional and unintentional) error explanations and the likelihood that the error 
explanations account for substantially all of the increase in gross margin (>85%) (cf., Peecher, 
1996; McMillan and White, 1993) (calculated as the sum of the likelihoods attached to the 
error explanations given and further referred to as the ‘weight of the error explanations’). 
 Finally, an indication of skepticism is the extent to which auditors want to perform 
further testing (e.g., Hurtt et al. 2003a). The most common variable of the extent of testing 
used in prior studies is the number of budgeted hours (cf., Shaub, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 
1996; Hurtt et al., 2008; Popova, 2006). A reference point of 100 hours for last year is given 
to minimize variance in responses by providing a benchmark and because it is common in an 
audit setting to have a reference point (e.g., prior year hours). 
 
Independent variables: four skeptical characteristics24 
Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale, the Need for Closure Scale and Rotter’s Locus of 
Control scale are all widely used and are found to have high construct validity and reliability 
(see e.g., Rotter, 1967; Webster and Kruglanski,1994; Lefcourt, 1991). The Hurtt Professional 
Skepticism Scale is relatively new, but analyses employing students and professional subjects 
indicate that the scale has adequate inter-item consistency and test-retest reliability (Hurtt, 
2007). There is also some evidence of the predictive validity of the scale (Hurtt et al., 2008; 
Popova, 2006). Most importantly, it is the only measure of skepticism developed specifically 
for the audit environment. 
 
Interpersonal trust 
The first skeptical characteristic, (the antithesis of) interpersonal trust, is measured by 
(the reverse of) the Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967). Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust 
Scale consists of 25 items that are scored on a five point Likert Scale (varying from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree). Three typical scale-items are, for example: (1) ‘in dealing with 
strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that they are 
trustworthy’ (reversely scored); (2) ‘it is safe to believe that in spite of what people say most 
people are primarily interested in their own welfare’ (reversely scored); and (3) ‘most 
salesmen are honest in describing their products’. 
 
                                                 
24
 The detailed measurement scale items per skeptical characteristic can be found in Appendix A. 
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Suspension of judgment 
Suspension of judgment is the second skeptical characteristic studied and is measured 
by the 42-item Need for Closure Scale (Webster and Kruglanski, 1994). Responses to the 42 
items are obtained on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly 
agree). Webster and Kruglanski (1994) argued that the need for closure will express itself in a 
variety of ways. Therefore, they viewed it as a latent variable visible through different facets 
(cf., Carver, 1989).25 Accordingly, Webster and Kruglanski (1994) identified five major facets 
that represent the construct: (1) preference for order; (2) preference for predictability; (3) 
decisiveness26; (4) discomfort with ambiguity; and (5) closed-mindedness; Webster and 
Kruglanski (1994) theorize that a person with a high need for closure possesses ‘an 
unwillingness to have one's knowledge confronted (hence, rendered insecure) by alternative 
opinions or inconsistent evidence’ and so would minimize skeptical actions. Three examples 
of scale items are: (1) ‘when I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset’; (2) ‘I 
dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways’; and (3) ‘I feel 
uncomfortable when I don’t understand the reason why an event occurred in my life’. 
 
Locus of control 
 The third skeptical characteristic studied is locus of control and is measured by 
Rotter’s (1966) Locus of Control scale. This scale contains 23 question pairs that are 
answered in a forced choice format (i.e., one of the two possibilities per question). For 
example, one of the question pairs was: (a) ‘without the right breaks one cannot be an 
effective leader’; and (b) ‘capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken 
advantage of their opportunities’. The participants choose one of the two options. In this case 
option (a) indicates an external locus of control. In this fashion the number of ‘hits’ on 
external locus of control statements constitutes the Locus of Control Score.  
 
Comprehensive professional skepticism 
 The fourth skeptical characteristic is the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale (2007), 
which has only been examined in a few unpublished papers (e.g., Hurtt et al. 2008; Popova, 
2006; Fullerton and Durtschi, 2004). This scale is examined, since, as discussed previously, it 
is specially designed for the audit environment. The scale consists of 30 items scored on a 6-
                                                 
25
 Webster and Kruglanski (1994) state that ‘[a]s our theoretical interest was in this latent construct as such, its 
extent was assessed additively across the different item categories’. 
26
 Webster and Kruglanski (1994) reasoned that persons with a high need for closure would possess a desire to 
reach closure, revealed in a decisiveness of their judgments and choices. 
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point scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The scale is designed to 
provide a single score of professional skepticism, although the items are organized along six 
theoretically derived facets: (1) questioning mind; (2) suspension of judgment; (3) search for 
knowledge; (4) interpersonal understanding; (5) self-confidence and (6) self-determination 
(see Hurtt, 2007). Three illustrative items are: (1) ‘I often accept other peoples’ explanations 
without further thought’ (reversely scored); (2) ‘I don’t like to decide until I’ve looked at all 
of the readily available information’; and (3) ‘It is easy for other people to convince me’ 
(reversely scored). 
 
Independent variables: manipulated and control variables 
 Strength of the control environment is manipulated as strong (coded as 0) or weak 
(coded as 1) and is used as the Control Environment Strength (CES) variable in the 
analyses.27 In the strong control environment setting, management is conservative in doing 
business, has modest disagreements with the external auditors, has strict guidelines for 
following internal control procedures, and obtains reward based on several financial and non-
financial performance measures. In the weak control environment setting management is 
aggressive in doing business, has frequent disagreements with the external auditors, has less 
strictly applied internal control procedures if advancement of work suffers from them, and has 
compensation plans that are mainly based on reaching short-term accounting-based 
performance measures. Strength of the control environment is manipulated in a between 
subjects design. As mentioned, the manipulation of the control environment is shown in 
Exhibit 2.1. 
To examine the effects of skeptical characteristics and strength of the control 
environment on skeptical judgments and decisions, it is necessary to control for the auditors’ 
prior task experience. To measure prior task specific experience, the research instrument 
contained a question that asked for the participants’ years of experience in conducting 
analytical procedures. Accordingly, task experience is statistically controlled in the analyses.  
 
Research instrument validation and manipulation checks 
The experiment was conducted during regular audit firm meetings (e.g., annual 
summer training courses) and was done in the official language that was used during the 
firms’ sessions. Since a majority of the sessions were in Dutch, the case-materials were 
                                                 
27
 The case materials of Cohen and Hanno (2000) are used with permission. 
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translated into Dutch.28 Concerning the measurement scales, Dutch translations were readily 
available for the Need for Closure scale (Cratylus, 1995) and for the Locus of Control Scale  
(see e.g., Boone and De Brabander, 1993). Translations were developed for the Interpersonal 
Trust Scale and for the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale. For that purpose a combination 
of the Parallel Blind Technique and Translation/Back-Translation methods was used (Behling 
and Law, 2000). 
Two experienced auditors compared the English and the Dutch versions of the case 
description and evaluated the contents of the case materials. In addition, four professors 
provided remarks on the research instrument. Two pilot-tests were conducted with 19 staff 
level auditors and minor modifications were made to the instrument on the basis of the 
comments received. 
The research instrument contains two parts.29 The first part includes the case 
description and the tasks (i.e., the dependent variables).30 The second part contains the scales 
to measure the skeptical characteristics, demographic information and debriefing questions 
about the case. 
 Two questions were asked as manipulation checks concerning the strength of control 
environment variable (cf., Cohen and Hanno, 2000): control environment effectiveness (1, 
very ineffective, to 9, very effective) and overall control risk (1, very low risk, to 9, very high 
risk). The means score on the control environment effectiveness was 3.49 in the weak control 
environment setting and 6.21 in the strong control environment setting. The mean score on the 
overall control risk was 6.63 in the weak control environment setting and 4.76 in the strong 
control environment setting. The manipulation check results for both variables are in the 
expected direction and are highly significant (independent samples t-test; p<0.01).31 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 In total, 86% of the participants completed the experiment in Dutch while the remaining 14% completed the 
experiment in English. 
29
 A version of the research instrument can be found in Appendix B. The version concerns the weak control 
environment setting and solicited the interpersonal trust and locus of control items. 
30
 The only exception is that one of the dependent variables (i.e. the likelihood of fraud) was asked in the second 
part of the questionnaire to prevent the possibility of revealing the purpose of the study. 
31
 In order to assess case realism and understandability two questions were asked using a 9-point scale. The scale 
for case realism ranged from highly unrealistic to highly realistic and the scale for case understandability ranged 
from very unclear to very clear. The mean score for case realism was 6.08 and the mean score for case 
understandability was 6.73. One-sample t-tests show that the mean scores are significantly above the middle 
points (i.e. a value of 5) of the scales (p<0.01), suggesting participants believed the case information was 
realistic and clear. 
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Sample 
All of the Big Four firms participated in the study and are randomly referred to as 
Firm A, B, C and D.32 Descriptive information on the sample can be found in Table 2.1. 
 
  Firm A 
 
Firm B Firm C Firm D Total 
Number of 
participants 
 
 85 96 140 55 376 
       
Number of sessions  1 3 6 2 12 
       
Staff level Partners 1 25 0 47 73 
 Managers 50 41 19 6 116 
 Seniors 32 27 65 0 124 
 Staff 2 0 54 0 56 
       
Gender Male 59 84 92 51 286 
 Female 26 11 47 2 86 
       
General experience Mean years 10.11 15.36 2.99 22.16 10.48 
 St.dev. 6.40 8.95 2.00 8.52 9.37 
Experience with 
analytical review 
Mean years 
9.67 14.75 2.75 20.07 9.85 
 St.dev. 6.11 9.36 1.93 6.86 8.86 
       
Strength of the 
control environment 
Weak 
42 47 68 27 184 
 Strong 43 49 72 28 192 
       
Language Dutch 85 96 101 41 323 
 English 0 0 39 14 53 
 Table 2.1 Descriptive sample information 
 
There were 376 participants of which 86 were female (i.e., 23%) and 286 were male (i.e., 
77%). Although there are a sufficient number of auditors from each staff level for our 
statistical analyses, due to data availability the number of partners (73) and staff (56) is less 
than managers (116) and seniors (124). Further, the distribution of auditors across staff levels 
varied by firm.33 
On average the auditors had about 10 years of general experience and 10 years of 
experience with conducting analytical procedures. Both general experience and task specific 
experience suggest that the participants possess the requisite task knowledge. As a result of 
random assignment the number of participants was relatively balanced across the two control 
                                                 
32
 Due to data availability, experience, language and gender are not distributed equally across firms, as can be 
seen in Table 2.1. 
33
 Only three auditors at the staff level indicated that they had no task specific experience. Leaving out the staff 
auditors in the MANOVA and regression analyses leads to similar findings. 
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environment experimental conditions: 184 participants in the weak condition and 192 
participants in the strong condition. 
Due to limited time availability and to avoid information overload and/or fatigue, 
participants completed two of four skeptical characteristics measurement scales. To mitigate 
the possibility that the order of the skeptical disposition scales may be a factor, the scales 
were randomly ordered. One-way ANOVAs show that there are no order effects in the 
administration of scales for skeptical disposition. Table 2.2 provides information on the 
sample sizes for the four measures of skeptical disposition across firms.34  
 
 Firm A 
 
Firm B Firm C Firm D Total 
Interpersonal Trust Scale 0 96 140 55 291 
Need for Closure Scale 85 0 0 0 85 
Locus of Control Scale 0 0 140 55 195 
Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale 85 96 0 0 181 
 Table 2.2 Number of participants responding to measures across firms 
 
As noted previously, participants completed two of the skeptical disposition scales. As can be 
seen in Table 2.2 there are three possibilities for comparison of the scales (1) the Hurtt 
Professional Skepticism Scale versus the Need for Closure Scale; (2) the Hurtt Professional 
Skepticism Scale versus the Interpersonal Trust Scale; and (3) the Interpersonal Trust Scale 
versus the Locus of Control Scale. Given limited participant time and the initial desire to 
mainly focus on the Interpersonal Trust Scale, the Need for Closure Scale and the Hurtt 
Professional Skepticism Scale, the first data gathering focused on these three scales. As 
greater data became available also Locus of Control was studied. For purposes of a separate 
study we decided to collect a representative sample of participants (Firm C and D) completing 
the Locus of Control in combination with Interpersonal Trust measures (cf., Massari and 
Rosenblum, 1972; Brenenstuhl and Badgett, 1977; Crutchfield, 1986). This results in an 
uneven spread of the sample across measures. Although the sample design allows us to 
provide evidence on the efficacy of each measure, it prevents a direct comparison across all 
four measures for a given participant. 
 
 
                                                 
34
 As will be seen in the subsequent analyses, the size of N is not always identical to the sample sizes mentioned 
in Table 2.2. These differences are predominantly caused by missing values. 
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Administration of the experiment 
  The experiment was conducted during 12 sessions of which 9 sessions were part of 
annual summer training courses, two were monthly partner meetings and one was an audit 
methodology training course for instructors. One of the authors attended all sessions and 
provided a brief introduction before the start of the experiment. The single remark concerning 
the topic of the study was that it comprised a case on conducting preliminary analytical 
procedures. After the introduction the participants received an envelope containing the 
research materials. A printed instruction regarding completion of the instrument was stuck on 
the envelope.  
  Participants were randomly assigned to the two control environment conditions. After 
a starting-signal from the instructor the participants opened the envelope. The envelope 
included two smaller envelopes with parts one and two of the research instrument. The two 
parts of the instruments were identified with identical numbers in order to enable ex post 
matching. The participants were asked to write down their name on the envelope in order to 
induce a feeling of accountability (cf., Asare et al., 2000).  
  Upon completion of part one (risk assessment and audit planning tasks), participants 
were instructed to put the first part of the questionnaire into the first envelope and seal it. 
Then they proceeded with part two (skeptical dispositions and debriefing questions) which 
they were instructed to put in the second envelope and to seal it after completion. Finally, 
envelopes one and two were placed into the large envelope. At the end of part two, 
participants were informed that if they would like a summary of the findings they should note 
their email address (255 out of the 376 or 68% did, indicating a high level of interest). 
 
Coding 
As noted, in the case description the CFO provided a non-error explanation for the 
increase in the gross margin percentage. The participants were requested to think about 
possible alternative explanations for the increase in the gross margin percentage. These 
explanations were coded by one of the authors and an experienced audit manager.  
The coding encompassed an assessment of the type and plausibility of the explanation 
(is the explanation logical and in the right direction to explain the fluctuation?).35 
Explanations were classified into the following categories: non-error explanations, 
unintentional error explanations, intentional error explanations and ambiguous 
                                                 
35
 There were about 30 non plausible explanations that are excluded from the analyses. 
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unintentional/intentional explanations.36 The participants identified a broad range of 
explanations for the increase in gross margin (for example, exchange rate effects, 
misallocation of costs and improved efficiency). A more detailed coding of the explanations is 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient regarding the coding of the plausibility of the explanation 
was 0.807 (p<0.01) and Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient for coding the type of explanation was 
0.874 (p<0.01). These levels of agreement are strong (e.g., Landis and Koch, 1977) and 
indicate a high inter-rater reliability. Differences were discussed by the two coders and 
mutually resolved.  
 
2.4 Results 
Descriptive statistics regarding the measures of the skeptical characteristics are shown 
in Table 2.3. While the range for Need for Closure Scale and the Hurtt Professional 
Skepticism Scale is considerably narrower than the theoretical range, mean scores are 
relatively close to the theoretical mid points of the scale, with the exception of the Hurtt 
Professional Skepticism Scale. Thus, responses appear to reasonably represent the underlying 
scales and are appropriate to use in the analyses. 
 
Measurement 
scale 
Mean 
score 
Standard 
deviation 
Theoretical 
range 
Actual 
range 
Theoretical 
mid point 
Cronbach 
alpha 
Interpersonal 
Trust Scale 72.98 8.76 25-125 45-105 75 0.760 
Need for Closure 
Scale 154.85 15.03 42-252 121-193 147 0.822 
Locus of Control 
scale 10.06 3.76 0-23 0-19 11.5 0.713 
Hurtt Professional  
Skepticism Scale 131.66 10.71 30-180 103-158 105 0.821 
 Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics concerning the measurement scales 
 
As reported in Table 2.3, the Cronbach alpha values for the scales are acceptable, ranging 
from 0.713 to 0.822 (see e.g., Nunnally, 1978). One-sample Kolmogorov Smirnov tests and 
                                                 
36
 The classification into intentional and non-intentional errors was done to test the robustness of the regression 
findings concerning the number of total error explanations (see Footnote 39). 
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an examination of the histograms indicate that the measurement scales are approximately 
normally distributed.37  
 In Table 2.4 descriptive statistics concerning the six dependent variables are reported.  
 
Dependent variable Mean score Standard 
deviation 
Theoretical 
range 
Actual range 
The likelihood that management 
explanation is right 
 
36.26 
 
21.82 
 
0-100 
 
0-100 
The likelihood of fraud  
32.03 
 
23.84 
 
0-100 
 
0-100 
Number of alternative explanations  
3.53 
 
1.79 
 
0-∞ 
 
0-11 
Number of total error explanations  
1.61 
 
1.68 
 
0-∞ 
 
0-11 
Weight of total error explanations  
28.04 
 
29.35 
 
0-100 
 
0-100 
Number of budgeted hours  
129.76 
 
35.30 
 
0-∞ 
 
20-400 
Table 2.4 Descriptive statistics regarding the dependent variables. 
 
Regarding three dependent variables (i.e., the likelihood that management explanation is right, 
the likelihood of fraud and the weight of total error explanations) the table shows that the 
actual range of scores is equal to the theoretical range of the scores. Although the maximum 
scores of the number of alternative explanations, the number of total error explanations and 
the number of budgeted hours are theoretically infinite, the actual maximum scores are not 
extremely high, which makes sense since extreme scores on these variables are not efficient. 
Furthermore, the table, for example, shows that the average number of alternative 
explanations is more than twice as high as the average number of total error explanations. 
This indicates that on average more non-error explanations than error-explanations are 
generated by the auditors. 
 
 
                                                 
37
 There is a significant negative correlation between interpersonal trust and locus of control (p<0.01), implying 
that an auditor who is more trusting (i.e. a higher score on interpersonal trust) has a more internal locus of 
control (i.e. a lower score on locus of control) and vice versa (the correlations are not tabulated). None of the 
correlations between the other combinations are significant. This suggests that the four measures largely capture 
different aspects of skepticism. Alternatively, this may also be an indication that some of the factors studied may 
not be strong determinants of skeptical disposition. However, it has to be bore in mind, as discussed earlier, that 
sample limitations do not enable comparison between interpersonal trust and need for closure, need for closure 
and locus of control, and locus of control and the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale. 
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Results for Hypothesis 1: Relationship between skeptical characteristics and skeptical 
judgments and decisions 
Linear regressions were conducted in order to understand the nature of the impact of 
the independent variables on the individual skeptical judgments and decisions.38 The scores 
on the skeptical characteristics were mean centered (see e.g., Kromrey and Foster-Johnson, 
1998). A summary of the regressions is provided in Table 2.5.39 
 
 Interpersonal 
Trust 
Need for 
Closure 
Locus of 
Control 
Hurtt PS Scale 
Regression of ‘the likelihood that 
management explanation is right’     
Constant 39.644*** 37.531 38.803 38.838 
Control environment strength (CES) -3.631* [-.084] -6.656 [-.149] -2.213 [-.051] -7.299 [-.165] 
Skeptical characteristic (SC) .359** [.148] -.051 [-.034] .262 [.046] -.031 [-.015] 
Task-specific experience (TSE) -.153 [-.066] .226 [0.062] -.144 [-.056] .066 [.024] 
CES*SC -.045 [-.012] .391 [.156] -.279 [-.030] -.370 [-.110] 
Adj. R-square (N) .015* (N=278) .001 (N=85) -.015 (N=188) .019 (N=175) 
     
Regression of ‘the likelihood of fraud’     
Constant 18.533*** 22.577*** 18.539*** 22.607*** 
Control environment strength (CES) 22.927*** [.492] 25.451*** [.499] 20.410*** [.512] 23.338*** [.489] 
Skeptical characteristic (SC) -.304** [-.115] .122 [.071] -.120 [-.019] .210 [.095] 
Task-specific experience (TSE) .164 [.066] -.174 [-.042] .214 [.078] -.179 [-.062] 
CES*SC -.666** [-.165] -.667* [-.224] 1.404* [.137] -.027 [-.008] 
Adj. R-square (N) .310*** (N=278) .267*** (N=84) .277*** (N=186) .236*** (N=176) 
     
Regression of ‘the number of 
alternative explanations’     
Constant 3.188*** 3.490 3.186*** 3.499 
Control environment strength (CES) .142 [.040] .239 [.067] .069 [.019] .323 [.091] 
Skeptical characteristic (SC) .018 [.088] .037 [.308] -.049 [-.102] .018 [.112] 
Task-specific experience (TSE) .023** [.123] .002 [.006] .056*** [.267] -.019 [-.091] 
CES*SC -.056** [-.180] -.057 [-.284] -.005 [-.007] -.031 [-.116] 
Adj. R-square (N) .019* (N=284) .028 (N=85) .071*** (N=191) .005 (N=178) 
     
                                                 
38
 Given potential relationships between the dependent variables, also four MANOVAs were conducted, one for 
each skeptical characteristic. All six of the dependent variables discussed previously were included. As 
independent variables the models included the respective skeptical characteristic, control environment strength, 
years of experience with conducting analytical procedures (i.e. task specific experience) and an interaction term 
between the skeptical characteristic and control environment strength. The scores on the continuous independent 
variables were mean centered. For Interpersonal Trust, the tests show statistical significance for all independent 
variables in the model. For Need for Closure, the tests show statistical significance for control environment 
strength and for the interaction of the Need for Closure measure and control environment strength. For Locus of 
Control, the tests show statistical significance for control environment strength and for task specific experience 
(and marginal significance for the interaction of the Locus of Control measure and control environment 
strength). For the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale, the tests show statistical significance for professional 
skepticism and control environment strength. 
39
 Further regression analyses were done on the two variables that constitute the variable ‘number of error 
explanations’: number of non-intentional error explanations and number of intentional error explanations. 
However, the results remain similar. There were ambiguous error explanations for which it was not certain 
whether they were unintentional or intentional. In one analysis, these explanations were all considered to be 
unintentional and one in which they were all considered to be intentional. The results were similar in both cases. 
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 Interpersonal 
Trust 
Need for 
Closure 
Locus of 
Control 
Hurtt PS Scale 
Regression of ‘the number of error 
explanations’     
Constant .768*** 1.106*** .484*** 1.539*** 
Control environment strength (CES) .671*** [.199] 1.031*** [.317] .958*** [.267] .577*** [.189] 
Skeptical characteristic (SC) .021 [.113] .044*** [.406] -.041 [-.087] .027** [.190] 
Task-specific experience (TSE) .045*** [.256] .015 [.054] .078*** [.379] -.010 [-.057] 
CES*SC -.057*** [-.196] -.054** [-.296] -.057 [-.074] -.021 [-.091] 
Adj. R-square (N) .111*** (N=283) .163*** (N=85) .234*** (N=190) .042** (N=178) 
     
Regression of ‘the weight of the error 
explanations’     
Constant 12.468*** 16.959*** 6.830*** 26.179*** 
Control environment strength (CES) 16.947*** [.293] 25.013*** [.413] 22.303*** [.390] 15.560*** [.263] 
Skeptical characteristic (SC) .028 [.009] .354 [.175] -.385 [-.051] .254 [.092] 
Task-specific experience (TSE) .590*** [.194] .229 [.046] .903*** [.274] -.186 [-.052] 
CES*SC -.664** [-.133] -.765* [-.225] .461 [.037] .283 [.063] 
Adj. R-square (N) .124*** (N=280) .165*** (N=85) .215*** (N=189) .071*** (N=176) 
     
Regression of ‘the number of budgeted 
hours’     
Constant 121.070*** 114.107*** 120.512 119.700*** 
Control environment strength (CES) 7.441* [.098] 15.459*** [.366] 7.526 [.102] 11.510*** [.183] 
Skeptical characteristic (SC) -.360 [-.084] .003 [.002] -.360 [-.037] .375* [.129]  
Task-specific experience (TSE) .558** [.136] .466 [.136] .068 [.016] .725** [.186] 
CES*SC -.287 [-.044] -.025 [-.011] 1.013 [.064] .691 [.147] 
Adj. R-square (N) .022** (N=273) .109** (N=82) -.009 (N=186) .105*** (N=169) 
Significance is indicated by asterisks: *<.10; **<.05; ***<.01. For the directional hypotheses concerning CES 
and SC, all significance-levels are one-sided unless the results are in the opposite direction. For the non-
significant models no significance is shown for the coefficients. The betas are shown in brackets. 
 
Table 2.5 Regression coefficients for the skeptical characteristics and the models’ adjusted R-
squares 
 
Interpersonal trust is significant in two of the six regression models (i.e., the likelihood that 
management explanation is right40 and the likelihood of fraud). These effects are in the 
expected direction. Need for closure is significant in one of the models (i.e., the number of 
error explanations). However, the effect is opposite to the expected direction, which may be 
due to the interaction that will be discussed later on.  
Locus of control is not significant in any of the models. The Hurtt Professional 
Skepticism Scale is significant for the model regarding the number of error explanations and 
marginally significant for the model with the number of budgeted hours as a dependent 
variable. Both effects are in the expected direction. 
In sum, there appears to be support for H1. Three of the four skeptical characteristics 
are found to be significantly associated with skeptical judgments and decisions that are 
considered to reflect auditor skepticism (e.g., higher assessments of fraud risk). 
 
                                                 
40
 Note that this model is marginally significant (p<0.10). 
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Results for Hypothesis 2: Relationship between strength of the control environment and 
skeptical judgments and decisions 
Hypothesis 2 examines the impact of control environment strength on skeptical 
judgments and decisions. For the interpersonal trust regressions, strength of the control 
environment is significant in three of the significant models (i.e., the likelihood of fraud, the 
number of error explanations and the weight of the error explanations) and marginally 
significant in two of the models (i.e., the likelihood that management explanation is right and 
the number of budgeted hours). The effects are all in the expected direction. For need for 
closure, strength of the control environment is significant in all four significant models (i.e., 
the likelihood of fraud, the number of error explanations, the weight of the error explanations 
and the number of budgeted hours). All effects are in the expected direction. For locus of 
control, strength of the control environment is significant in three of the four significant 
models (i.e., the likelihood of fraud, the number of error explanations and the weight of the 
error explanations). All effects are in the expected direction. For the Hurtt Professional 
Skepticism Scale, strength of the control environment is significant in all four significant 
models (i.e., the likelihood of fraud, the number of error explanations, the weight of the error 
explanations and the number of budgeted hours). All effects are in the expected direction.  
In sum, all significant effects of strength of the control environment are in the 
expected direction. In the models with the likelihood of fraud, the number of error 
explanations and the weight of the error explanations as the dependent variable, strength of 
the control environment has a significant effect for all skeptical characteristics, providing 
support for H2. However, interpretation of the main effect of strength of the control 
environment is ambiguous in the presence of significant interaction effects, which are 
discussed in the next section.  
 
Interaction between control environment strength and skeptical characteristics  
The results in Table 2.5 show that there are significant interaction effects between 
interpersonal trust and the strength of the control environment for four of the models (i.e., the 
assessment of the likelihood of fraud, the number of alternative explanations, the number of 
error explanations and the weight of the error explanations). For need for closure, there is a 
significant interaction between need for closure and the strength of the control environment 
concerning the number of error explanations and there are two marginally significant 
interaction effects for the likelihood of fraud and the weight of the error explanations. For 
locus of control, there is a marginally significant interaction effect between locus of control 
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and the strength of the control environment regarding the likelihood of fraud. There are no 
interaction effects for the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale. In all, these results suggest that 
the effect of skeptical characteristics on auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions depends 
on the strength of the control environment.  
Since several of the interaction effects present are similar, only two interaction effects 
are depicted. The other interaction effects are referred to when expedient. Figure 2.1 shows 
the nature of the interaction when using interpersonal trust as the measure for skeptical 
disposition and the dependent variable ‘assessment of the likelihood of fraud’. For purposes 
of plotting the interaction-effects and conducting post hoc tests the scores of the skeptical 
characteristics are split at the median. The figure shows an almost horizontal line for the 
strong control environment setting. When the control environment is strong all auditors assess 
a relatively low level of fraud risk regardless of level of interpersonal trust. The weak control 
environment setting shows a downward sloping line indicating that auditors with a lower level 
of interpersonal trust (i.e., a greater skeptical disposition) assess a higher likelihood of fraud 
than auditors with a higher level of personal trust. Post hoc Scheffé tests show that the means 
at the two anchor points of the weak control environment line are significantly different 
(p<0.01) and not significant when the control environment is strong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 A plot of the interaction effect between interpersonal trust and control environment 
strength concerning the likelihood of fraud. 
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The interaction effect in Figure 2.1 suggests that auditors show more skeptical judgment and 
decisions when they have a more skeptical disposition and when the client has a weak control 
environment (i.e., auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions are related to interpersonal trust 
in high risk situations). We also examined whether this interaction is present when 
considering alternative measures of skeptical disposition. This finding is corroborated by the 
plot (not shown) of the (marginally significant) interaction effect of need for closure and 
control environment strength on the likelihood of fraud (i.e., the plot is similar). The plot (not 
shown) of the (marginally significant) interaction between locus of control and control 
environment strength regarding the likelihood of fraud reveals that the slope of the line 
concerning the weak control environment is opposite to the slopes for the interpersonal trust 
and need for closure constructs.41 This implies that auditors with more internal locus of 
control (i.e., a lower score on the locus of control construct), which allegedly means a higher 
skeptical disposition, assess lower likelihoods of fraud, contrary to expectations. This seems 
to suggest locus of control is not capturing judgments and decisions that depict the notion of 
skepticism as outlined in professional standards.  
The plot of the interaction effect between interpersonal trust and control environment 
strength pertaining to the number of error explanations is presented in Figure 2.2.42 Plotting 
the interaction effect for need for closure leads to a similar figure and is therefore not shown. 
Hence the conclusions for interpersonal trust also apply to need for closure when considering 
number of error explanations. The figure shows that the number of error explanations is about 
equal for the low and high interpersonal trust groups in the weak control environment 
setting.43 Hence, when there is a weak control environment, all auditors seem to adequately 
respond to the higher level of control environment strength, regardless of their skeptical 
disposition. However, in the strong control environment setting there is a significant 
difference (post hoc Scheffé test) between the mean number of total error explanations for the 
low and high interpersonal trust groups.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
 An independent sample t-test shows a marginal significance (two-tailed p<0.10) of the difference between the 
low and high locus of control groups in the weak control environment setting. 
42
 The number of alternative explanations interaction concerning interpersonal trust is similar to the number of 
error explanations interaction and is therefore not presented. 
43
 Post hoc Scheffé tests and independent sample t-tests show no significant difference between the means for the 
low and high need for closure groups in the weak control environment setting. 
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Figure 2.2 A plot of the interaction effect between interpersonal trust and control environment 
strength regarding the number of total error explanations  
 
Contrary to intuition, the line is upward sloping which indicates that auditors with a lower 
interpersonal trust (i.e., greater skeptical disposition) generate less alternative error 
explanations than auditors with higher interpersonal trust. This pattern is also suggested by 
the plot of the interaction effect of the weight of the error explanations (not shown). A 
potential explanation may be that skeptical auditors focus more on fewer errors. This 
explanation is examined by calculating the weight of the error explanations divided by the 
number of error explanations (i.e., the summed likelihoods attached to their error explanations 
divided by the number of error explanations generated). A plot of this variable is presented in 
Figure 2.3. As can be seen from Figure 2.3, the slope for the strong control environment 
setting has reversed, as conjectured. This finding implies that skeptical auditors focus more 
(i.e., put more weight) on fewer errors which would result in a higher average weight per 
error. Hence, they put more emphasis on the ‘depth’ rather than the ‘breadth’ of testing (see 
e.g., Asare et al., 2000). As mentioned, this result applies to both interpersonal trust and need 
for closure. 
 
 
 50 
median split interpersonal trust score
higher than medianat median or lower
M
ea
n
 
av
er
ag
e 
w
ei
gh
t p
er
 
(to
ta
l) e
rr
o
r
24,00
22,00
20,00
18,00
16,00
14,00
weak control 
environment
strong control 
environment
Control environment 
strength
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 A plot of the interaction effect between interpersonal trust and control environment 
strength concerning the average weight per error. 
 
In sum, the findings suggest that the effect of skeptical characteristics on the skeptical 
judgments and decisions depends on the strength of the control environment. This in 
particular holds for the interpersonal trust and need for closure measures, which show similar 
interaction effects. The findings, thus, suggest the affect of auditors’ skeptical characteristics 
on planning judgments and decisions depend upon the level of client risk.44 
 
2.5 Discussion 
The results indicate that the four skeptical measures appear to represent different 
constructs. A summary of the findings concerning the effects of the skeptical characteristics 
and control environment strength on skeptical judgments and decisions (as well as their 
interaction effects) is presented in Table 2.6.  
Overall, interpersonal trust displays the strongest ability to predict skeptical judgments 
and decisions in terms of the highest number of dependent variables with a significant impact, 
via the main and the interaction effects. Interpersonal trust and the Hurtt Professional 
                                                 
44
 This study controls for experience. As can be seen in Table 2.5, task specific experience has a significant 
impact in several of the models.  
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Skepticism Scale show the most significant main effects on judgments and decisions. 
However, both constructs have an impact on different judgments and decisions. Surprisingly, 
locus of control appears to have no main effect on skeptical judgments and decisions. Need 
for closure also exhibits significance in predicting skeptical judgments and decisions but 
showed one effect that was opposite to the expected direction.  
 
 
 
 
Dependent variables 
 
1-tailed 
sign.  SC 
 
sign 
 
1-tailed 
sign. CES 
 
sign 
 
2-tailed 
sign. 
SCxCES 
Interpersonal 
trust 
Likelihood mngt expl. is right 
Likelihood of fraud 
Number alternative 
explanations 
Number of error explanations 
Weight of error explanations 
Number of budgeted hours 
 
0.032 
0.042 
 
 
+ 
- 
 
0.081 
0.000 
 
 
0.000 
0.000 
0.051 
- 
+ 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
0.013 
 
0.022 
0.009 
0.074 
Need for 
closure 
Likelihood mngt expl. is right 
Likelihood of fraud 
Number alternative 
explanations 
Number of error explanations 
Weight of error explanations 
Number of budgeted hours 
 
 
 
 
 
0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
+* 
 
 
0.000 
 
 
0.002 
0.000 
0.001 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
0.059 
 
 
0.021 
0.077 
Locus of 
control 
Likelihood mngt expl. is right 
Likelihood of fraud 
Number alternative 
explanations 
Number of error explanations 
Weight of error explanations 
Number of budgeted hours 
 
   
0.000 
 
 
0.000 
0.000 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
+ 
 
0.092 
Hurtt 
Professional 
Skepticism 
Scale 
 
Likelihood mngt expl. is right 
Likelihood of fraud 
Number alternative 
explanations 
Number of error explanations 
Weight of error explanations 
Number of budgeted hours 
 
 
 
 
 
0.023 
 
0.085 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
0.000 
 
 
0.006 
0.000 
0.007 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
 
* This sign is not in the expected direction. 
Table 2.6  Summary of significant and marginally significant effects. 
 
Furthermore, there are significant interaction effects for the models concerning 
interpersonal trust, need for closure and locus of control. Predominantly, these interaction 
effects are present for the likelihood of fraud, the number of error explanations and the weight 
of the error explanations. It is interesting to see that these interaction effects differ depending 
on the skeptical judgments and decisions studied. 
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In all, auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions are more significantly associated 
with interpersonal trust than any of the other characteristics, suggesting it is most closely 
associated with the skeptical judgments and decisions prescribed in the auditing literature and 
professional standards. It is interesting to note that the more comprehensive and specific Hurtt 
Professional Skepticism Scale does not show the strongest results. Furthermore, as noted only 
one of the correlations that could be calculated between the skeptical characteristics was 
found significant suggesting that the measures capture different aspects of skepticism. 
However, keep in mind that not all possible correlations could be tested due to the 
composition of the sample. 
The number of error explanations is explained by three of the four skeptical 
characteristics (via the main and the interaction effects) and number of alternative 
explanations is explained only by one characteristic.45 Apparently skeptical characteristics are 
more related to a ‘presumptive doubt’ variable like number of error explanations than to a 
‘neutral stance’ variable like number of alternative explanations. The neutral stance refers to 
the fact that the auditor neither assumes that management is dishonest nor assumes 
unquestioned honesty (e.g., Cushing, 2000). Presumptive doubt is a view often used by 
forensic experts (e.g., Public Oversight Board, 2000, p. 88; Bell et al., 2005). Bell et al. 
(2005) assert that an auditor assumes some level of dishonesty unless evidence indicates 
otherwise (cf., POB, 2000, p. 76); forensic auditors generally assume dishonesty unless there 
is evidence to the contrary. Similarly, McMillan and White (1993) state that professional 
skepticism entails ‘conservative bias’ and ‘conservative behavior’ in audit judgments, 
implicating that skeptical auditors will focus on more error-related evidence (cf., Smith and 
Kida, 1991). 
In addition, strength of the control environment has a significant effect in a majority of 
the models providing support for H2. Apparently, the majority of the auditors pick up the 
potential problems in control environment strength. 
 There are several limitations in the study that should be considered in interpreting the 
results. First, experience, firm and language effects cannot be disentangled due to the data 
availability. Second, participants completed only two of the four skeptical measures. Hence, 
this precludes a complete comparison between all four measures. Third, there exists no 
normative solution to the case problem used in the research instrument so that it is not 
                                                 
45
 Additional regression analyses show that non-error explanations are not significantly related to any of the four 
skeptical characteristics (via the main and/or the interaction effect). 
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possible to determine which measure is most closely related to optimal judgments and 
decisions. 
 
Implications and suggestions for further research 
The study shows that skeptical characteristics are related to skeptical judgments and 
decisions. This has not been strongly evidenced by previous studies. In particular, the finding 
that interpersonal trust is most significantly related to skeptical judgments and decisions 
warrants a further study of the components of the trust variable in order to find more specific 
trust facets influencing auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions.46  
Furthermore, it is unclear whether auditors’ personality traits are stable (see e.g., 
Libby and Luft, 1993; Nelson, 2009; Carpenter, 2004). For instance, do auditors become more 
or less skeptical as they gain experience? Another suggestion for further research is to 
develop a realistic complex case setting with a seeded error which enables a test of whether 
the skeptical judgments and decisions are effective in detecting a material misstatement. Also 
professional skepticism in team settings is a promising avenue of research. Finally, future 
research may focus on developing more specific measures of skeptical attitude in particular 
settings (see e.g., Ajzen, 2005; Lefcourt, 1991, pp. 414), instead of the so-called global 
measures examined in this and prior studies. 
The research model focused on an important an pervasive client risk (as measured by 
control environment strength) in examining the relationship between skeptical characteristics 
and skeptical judgments and decisions. Future research could focus on other risks, as for 
example identified in ISA 315 (IFAC, 2008). Future research could also study other important 
auditor incentives such as budget pressure, audit quality, litigation and reputation loss (see 
Nelson, 2009, for an overview). 
 There are also a number of implications for audit practice. For instance, the findings 
justify further consideration of the interpersonal trust variable to develop adequate 
recruitment, and staffing and training guidance. Also a consideration for practice and future 
research is whether quality control processes (like audit reviews) mitigate auditors’ individual 
skepticism. For example, it is not clear how the review process interacts with skeptical 
disposition and can compensate for insufficient testing and care. 
                                                 
46
 See Chapter 3 for an examination of this issue. 
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Chapter 3 The relationship between auditors’ interpersonal trust factors and  
skeptical judgments and decisions47 
 
Abstract 
  Professional skepticism is a pervasive feature of contemporary audits. While there is 
no universally accepted definition, prior empirical auditing and non-auditing literature has 
primarily characterized skepticism as the antithesis of trust. The purpose of this study is to 
conduct an in depth examination of the association between interpersonal trust factors based 
on Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967) and skeptical judgments and decisions. An 
important issue is whether the individual trust factors are more strongly associated with 
skeptical judgments and decisions than the summated interpersonal trust scale. If so, there can 
be greater focus on these specific trust factors in providing guidance and training for auditors. 
This study also provides additional findings on the relationship between auditor rank and 
interpersonal trust and skeptical judgments and decisions. 
  The sample includes 291 auditors from offices of three of the Big Four auditing firms 
in The Netherlands, with experience ranging from staff to partner. The results suggest that the 
general construct measuring interpersonal trust across a set of social objects and situations 
appears to be a better predictor of skeptical judgments and decisions than the individual 
factors comprising it. 
  Furthermore, additional analyses show that rank is positively associated with both 
interpersonal trust and skeptical judgments and decisions. Despite having higher levels of 
interpersonal trust (lower skeptical disposition), partners, nonetheless, exhibit the most 
skeptical judgments and decisions, suggesting they are trained to compensate for lower 
skeptical disposition. 
 
3.1  Introduction 
  The importance of professional skepticism in auditing is evidenced by the fact that: (1) 
professional skepticism is prominently noted in professional auditing standards (e.g., IFAC, 
2008); (2) international audit firms prescribe the application of professional skepticism in 
                                                 
47
 I am indebted to the three Big Four auditing firms that participated in this study. I am also grateful to Jeff 
Cohen, Michael Shaub, the participants of the paper presentation at the Annual Congress of the European 
Accounting Association (EAA) in Lisbon (April 2007) and the participants of the ARCA lunch seminar at the 
VU University Amsterdam for providing comments on earlier versions of this paper. Furthermore, I would like 
to thank individuals who have helped in developing the research materials, coding and analyzing the results. 
Finally, this paper benefited greatly from a leave of absence from Ernst & Young that was financially supported 
by the VU University Amsterdam. 
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their audit methodologies; (3) professional skepticism is part of education and training of 
auditors; and (4) the academic and professional auditing literatures stress the importance of 
professional skepticism (see e.g., Hurtt et al., 2003, p.2; Kadous, 2000). The significance of 
professional skepticism is further illustrated by several studies of fraud related SEC cases 
which conclude that on many occasions auditors failed to detect material misstatements, 
particularly those involving fraudulent financial reporting, as a result of a lack of sufficient 
professional skepticism (e.g., Beasley et al., 2001; POB, 2000; Benston and Hartgraves, 2002, 
p. 122).  
  International auditing standards state that auditors should plan and perform an audit 
with an attitude of professional skepticism (e.g., ISA 200.15, IFAC, 2008). ISA 200.16 
(IFAC, 2008) states that this means ‘the auditor makes a critical assessment, with a 
questioning mind, of the validity of audit evidence obtained and is alert to audit evidence that 
contradicts or brings into question the reliability of documents and responses to inquiries and 
other information obtained from management and those charged with governance’. 
Professional skepticism requires auditors to evaluate the reliability of management assertions 
and to develop an appropriate audit program (Shaub and Lawrence, 1999, p. 62). 
Despite its importance, in the existing auditing literature there is lack of consensus on 
a definition and measurement of professional skepticism (e.g., Hurtt et al., 2003; Nelson, 
2009). However, most definitions contain a trust-related aspect (see e.g., Choo and Tan, 2000; 
Cushing, 2000; Payne and Ramsay, 2005, p. 324; Shaub, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 1996; 
1999). The previous empirical auditing studies that use various trust scales to measure 
professional skepticism show weak and inconclusive results. However, the study presented in 
Chapter 2 is the first study in auditing to employ Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967). In 
an experiment concerning an analytical procedures setting they find this scale to be the most 
significant predictor of skeptical judgments and decisions among four widely recognized 
measures.48 Thus, this scale appears to have great promise in measuring auditors’ skeptical 
disposition. Hence, it warrants further study. 
  Interestingly, previous analyses of the Interpersonal Trust Scale items show this 
measure reflects a complex factor structure (see e.g., Chun and Campbell, 1974; Kaplan, 
1973; Hunt et al., 1983; Wright and Tedeschi, 1975). However, none of these studies test the 
                                                 
48
  The four skeptical characteristics studied are: (1) interpersonal trust (as measured by the Interpersonal Trust 
Scale, Rotter, 1967); (2) suspension of judgment (as measured by the reversal of the Need for Closure Scale, 
Webster and Kruglanski, 1994); (3) locus of control (as measured by the Locus of Control Scale, Rotter, 1966); 
and (4) a comprehensive professional skepticism scale (i.e. the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale, Hurtt, 
2003). 
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predictive validity of the individual factors in relating factors to judgments and decisions. 
Therefore, this study presents a factor analysis of Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale and 
examines whether extracted factors are more related to skeptical judgments and decisions than 
the summated scale. If so, this allows firms to focus more on specific factors when hiring and 
training employees. It also enables researchers to focus more on what factors are specifically 
driving skeptical judgments and decisions. 
  As an additional analysis, the study looks at how auditors’ interpersonal trust differs at 
various organizational levels and how auditors’ professional rank is associated with skeptical 
judgments and decisions. This is important to study since partners have the ultimate authority 
and responsibility for issuing the audit opinion. Thus, it is very important to know whether 
their skepticism is higher than that of the other audit team members. Furthermore, it is 
valuable to know how interpersonal trust and skeptical judgments and decisions develop from 
staff to partner level, since this may have important implications for training and/or self-
selection. 
  The study provides two important contributions to the literature. First, the research 
extracts factors from Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale, which enables derivation of trust 
elements that are of particular importance for auditor professional skepticism. This has not 
been done in auditing contexts before. Furthermore, the study tests the association of the 
extracted factors with skeptical judgments and decisions. Second, the sample contains 
auditors with a broad range of experience who are evenly spread across professional ranks 
(including partners), allowing an additional analysis of professional skepticism between 
organizational levels. 
  The study entails an experiment in an analytical procedures setting, since analytical 
procedures can have a significant impact on audit effectiveness and efficiency (see e.g., Asare 
and Wright, 1997a, 1997b; Bedard and Biggs, 1991; Wright and Ashton, 1989; Hirst & 
Koonce, 1996, p. 461, 464; Peecher, 1996, p. 125-126; Koonce et al., 1995, p. 369). The 
experimental case, adapted from Peecher (1996), contains an unexpected material increase in 
the gross margin and a related management non-error explanation concerning the fluctuation. 
Two hundred and ninety-one auditors from three of the Big 4 firms participated in the 
experiment.49 
  The results suggest that the general construct measuring interpersonal trust appears to 
be a better predictor of skeptical judgments and decisions than the individual factors 
                                                 
49
 The dataset used in this study is a subset of that used in Chapter 2. 
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comprising it. From additional analyses, professional rank appears to be positively related to 
skeptical judgments and decisions and to interpersonal trust. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized into four sections. Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of prior literature, relevant theory, and the research questions. The research design 
is described in Section 3.3, while Section 3.4 contains a presentation of the results. Finally, 
Section 3.5 is devoted to a discussion of the major findings and their implications for future 
research and practice. 
 
3.2  Prior literature, theory and research questions 
Interpersonal trust as a measure of skeptical disposition 
  Dispositional skeptical characteristics of auditors are expected to be predictive of 
skeptical judgments and decisions (cf., Ajzen, 2005).50 A skeptical judgment, for instance, 
may be an auditor’s low likelihood assessment that management’s non-error explanation for a 
material unexpected fluctuation detected during analytical procedures is correct, expressing 
the need to substantiate that explanation through further testing. This study considers both 
auditors’ skeptical disposition, as measured by auditors’ level of interpersonal trust and its 
underlying factors, and various skeptical judgments and decisions. 
  There is no universally accepted definition of professional skepticism (see e.g., Hurtt, 
2007; Nelson, 2009; Doucet and Doucet, 1996). However, a substantial number of authors 
view professional skepticism as being the antithesis of trust (see e.g., Choo and Tan, 2000; 
Cushing, 2000; Payne and Ramsay, 2005, p. 324; Shaub, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 1996; 
1999). The general idea is that auditors with a skeptical disposition have a lower level of 
interpersonal trust (e.g., Shaub, 1996; Hurtt, 2007). Interpersonal trust can be defined as ‘a 
generalized expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or 
written statement of another individual or group can be relied upon’ (Rotter, 1967, p. 651; 
Rotter, 1980, p. 1). 
  The auditing literature also describes trust as being an ingredient of skepticism (see 
e.g., Hurtt, 1999; Hurtt et al., 2003; 2008). Furthermore, some authors argue that while trust 
and professional skepticism might be different constructs, they are likely related (e.g., 
Popova, 2006; Rennie et al., 2007; Kopp et al., 2003; and Doucet and Doucet, 1996). All 
these views and definitions contain a trust-related aspect.  
                                                 
50
 A disposition is defined as ‘a person’s inherent qualities of mind and character; an inclination or tendency’ 
(Concise Oxford Dictionary, tenth edition, 1999). 
 59 
  Also in the non-auditing literature, skepticism has been defined as initial distrust (e.g., 
Bunge, 1991, p. 131), distrust (e.g., Forehand and Grier, 2003, p. 350), and a subjective 
feeling of mistrust (e.g., Tsfati and Cappella, 2003, p. 506; Tsfati, 2003). Personality 
researchers and social psychologists view mistrust/distrust and trust as opposite ends of a 
single continuum (cf., Lewicky et al., 1998, p. 440; Webb and Worchel, 1986, pp. 214-215). 
Hence, it is argued that skepticism can be measured as the antithesis of trust. 
To measure trust, Shaub (1996) used the independence and trustworthiness parts of the 
Wrightsman Philosophies of Human Nature scale (Wrightsman, 1964, 1974). Furthermore 
Shaub (1996) used a self-developed Client Trust scale. Rose (2007) also used the 
trustworthiness part of the Wrightsman Philosophies of Human Nature scale (Wrightsman, 
1964, 1974). Choo and Tan (2000) used a modified version of the Rempel et al. Trust Scale 
(1985), originally measuring trust in the relationship with a person’s life partner. 
Although the Rotter Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967) is widely accepted in other fields 
to measure interpersonal trust (see e.g., Hoell, 2004; Johnson-George and Swap, 1982; Stack, 
1978; Webb and Worchel, 1986), it has been used in only one auditing research study that is 
presented in Chapter 2. In contrast, in a large number of non-auditing studies Rotter’s 
Interpersonal Trust Scale has been more highly associated with actual behaviors and other 
validating evidence than other interpersonal trust scales, such as the trustworthiness part of 
Wrightsman’s Philosophies of Human Nature Scale (Stack, 1978, p. 569; Rotter, 1980, p.2).  
  To a limited extent the scales used in previous auditing studies showed significant 
main and/or interaction effects in explaining skeptical judgments and decisions. The 
trustworthiness and independence parts of the Wrightsman Philosophies of Human Nature 
Scale do not significantly relate to the auditor decision to trust a client in the Shaub (1996) 
study. However, the trustworthiness part of the Wrightsman Philosophies of Human Nature 
scale (Wrightsman, 1964, 1974) is significantly related to skeptical judgments in the Rose 
(2007) study. More particularly, less trusting auditors pay more attention to evidence of 
aggressive reporting and increase the belief that intentional misstatement has occurred. Hence, 
the results of using the Wrightsman subscale are inconclusive. Furthermore, Shaub’s Client 
Trust Scale only shows significant results in two of the 18 regressions tested. In those two 
instances there was an incentive present to overstate sales. The Rempel et al. Trust Scale 
showed some significant results: specifically, class room instruction interacted with skeptical 
attitude (as measured by the trust scale) in affecting the ability to detect frauds. None of the 
scales yield strong results.  
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  In contrast, the study in Chapter 2 found Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967) to 
be the most significant predictor (out of four measures) of skeptical judgments and decisions 
in an experiment concerning an analytical procedures setting. Thus, it appears fruitful to 
explore this scale further. 
 
Multidimensionality of the Interpersonal Trust Scale 
  The Interpersonal Trust Scale reflects a wide variety of social objects such as parents, 
teachers, physicians, politicians, classmates and friends (Rotter, 1967, p. 653). Although 
Rotter used a rather one-dimensional definition (Hunt et al., 1983), previous analyses of 
Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale items reveal a complex factor structure (see e.g., Chun and 
Campbell, 1974; Kaplan, 1973; Hunt et al., 1983; Wright and Tedeschi, 1975). Table 3.1 
shows the factors that have been identified in preceding factor-analytic studies (the factors are 
ordered according to their eigenvalues, highest eigenvalues first).  
 
 Kaplan (1973) Chun and 
Campbell (1974) 
Wright and 
Tedeschi (1975) 
Hunt et al. (1983) 
Factor 1 Institutional trust Political cynicism Political trust Exploitation 
Factor 2 Sincerity Interpersonal 
exploitation 
Paternal trust Sincerity 
Factor 3 Caution Societal hypocrisy Trust of strangers Institutional trust 
Factor 4  Reliable role-
performance 
  
Table 3.1 Summary of Interpersonal Trust Factors in Previous Research 
 
As revealed by the table, the names of the extracted factors differ across studies. However, the 
factor structures in the studies (see Appendix C for the underlying constructs) show 
similarities, as is also noted by Hunt et al. (1983): (1) institutional trust resembles political 
cynicism (and societal hypocrisy) and political trust.51 Hunt et al. (1983) describe this set of 
dimensions as ‘differential trust in the media and the legal system’; (2) sincerity is similar to 
reliable role performance and paternal trust. Hunt et al. (1983) describe this set of dimensions 
as the ‘differential disposition to accept people’s word’; and (3) exploitation resembles trust 
of strangers and (interpersonal) exploitation. Hunt et al. (1983) describe this set of dimensions 
as the ‘expectation that people will behave exploitatively and selfishly vs. fairly and 
altruistically’. 
  All of the factor-analytic studies of the Interpersonal Trust Scale in Table 3.1 have 
been conducted in a non-auditing context and three of the four studies use students as 
                                                 
51
 Unfortunately, the detailed factor structure regarding the Kaplan (1973) study was unavailable. 
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participants (i.e., Chun and Campbell, 1974; Kaplan, 1973; Wright and Tedeschi, 1975). Hunt 
et al. (1983) used a more demographically diverse group of non-college ‘volunteers’. This 
group consisted of visitors to the Ontario Science Centre.  
  Furthermore, none of the studies relate extracted interpersonal trust factors to 
behaviors.52 Factor-analytic studies can be useful because applying the dimensions in addition 
to (or instead of) the summated scale could increase the predictability of behaviors (see e.g., 
Chun and Campbell, 1974, p. 1066; Stack, 1978, p. 568). 
 
The relationship between interpersonal trust factors and skeptical judgments and 
decisions 
  Research in psychology has suggested that dispositional characteristics are related to 
judgments and decisions (cf., Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; 2005; Ajzen, 2005, pp 34-37). For 
example, as mentioned, auditors are assumed to be more skeptical when they have a lower 
level of interpersonal trust and if they behave accordingly (cf., Shaub, 1996; Hurtt, 2007). 
Although previous auditing studies examining the relationships between interpersonal trust 
and skeptical judgments and decisions show weak and inconclusive results, the study in 
Chapter 2 used Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967), not examined in prior auditing 
research, and found this measure to be the most significant predictor (out of four measures; 
see Footnote 48).  
  In this study, an exploratory factor analysis will be conducted to examine whether the 
extracted factors from the Interpersonal Trust Scale outperform the summated scale in their 
association with skeptical judgments and decisions. Since individual constructs underlying 
interpersonal trust are more specific and focused than the summated scale, it is likely that they 
better predict skeptical judgments and decisions (cf., Chun and Campbell, 1974; DeVellis, 
2003; Stack, 1978). Furthermore, it has been argued that the summated Interpersonal Trust 
Scale appears to contain redundant items, items that are not related to trust and items that do 
                                                 
52
 However, there is anecdotal evidence of the link between interpersonal trust factors and behaviors. Stack 
(1978, p. 568) mentions a personal communication with Rotter in which the latter states that two replicated 
factors of interpersonal trust are found to be more closely related to certain behaviors than the total interpersonal 
trust score is. One factor that Rotter found is trust of peers or other familiar social agents (examples of scale 
items: ‘Parents usually can be relied upon to keep their promises’ and ‘using the Honor System of not having a 
teacher present during exams would probably result in increased cheating’). This factor is similar to sincerity, 
reliable role performance and paternal trust. Students who score low on this dimension appear to cheat fellow 
students more (the type of cheating is not identified). The second factor is institutional or political trust, or trust 
in those with whom people of little direct contact (example of a scale item: ‘The judiciary is a place where we 
can all get unbiased treatment’). This factor is similar to the equivalently named factors in Table 3.1. In an 
unpublished PhD thesis, Roberts (1971) found Rotter’s political trust factor to be significantly related to high 
levels of social activism by students. 
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not refer to interpersonal relationships – like ‘the future seems very promising’ (see Chun and 
Campbell, 1974). Hence, factor analysis can be used to make the scale more effective and 
efficient.  
  Given the exploratory nature of this study, this issue is examined in the following 
research question: 
 
RQ1: Are individual Interpersonal Trust Scale factors more closely related to skeptical 
judgments and decisions than the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale? 
 
The relationship between situational variables, trust factors, and skeptical judgments 
and decisions 
  Auditor skeptical judgments and decisions are particularly necessary in high risk 
situations. For instance, professional standards dictate that engagements with a higher risk of 
material misstatement due to fraud should be audited with increased professional skepticism 
(IFAC, 2008, ISA 240.63). Furthermore, clients’ explanations of unexpected fluctuations 
should be corroborated by the auditor more fully if the risk related to the areas of explanation 
is high (cf., Hirst and Koonce, 1996, p. 473).   
  Prior empirical auditing research on professional skepticism shows that situational 
(risk) factors have an influence on skeptical judgments and decisions (e.g., Hurtt et al., 2008; 
Shaub, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 1996; Payne and Ramsay, 2005). In general, these studies 
suggest that auditors are sensitive to fraud and other risks in the expected direction. To 
corroborate earlier studies, the main effect of client risk on auditor skeptical behavior (as 
reflected in audit planning judgments) will be studied.  
  One of the most pervasive client risks is the client’s control environment (e.g., 
Haskins, 1987; Bernardi, 1994). Often companies’ financial reporting problems are related to 
a weak control environment (see e.g., COSO, 1992; Doyle et al., 2007). Furthermore, Cohen 
and Hanno (2000) found that audit planning judgments are responsive to the control 
environment. Hence, in this study client risk is manipulated as control environment strength 
(weak or strong). 
  In addition, prior auditing research reports significant interactive effects between 
situational factors and skeptical disposition in explaining skeptical judgments and decisions 
(e.g., Hurtt et al, 2008; Popova, 2006; Chapter 2 of this dissertation). These studies suggest 
that the relationship between skeptical characteristics and skeptical judgments and decisions 
are dependent upon the risk setting. Since extracted factors of interpersonal trust scale are 
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expected to be focused and efficient, as discussed (e.g., Chun and Campbell, 1974; Stack, 
1978), this may lead to interaction effects which are different from prior studies employing 
the summated scale (e.g., patterns may become clearer). Therefore, the interaction effect will 
be studied in research question 2. 
 
RQ2: Will the relationship between interpersonal trust, situational risk and skeptical 
judgments and decisions differ for some of the extracted Interpersonal Trust Scale 
factors as compared to the summated scale? 
   
3.3  Research design 
Task setting 
  The current study is placed in a planning-stage analytical procedures setting. 
Analytical procedures are an important part of financial statement auditing and are required 
by auditing standards during the planning and review stages (see e.g., ISA 520, IFAC, 2008; 
Hirst and Koonce, 1996, p. 458). Analytical procedures in the planning phase may reveal 
unexpected fluctuations that have been found to influence audit risk assessments and 
consequentially the audit work conducted, which subsequently impacts audit effectiveness 
and efficiency (see e.g., Cohen and Kida, 1989; Hirst and Koonce, 1996, p. 461, 464; Peecher, 
1996, p. 125-126; Koonce et al., 1995, p. 369). The audit client is the most common source of 
explanations concerning unexpected fluctuations in planning-stage analytical procedures (see 
e.g., Hirst and Koonce, 1996, p. 463; Trompeter and Wright, 2009). However, client 
explanations should be viewed with professional skepticism because management may lack 
independence (cf., Bedard and Biggs, 1991, pp. 77-79; Glover et al., 2000, p. 29; ISA 240, 
par. 42). 
  The case used in this study was adapted from that developed by Peecher (1996; 1994). 
The case contains an unexpected, material increase in the gross margin and a related 
management non-error explanation concerning the fluctuation. Peecher studied how auditors’ 
justification processes influence two dimensions of planning-stage analytical procedures 
performance: assessments of client-provided explanations; and the extent of the search for 
competing explanations. 
  The experimental case does not have a normative answer as to the actual cause of the 
fluctuation. It is a hypothetical but realistic case, without a seeded error. The case-materials 
(Peecher, 1994) were used with permission to develop the ‘MAEdic case’. Two versions of 
the case were developed by manipulating control environment strength. Using the 
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manipulation employed by Cohen and Hanno (2000), control environment strength was 
reflected as strong or weak, as will be described more fully in the next section. 
  The research instrument consists of two parts. The first part contains the case 
description and the tasks.53 The second part includes the Interpersonal Trust Scale, 
demographic information and debriefing questions. 
 
Description of the task 
  The dependent variables in this study consist of auditors’ skeptical planning judgments 
and decisions in conducting analytical procedures. Specifically, this study examines three 
types of ‘skeptical behavior’: 
 
• Increased scrutiny of source reliability, which means that an auditor not only considers 
the information that is provided by a client, but also the motivations that the client might 
have in providing that information (e.g., Hurtt et al. 2003). The assumption is that auditors 
who assess a lower probability of accepting management’s explanation show more 
skeptical judgments and decisions. The main variables studied are the likelihood that 
management’s explanation (a change in sales mix) accounts for substantially all of the 
increase in gross margin (>85%)54 (represented by the likelihood attached to the CFO’s 
explanation in Task 1 of the case) and the likelihood of fraud (which is requested in the 
second part of the questionnaire) (cf., Peecher, 1996; Shaub, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 
1996; Payne and Ramsay, 2005; Choo and Tan, 2000; Knapp and Knapp, 2001). 
• Increased alternative hypothesis generation requires auditors to construct explanations, 
hypotheses, or scenarios as alternative interpretations for the information that they observe 
(e.g., Hurtt et al. 2003). Furthermore, auditors are also required to understand and explain 
any significant differences, and the ability to generate potential alternatives is a crucial 
step in developing that understanding. The assumptions are that auditors show more 
skeptical judgments and decisions when they: (1) are able to generate a greater number of 
plausible alternative explanations; (2) provide more error explanations; and (3) assess 
higher probabilities of the truth of error explanations (see e.g., Peecher, 1996). Error 
explanations are of particular concern for the auditor since they may lead to the 
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 However, the question concerning the dependent variable ‘likelihood of fraud’ was asked in the second part of 
the questionnaire since that otherwise might have had a demand effect on the responses of the other dependent 
variables. 
54
 Mentioning a percentage expresses the precise meaning of ‘substantially all’ (cf., Koonce, 1992; Peecher, 
1996).  
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identification of a material misstatement that could cause inappropriate decisions by users 
who rely on the financial statements. As a result, the variables studied are the number of 
alternative explanations provided (calculated as the number of error and non-error 
explanations provided in addition to the CFO’s non-error explanation in the case), the 
number of (intentional and unintentional) error explanations provided and the likelihood 
that the error explanations account for substantially all of the increase in gross margin 
(>85%) (cf., Peecher, 1996; McMillan and White, 1993) (calculated as the sum of the 
likelihoods attached to the error explanations given and further referred to as the ‘weight 
of the error explanations’).  
• Expanded evidence gathering. The assumptions are that auditors who want to conduct 
further testing are more skeptical (e.g., Hurtt et al. 2003), as measured by the number of 
budgeted hours (cf., Shaub, 1996; Shaub and Lawrence, 1996; Hurtt et al., 2008; Popova, 
2006). Last year’s budgeted time for substantive testing of the sales account were 
presented as 100 hours. It was mentioned that last year there were no specific matters 
meriting attention. Based on the case description participants had to then plan this year’s 
substantive testing budget. 
 
Description of the independent variables 
  In the psychology literature, two scales are often used to measure interpersonal trust: 
Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967) and the Trustworthiness part of Wrightsman’s 
Philosophies of Human Nature Scale (1964, 1974) (see e.g., Johnson-George and Swap, 1982; 
Stack, 1978; Webb and Worchel, 1986). Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (Rotter, 1967) is 
examined in the current study for 5 reasons: (1) the study presented in Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation found Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (1967) to be the best predictor (out of 
four measures) of skeptical judgments and decisions; (2) Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale is 
widely used and accepted in non-auditing research (see e.g., Hoell, 2004; Johnson-George and 
Swap, 1982; Stack, 1978; Webb and Worchel, 1986); (3) the stability of Rotter’s 
Interpersonal Trust Scale is strong (Rotter, 1967); (4) in non-auditing studies, Rotter’s 
Interpersonal Trust Scale has been associated more strongly with actual behaviors and other 
validating evidence than Wrightsman’s Philosophies of Human Nature Scale (Stack, 1978, p. 
569; Rotter, 1980, p.2); and (5) the trustworthiness part of Wrightsman’s Philosophies of 
Human Nature Scale has not shown unequivocal results in two previous auditing studies 
(Rose, 2007; Shaub, 1996).  
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  Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale consists of 25 items that are scored on a five point 
Likert Scale (varying from strongly disagree to strongly agree). The scale items deal with 
interpersonal trust in a range of situations, involving a number of different social agents 
including parents, salespeople, the judiciary, people in general, political figures, as well as 
news media. The scale items are shown in Appendix C.  
  As mentioned, factor analysis techniques are used to identify dimensions within the 
Interpersonal Trust Scale. These dimensions are used as independent variables in subsequent 
analyses. 
  The second independent variable is control environment strength, manipulated as 
strong (coded as 0) and weak (coded as 1) and is used as the Control Environment Strength 
(CES) variable in the analyses. For this purpose the Cohen and Hanno (2000) case materials 
were used with permission. In the weak control environment setting, management is described 
as being aggressive in business practices, having frequent disputes with the external auditors, 
applying internal control procedures less strictly if work progress suffered, and utilizing 
compensation plans based primarily on achieving short-term accounting-based performance 
measures. In the strong control environment setting, management is described as conservative 
in business practices, having few disputes with external auditors, following a strict policy for 
following all established internal control procedures, and employing compensation based on 
several financial and non-financial performance measures. See Exhibit 2.1 in Chapter 2 for 
the manipulation employed. 
To examine the effects of skeptical characteristics and strength of the control 
environment on skeptical judgments and decisions, it is necessary to control for the auditors’ 
prior task specific experience. In order to measure prior task experience the research 
instrument contained a question that asked for the participants’ years of experience in 
conducting analytical procedures. Accordingly, task specific experience is statistically 
controlled in the analyses (cf., Chapter 2).  
 
Validation of the research instrument and manipulation checks 
  Two experienced auditors judged the case description and compared the English and 
the Dutch versions of the case description.55 Furthermore, four academics provided comments 
                                                 
55
 Since most of the participants in the experiment were living in the Netherlands and their mother tongue is 
Dutch, the Interpersonal Trust Scale was translated into Dutch. In order to do so, a combination of the Parallel 
Blind Technique and Translation/Back-Translation methods was used (Behling and Law, 2000). 
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on the research instrument. Two pilot-tests were conducted with 19 staff level auditors. Based 
on their remarks adjustments were made to the instrument. 
  Two manipulation check questions were asked to examine the effectiveness of the 
control environment strength manipulation. These questions were similar to the ones used by 
Cohen and Hanno (2000) and required an assessment of the level of overall control risk (1, 
very low risk, to 9, very high risk) and the effectiveness of the control environment on a 9 
point scale (1, very ineffective, to 9, very effective). These questions were preceded by the 
IFAC (2006) definitions of control risk (ISA 200.20) and the control environment (ISA 
315.67). The mean value of the level of overall control risk was 6.50 in the weak control 
environment setting versus 4.91 in the strong control environment setting. The mean value of 
the effectiveness of the control environment was 3.50 in the weak control environment setting 
versus 6.06 in the strong control environment setting The results of a independent samples t-
test show highly significantly different scores in the expected direction for both questions 
(p<0.01) which indicates that the manipulation was effective.56 
   
Conduct of the experiment 
  The experiment was administered during 11 sessions of three of the Big Four auditing 
firms. Nine sessions were part of the yearly summer courses and two of the sessions were 
during monthly partner meetings.57 
  The author was present during all sessions and provided short instructions before the 
start of the experiment. The only statement about the purpose of the research was that it 
contained a case on conducting preliminary analytical procedures. At the end of the research 
instrument, participants could leave their email address to indicate that they would like to 
receive a summary of the findings; seventy-one percent (207 out of 291 participants) did so, 
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 The participants in the experiment were asked two questions on case realism and understandability. The first 
question was ‘how realistic do you think the case was?’ The response scale was a 9 point scale with the anchors 
‘highly unrealistic’ (value 1) and ‘highly realistic’ (value 9). The mean score was 6.03 and the standard deviation 
was 1.50. The mean is significantly above the middle point (5) of the scale (p<0.01, one-sample t-test) which 
suggests that on average the case was viewed as realistic. The second question was ‘how understandable do you 
consider the case to be?’ The response scale was a 9 point scale with the anchors ‘very unclear’ (value 1) and 
‘very clear’ (value 9). The mean score was 6.68 and the standard deviation was 1.42. The mean score was 
significantly above the middle point (5) of the scale (p<0.01, one-sample t-test) which suggests that the case was 
understandable. 
57
 The audit firms decided on the sessions in which the researchers were to collect the data. This resulted in the 
fact that the average experience of participants differed by firm which led to significant correlation between firm 
and auditing experience (cf., Table 3.2). Furthermore, the firms allowed us to collect data during several 
international sessions in which the official language was English. Therefore, language was also significantly 
correlated with auditing experience since most auditors completing the English version of the research 
instrument (the Firm B auditors) had little experience (see Table 3.2).  Hence, the effects of experience, firm and 
language effects cannot be disentangled. However, the careful procedures used for translation, as described 
previously, provide comfort that the meaning of the questions was conveyed in an accurate, clear manner. 
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suggesting a high level of interest in the study. In addition, the participants received a printed 
list with instructions for completing the instrument that was glued on a large sealed envelope 
with the research materials. All participants then opened the envelope which contained two 
smaller envelopes with parts one and two of the research instrument.  
  There were two versions of the first part of the research instrument as a result of the 
manipulation of the strength of the control environment. Furthermore, four versions of the 
second part of the research instrument were used, alternating the order of the questions of the 
Interpersonal Trust Scale. Hence, in total there were eight different versions of the research 
instrument that were randomly distributed to participants. A One-Way ANOVA testing for 
differences in mean scores on the interpersonal trust score between the four versions showed 
no significant order effects. Therefore, order is not considered as a covariate in the subsequent 
analyses. 
  The two envelopes containing the parts of the instruments were identified with 
identical numbers in order to enable ex post matching. To enhance accuracy in completing the 
instrument, participants were asked to write down their name on the envelope in order to 
induce a feeling of accountability (cf., Asare et al., 2000). After completion of the first part of 
the research instrument participants were asked to put it back into the first envelope and seal 
it. This was done to prevent them from changing answers in part one while working on part 
two. Then they continued with part two. After they had finished part two they put that in the 
second envelope, sealed it and put the two smaller envelopes into a large envelope. 
 
Sample 
  Three of the Big Four auditing firms participated in the study (referred to as Firm A, 
Firm B and Firm C). Descriptive information about the sample can be found in Table 3.2. In 
total, 291 auditors participated in the study.58 The dispersion of participants across staff levels 
was relatively uniform but differed by firm due to data availability. On average the auditors 
had about 10 years of general auditing experience and 10 years of task specific experience 
with conducting analytical procedures. Both general experience and task specific experience 
suggest that all participants possessed the requisite task knowledge to perform the analytical 
procedures task examined. 
 
 
                                                 
58
 In the subsequent analyses, the size of N is not always identical to the sample size mentioned here. These 
differences are predominantly caused by missing values. 
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  Firm A Firm B Firm C Total 
      
Number of participants  
 
96 
 
140 55 291 
      
Number of sessions  3 6 2 11 
      
Staff level Partners 25 0 47 72 
 Managers 41 19 6 66 
 Seniors 27 65 0 92 
 Staff 0 54 0 54 
      
Gender Male 84 92 51 227 
 Female 11 47 2 60 
      
General experience Mean years 15.36 2.99 22.16 10.48 
 St.dev. 8.95 2.00 8.52 9.37 
Experience with 
analytical review 
Mean years 14.75 2.75 20.07 9.85 
 St.dev. 9.36 1.93 6.86 8.86 
      
Control Environment 
strength 
Weak 47 68 27 142 
 Strong 49 72 28 149 
      
Language Dutch 96 101 41 238 
 English 0 39 14 53 
Table 3.2 Descriptive information about the study 
  
Coding of qualitative responses 
Participants were asked to think about possible explanations for the increase in the 
gross margin percentage in the case-description other than the explanation provided by the 
client. Explanations were coded by an experienced audit manager and by the author. The 
coding comprised an assessment of the plausibility of the explanation (i.e., is the explanation 
logical and in the right direction?)59 and an assessment of type of explanation (non-error, 
unintentional error, intentional error and ambiguous unintentional/intentional explanations).60 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the participants identified a broad range of explanations for the 
increase in gross margin (for example, exchange rate effects, misallocation of costs and 
improved efficiency). A more detailed coding of the explanations is outside the scope of this 
thesis. 
Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient for coding the plausibility of the explanation was 0.805 
(p<0.01) and Cohen’s Kappa Coefficient for coding the type of explanation was 0.864 
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 There were about 30 non plausible explanations that were excluded from the analyses. 
60
 The classification into intentional and non-intentional errors was used in testing the robustness of the 
regression findings concerning the number of total error explanations. The results of the regressions were found 
to be robust. 
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(p<0.01), which reflect a high level of agreement (e.g., Landis and Koch, 1977). Differences 
were discussed by the two coders and mutually resolved. The findings presented in the next 
section use the reconciled data. 
 
3.4  Results 
Factor analysis of the interpersonal trust scale 
  A descriptive analysis of the interpersonal trust score reveals a mean of 72.98, a 
standard deviation of 8.76, and a range of 45-105. The score has a theoretical range of 25-125, 
and a theoretical midpoint of 75. An inspection of the histogram, as well as a Kolmogorov 
Smirnov test (both not shown), suggest that the interpersonal trust score is normally 
distributed. The Cronbach alpha is 0.760, which is considered to be adequate (see e.g., 
Nunnally, 1978). 
  Before conducting factor analysis, the testing assumptions are considered (see e.g., 
Hair et al., 2006). Bartlett’s test of sphericity is highly significant (p<0.01), which indicates a 
relationship between the items. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy is 
0.734 which is considered to be ‘middling’ but far above the cut-off point of 0.50 needed for 
proceeding with a factor-analysis. Also the variable specific Measures of Sampling Adequacy 
are all above 0.50, ranging from 0.547 to 0.837, suggesting sufficient intra-correlation 
between the items.61 In sum, factor analysis appears to be an appropriate technique to identify 
underlying constructs contained within the summated score. 
  In order to test for dimensionality of the Interpersonal Trust Scale, common factor 
analysis was conducted (Hair et al., 2006, p. 118). The specific method used is a Principal 
Axis Factoring with Direct Oblimin Rotation.62 Based on conservative guidelines (Hair et al., 
2006, p. 128), factor loadings of 0.35 and higher are considered to be significant in the 
analysis.  
  As mentioned, most of the previous research concerning the Interpersonal Trust Scale 
has shown three dimensions (see e.g., Hunt et al., 1983). Given this a priori expectation and 
an inspection of the scree plot (not shown), the factor analysis is set to extract three factors 
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 Furthermore, among the interpersonal trust scale items there are 176 significant (one-tailed test, p<0.05) 
Pearson correlations out of 300 correlations, ranging from about 0.10 to about 0.40, indicating significant 
correlation. However, the correlations are somewhat low. Partial correlations from the anti-image correlation 
matrix are all far below the cut-off point of 0.7 (i.e., they are all below 0.2), and are hence acceptable (Hair et al., 
2006, p. 114). 
62
 Other methods and rotations show similar solutions. 
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(cf., Kaplan, 1973; Hunt et al., 1983).63 Based on the results of the factor analysis the model 
was re-specified by leaving out the 11 non-significant items. Before rotation, the percentage 
of variance explained is 15.869% for factor 1, 5.558% for factor 2, and 4.569% for factor 3.64 
 
Factor 1 Honesty and Integrity    
Item nr. Description 
 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Factor 
Loading 
18 Most people can be counted on to do what they say they 
will do. 
3.2955 0.7714 0.565 
14 Most elected officials are really sincere in their campaign 
promises. 
2.4742 0.9551 0.537 
21 Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. 2.6357 0.8933 0.460 
23 Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think 
you are ignorant of their speciality. 
2.7595 0.8851 0.450 
20 Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they 
preach. 
3.0928 0.9294 0.396 
22 Most students in school would not cheat even if they are 
sure of getting away with it. 
2.2371 0.9625 0.358 
     
Factor 2 Institutional Trust    
Item nr. Description 
 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Factor 
Loading 
9 (r) Most people would be horrified if they knew how much 
news that the public hears and sees is distorted. 
2.6942 0.9573 -0.691 
13 (r) If we really knew what was going on in international 
politics, the public would have reason to be more 
frightened than they now seem to be. 
2.8007 0.9938 -0.562 
24 (r) A large share of accident claims filed against insurance 
companies are phony. 
3.3471 0.8943 -0.430 
     
Factor 3 Exploitation    
Item nr. Description 
 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Factor 
Loading 
2 (r) In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious 
until they have provided evidence that they are 
trustworthy. 
2.7801 0.9467 0.506 
19 (r) In these competitive times one has to be alert or someone 
is likely to take advantage of you. 
2.7079 0.9251 0.482 
Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics by extracted factor 
 
The main descriptive statistics for the three factors from the re-specified factor model are 
presented in Table 3.3.65 The three extracted factors contain similar items as in the dimensions 
                                                 
63
 When a latent root criterion (eigenvalues>1) is used, the factor analysis results in 8 factors (1 with 5 variables; 
3 with 2 variables and 4 with 1 variable). This is similar to earlier studies (e.g., Chun and Campbell, 1974). 
However, the total variance explained by the 8 factors is 34.173% of which 22.444% is explained by the first 
three factors and the fourth to the eighth factor explain only 2.3458% on average per factor. Hence, the later 
factors on average do not explain significantly greater variance per factor than when utilizing the three factors 
identified. 
64
 Given the non-orthogonal rotation used it is not possible to partition variance uniquely among the factors after 
rotation since the rotated factors share common variance. 
65
 Of the 14 items that were entered into the respecified factor analysis, three items were not significant in the 
solution: item 6, 15 and 17 (i.e., their factor loading was smaller than 0.35). They are not shown in the table. 
 72 
found in the previous factor-analytic studies (see Appendix C). The first extracted factor 
contains similar items to the ones that have been described by Hunt et al. (1983) to comprise a 
‘differential disposition to accept people’s word’. In an auditing setting, this factor will be of 
particular importance concerning the honesty and integrity of management (see e.g., ISA 
240). For example, ISA 240.97 states: ‘If the integrity or honesty of management or those 
charged with governance is doubted, the auditor considers seeking legal advice to assist in the 
determination of the appropriate course of action.’ Therefore, the first factor is labeled 
‘Honesty and Integrity’.  
  The second factor partly contains items similar to the ones in the factor that has been 
described by Hunt et al. (1983) as ‘differential trust in the media and the legal system’. 
Interesting in this respect is the trust typology presented by McKnight and Chervany (2001, p. 
33) which consists of three types of trust: (1) trust in general others; (2) trust in the situation 
or structure; and (3) trust in specific others. They term the second type of trust ‘institutional 
trust’ and distinguish this type of trust from trust in other people (either in general or 
specifically). Institutional trust stems from the sociology tradition which posits that ‘people 
can rely on others because of structures, situations, or roles that provide assurances that things 
will go well’ (McKnight and Chervany, 2001, p. 37). Although institutional trust is discerned 
from interpersonal trust by McKnight and Charvany (2001), it does affect interpersonal trust 
by making the trustor feel more comfortable about trusting others in the situation (McKnight 
and Chervany, 2001, p. 37). Both item 9 and 13 (fear for distortion of news and fear for the 
reality behind international politics) appear to be more related to underlying structures and 
situations than to interpersonal factors. However, the third item (phoniness of accident claims 
filed against insurance companies) does not seem to seamlessly fit with the other two items. 
Yet, also across other factor extraction and rotation methods this item appears to be related to 
items 9 and 13. A reason may be that the filing of phony accident claims is interpreted more 
like a structural issue than it is being viewed as trust in other people.66 This could be caused 
by the fact that the potential victim of the phony claims mentioned in the item is the insurance 
company while the claims do not negatively affect the ‘general public’ (i.e., ‘you and me’) 
immediately. Hence, it is in that sense more institutional (the functioning of an arrangement 
between the insurance company and individual policy holders), and like the other two 
institutional trust items affects interpersonal trust by making the trustor feel more (or less) 
comfortable about trusting others. In the auditing standards there seems to be no specific 
                                                 
66
 Note that item 24 is not a (significant) part of any of the factors in previous studies. 
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treatment of the concept of institutional trust. Therefore, this second factor will be labeled 
‘Institutional Trust’ based on McKnight and Chervany (2001) and similar factor labeling in 
Kaplan (1973) and Hunt et al. (1983).67  
  The third factor encompasses the items that are also part of the factor that has been 
described by Hunt et al. (1983) as ‘expectation that people will behave exploitatively and 
selfishly vs. fairly and altruistically’. Based on the fraud triangle, auditors have to assess 
whether management has incentives or pressures to engage in fraudulent financial reporting 
(cf., ISA 240:10). Although the two items in this factor may be related to this phenomenon, 
the term ‘exploitation’ appears to better describe the underlying factor. This identification also 
relates to the already existing factor labels concerning these items (Chun and Campbell, 1974; 
Hunt et al., 1983). Therefore this factor is labeled ‘Exploitation’. 
  A reliability analysis of the three factors shows Cronbach alphas of 0.646, 0.553 and 
0.525 respectively. Nunnaly and Bernstein (1994, pp. 264-265) state that ‘in the early stages 
of predictive or construct validation research, time and energy can be saved by using 
instruments that only have modest reliability. An often mentioned necessary level of alpha is 
0.70 (Nunnaly, 1978). However, the lower value of 0.60 is also used (cf. DeVellis, 1991). 
DeVellis (1991) considers values below 0.60 to be unacceptable. Based on this norm the 
internal consistency reliability of Institutional Trust and Exploitation is low. Hence, the 
following analyses for these two factors should be interpreted with care. In further analyses 
the factor scores (regression method) are used in the analyses to study whether the factors are 
more related to skeptical judgments and decisions than the summated Interpersonal Trust 
Scale. 
                                                 
67
 All the three significant items constituting ‘Institutional Trust’ have negative factor loadings. The sign has no 
intrinsic meaning and should not be used to assess the extent of the relationship between the variable and the 
factor (Kim and Mueller, 1978). However, as a consequence of the negative sign the saved factor scores, which 
are used in the further analyses, were reversed to enable appropriate interpretation. 
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Regression analyses 
  To interpret the nature of the influence of the independent variables, in Table 3.4 
linear regressions for each of the six dependent variables68 on all independent variables are 
presented for the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale and for the three respective 
interpersonal trust factors.69 The scores on Interpersonal Trust were mean centered (see e.g., 
Kromrey and Foster-Johnson, 1998). Given the fact that the factor scores were used for the 
three respective interpersonal trust factors, the mean of these factors is zero and hence mean 
centering is redundant. 
 
Extracted interpersonal trust factors  Interpersonal 
Trust 
(summated) 
Honesty and 
Integrity 
Institutional 
Trust 
Exploitation 
Regression of ‘the likelihood that 
management explanation is right’     
Constant 39.644*** 39.820 39.116 39.325 
Control environment strength (CES) -3.631* [-.084] -3.983 [-.092] -3.636 [-.084] -3.938 [-.091] 
IPT factor (IPTF) .359** [.148] 2.459 [.095] 3.373 [.129] 2.563 [.085] 
Task-specific experience -.153 [-.066] -.151 [-.065] -.111 [-.047] -.107 [-.046] 
CES*IPTF -.045 [-.012] 1.082 [.028] -2.474 [-.063] -2.599 [-.061 
Adj. R-square (N) .015* (N=278) .009 (N=278) .005 (N=278) -.001 (N=278) 
     
Regression of ‘the likelihood of fraud’     
Constant 18.533*** 18.586*** 18.954*** 19.249*** 
Control environment strength (CES) 22.927*** [.492] 23.610*** [.507] 22.817*** [.490] 23.689*** [.508] 
IPT factor (IPTF) -.304** [-.115] -2.405 [-.086] -2.399 [-.084] -4.395** [-.133] 
Task-specific experience .164 [.066] .143 [.058] .126 [.051] .076 [.031] 
CES*IPTF -.666** [-.165] -5.252** [-.129] -7.236** [-.169] 1.085 [.024] 
Adj. R-square (N) .310*** (N=278) .284*** (N=278) .300*** (N=278) .260*** (N=278) 
     
Regression of ‘the number of 
alternative explanations’     
Constant 3.188*** 3.202 3.205 3.238*** 
Control environment strength (CES) .142 [.040] .152 [.042] .143 [.040] .159 [.044] 
IPT factor (IPTF) .018 [.088] .162 [.075] .016 [.007] .611*** [.242] 
Task-specific experience .023** [.123] .023 [.121] .022 [.117] .018 [.098] 
CES*IPTF -.056** [-.180] -.422 [-.133] -.243 [-.074] -.690** [-.193] 
Adj. R-square (N) .019* (N=284) .009 (N=284) .004 (N=284) .029** (N=284) 
     
                                                 
68
 Descriptive statistics concerning the six dependent variables for the dataset used in Chapter 2 can be found in 
Table 2.4. The descriptives in Table 2.4 are similar to the descriptives regarding the IPT sample. 
69
 Given the potential relationships between the dependent variables, four MANOVAs were performed for 
interpersonal trust and the three respective interpersonal trust factors. The dependent variables discussed 
previously were included. As independent variables, the models include interpersonal trust (factor), control 
environment strength, task specific experience and an interaction term between interpersonal trust (factor) and 
control environment strength. The findings for the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale model show statistical 
significance for all independent variables. Hence, all independent variables appear to have a significant influence 
on the collective set of dependent variables. For the Honesty and Integrity model, the tests show statistical 
significance for Honesty and Integrity, control environment strength and task specific experience. This indicates 
that Honesty and Integrity, control environment strength and task specific experience have a significant influence 
on the collective set of dependent variables. For the Institutional Trust model, the tests show statistical 
significance for all independent variables. Finally, for the Exploitation model, the tests show statistical 
significance for all independent variables, except for the interaction of Exploitation with control environment 
strength. 
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Extracted interpersonal trust factors  Interpersonal 
Trust 
(summated) 
Honesty and 
Integrity 
Institutional 
Trust 
Exploitation 
Regression of ‘the number of error 
explanations’     
Constant .768*** .789*** .768*** .817*** 
Control environment strength (CES) .671*** [.199] .677*** [.201] .673*** [.200] .684*** [.203] 
IPT factor (IPTF) .021 [.113] .233* [.116] .165 [.081] .479*** [.202] 
Task-specific experience .045*** [.256] .045*** [.252] .045*** [.254] .041*** [.232] 
CES*IPTF -.057*** [-.196] -.457** [-.154] -.498** [-.162] -.497* [-.149] 
Adj. R-square (N) .111*** (N=283) .102*** (N=283) .104*** (N=283) .109*** (N=283) 
     
Regression of ‘the weight of the error 
explanations’     
Constant 12.468*** 12.082*** 12.746*** 13.265*** 
Control environment strength (CES) 16.947*** [.293] 17.266*** [.299] 17.161*** [.297] 17.324*** [.300] 
IPT factor (IPTF) .028 [.009] .110 [.003] 1.188 [.034] 1.558 [.038] 
Task-specific experience .590*** [.194] .631*** [.208] .554*** [.182] .509*** [.167] 
CES*IPTF -.664** [-.133] -8.629** [-.170] -5.120 [-.097] -.021 [.000] 
Adj. R-square (N) .124*** (N=280) .136*** (N=280) .115*** (N=280) .110*** (N=280) 
     
Regression of ‘the number of budgeted 
hours’     
Constant 121.070*** 121.483 121.784 119.370*** 
Control environment strength (CES) 7.441* [.098] 7.906 [.105] 7.461 [.099] 7.847** [-.104] 
IPT factor (IPTF) -.360 [-.084] -2.148 [-.047] -3.439 [-.075] -9.410** [-.176] 
Task-specific experience .558** [.136] .500 [.122] .498 [.121] .715*** [.174] 
CES*IPTF -.287 [-.044] -.111 [-.002] .357 [.005] -12.241** [-.161] 
Adj. R-square (N) .022** (N=273) .011 (N=273)  .014 (N=273) .103*** (N=273) 
Significance is indicated by asterisks: *<.10; **<.05; ***<.01. For the directional hypotheses concerning CES 
and SPC, all significance-levels are one-sided unless the results are in the opposite direction. For the non-
significant models no significance is shown for the coefficients. The betas are shown in brackets. 
 
 
Table 3.4  Regression coefficients for interpersonal trust and interpersonal trust factor scores 
and the models’ adjusted R-squares 
 
Results for RQ 1: Are individual Interpersonal Trust Scale factors more closely related to 
skeptical judgments and decisions than the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale? 
  In testing RQ1 it is noteworthy that in terms of highest adjusted R-squares, overall the 
regression models with the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale performs the best. In two of 
the six models the summated interpersonal trust measure is significant as an independent 
variable.  
  When looking at the findings for the individual factors, Honesty and Integrity is 
marginally significant concerning the number of error explanations, although the sign in the 
model is not in the expected direction, perhaps due to the interaction effects present. 
Institutional Trust is not significant in any of the models. In four of the six models the 
Exploitation factor is significant, although the sign in the models concerning the number of 
alternative explanations and the number of error explanations is not in the expected direction, 
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perhaps due to the interaction effects present. The interactions will be discussed in the next 
section.  
  In sum, four of the six models with the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale have a 
higher explanatory power than with the individual factors. Interestingly, the main effect of 
Exploitation appears to be significant twice as many times as the summated scale (four times 
versus two times). This means that, although the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale results 
in better explanatory models overall, the main effect of Exploitation appears to be of interest. 
 
Results for RQ2: Influence of control environment strength 
As can be seen in Table 3.4, control environment strength is significant in three of the 
six models (i.e., the likelihood of fraud, the number of error explanations and the weight of 
the error explanations) for summated interpersonal trust as well as for the three interpersonal 
trust factors. In addition, for the summated scale control environment strength is marginally 
significant for the models explaining the likelihood that management explanation is right and 
the number of budgeted hours. Furthermore, for Exploitation, control environment strength is 
significant for the number of budgeted hours. All effects are all in the expected direction. This 
indicates substantial influence of control environment strength on skeptical judgments and 
decisions. 
Furthermore, there are significant interaction effects, as can be seen in Table 3.4. 
There were two basic interaction patterns identified for the summated Interpersonal Trust 
Scale in Chapter 2. The first pattern pertained to the dependent variable ‘assessment of the 
likelihood of fraud’ and is depicted in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1  A plot of the interaction between summated Interpersonal Trust and control 
environment strength for the likelihood of fraud variable 
 
Figure 3.1 indicates an almost horizontal line for the strong control environment setting. 
When the control environment is strong all auditors assess a similar level of fraud risk 
regardless of their level of interpersonal trust. The weak control environment setting shows a 
downward sloping line indicating that auditors with a lower level of interpersonal trust (i.e., 
more skepticism) assess a higher likelihood of fraud than auditors with a higher level of 
personal trust. 
  The second pattern in Chapter 2 concerned the interaction effect for the variable ‘total 
error explanations’, which is depicted in Figure 3.2.70  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
70
 The pattern for the interaction effects regarding the ‘number of alternative explanations’ and the ‘weight of the 
error explanations’ were similar to the effect in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2  A plot of the interaction between summated Interpersonal Trust and control 
environment strength for the variable ‘number of total error explanations’ 
  
This figure shows an almost horizontal line for the weak control environment setting, 
suggesting that auditors generate a similar number of error explanations regardless of their 
level of interpersonal trust in the weak control environment setting. In the strong control 
environment setting the line is upward sloping which suggests that auditors with a lower level 
of interpersonal trust generate less error alternatives than auditors with a higher level of 
interpersonal trust.71 
  These two interaction patterns are similar to the patterns found for the derived 
Interpersonal Trust factors. The likelihood of fraud variable is significantly influenced by the 
interaction regarding the Institutional Trust factor and marginally significantly influenced by 
the Honesty and Integrity factor. The pattern concerning the number of error explanations 
                                                 
71
 The examination of the interaction effect in Figure 3.2 suggests that auditors show more skeptical behavior 
when the client has a weak control environment, regardless of skeptical disposition. However, it was not 
expected that in the strong control environment setting auditors with a lower level of interpersonal trust would 
generate less error explanations than auditors with a higher level of trust. This appears to be caused by the fact 
that, in the strong control environment setting, less trusting auditors seem to generate less error explanations than 
their more trusting colleagues but allocate more weight per error explanation. Hence, the less trusting auditors 
seem to focus more intensively on fewer errors in the strong control environment setting. This effect is discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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variable is similar for the interaction regarding Honesty and Integrity and Institutional Trust 
and for the marginal significant interaction concerning Exploitation.72 
 In addition, there is a significant interaction effect of the Exploitation factor and 
control environment strength in explaining the number of budgeted hours. This effect is 
plotted in Figure 3.3.73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 A plot of the interaction between the Exploitation factor and control environment 
strength for the variable ‘number of budgeted hours’ 
 
The plot shows that, particularly in the weak control environment setting, auditors showing 
less trust (as a result of the assessment of the pressures and incentives management may have) 
assess a higher number of budgeted hours. This resembles the pattern in Figure 3.1. 
  Since extracted factors of interpersonal trust scale are expected to be focused and 
efficient (e.g., Chun and Campbell, 1974; Stack, 1978), RQ 2 studied whether interaction 
effects concerning the extracted factors are different from prior studies employing the 
                                                 
72
 Furthermore, the plot is also similar to the plots concerning the weight of the error explanations in which the 
interaction of the Honesty and Integrity factor and control environment strength is significant. This also holds for 
the plot concerning the number of alternative explanations in which the interaction between Exploitation and 
control environment strength is significant. 
73
 The difference between high and low exploitation scores regarding the mean number of budgeted hours is 
significant for the weak control environment (independent samples t-test; p<0.05). 
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summated scale. The findings show that the patterns did not become clearer across the 
different skeptical judgments and decisions. In general, it can be concluded that the 
interaction effects of the derived interpersonal trust factors are similar to the interaction 
effects of the summated scale reported in Chapter 2. Hence, no different patterns of 
interaction effects were found concerning the derived factors. However, the summated 
interpersonal trust factor shows the most significant interaction effects, directly followed by 
the Honesty and Integrity factor and the Exploitation factor.  
 
Additional analyses: differences across ranks in interpersonal trust and in skeptical 
judgments and decisions 
In addition to the previous results, this study provides evidence of the relationship 
between auditor rank and auditor interpersonal trust and skeptical judgments and decisions. 
The previous analyses in this study show that task specific experience (measured as 
years of experience in conducting analytical reviews), which was included as a control 
variable in the models, has a significance influence. Task specific experience was 
significantly positively associated with number of alternative explanations generated, number 
of error explanations generated, the weights attached to the error explanations and the number 
of budgeted hours. This indicates that in this study the more experienced the auditor is, the 
more skeptical judgments and decisions are exhibited.74 In addition, it is important to know 
whether auditors differ across ranks in terms of skeptical disposition and skeptical 
judgments.75 Significant differences exist in the importance of auditor attributes between 
auditor ranks (see e.g., Tan, 1999; Tan and Libby, 1997; Dillard and Ferris, 1979). For 
example, Tan and Libby (1997) find that outstanding auditors at the assistant and senior levels 
are distinguished on the basis of technical knowledge, while outstanding managers are 
distinguished based on their tacit managerial knowledge. Differences in auditor attributes 
influence auditor judgment and decision making (e.g., Bonner, 2008; Nelson and Tan, 2005). 
Since auditors’ tasks as well as their training, responsibilities, and authority are closely 
associated with professional rank (cf. Abdolmohammadi, 1999; Abdolmohammadi and 
Wright, 1987; Tan, 1999), it is important to know whether auditors differ across ranks in 
                                                 
74
 Task specific experience was also significantly positively correlated with interpersonal trust (Pearson 
correlation=0.174; p<0.01). Hence, the auditors with more task specific experience possess a higher level of 
interpersonal trust. This finding is similar to the finding for rank which is considered in the remainder of this 
section. 
75
 According to ISA 330.4, the assignment of engagement personnel to particular engagements should reflect the 
auditor’s risk assessment, which is based on the auditor’s understanding of the entity. For example, one of the 
responses to address the risks of material misstatement at the financial statement level is assigning more 
experienced staff or those with special skills or using experts, who are often higher ranked auditors. 
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terms of skeptical disposition and skeptical judgments. For example, partners have the 
responsibility and authority for determining whether the audit evidence is sufficient. 
Furthermore, it is very important to know whether partner’s skepticism is higher than that of 
the audit team members since partners have the definite say in signing off the audit opinions. 
Thus, there is great reliance on the judgments and decisions of partners and their professional 
skepticism. 
There is no unequivocal theory on the relationship between auditor rank and auditor 
professional skepticism. On the one hand, with increasing rank auditors may become less 
skeptical due to their need to work with and develop a strong relationship with clients (see 
e.g., Bazerman et al., 1997; 2002; Emby and Etherington, 1996) and due to the fact that 
encountering fraud in practice is rare (see e.g., Kaplan et al., 1992; Nelson, 2009; Solomon et 
al., 1999; Taylor, 2000). There is some support for this notion in previous studies. For 
example, Shaub and Lawrence (1999) find that auditors at the staff level show higher levels of 
skeptical thoughts and behavior than seniors, managers and partners. Also Payne and Ramsay 
(2005) report that staff auditors assess a client explanation as less truthful than senior auditors 
and thus are more skeptical than senior auditors. On the other hand, auditors may become 
more skeptical with increasing rank due to increased litigation risk, the need for greater 
conservatism and greater responsibilities to the firm and society (see e.g., Trompeter, 1994; 
Salterio, 1996; Moreno and Bhattacharjee, 2001).  
 
 
 
 N Mean St. dev. Differs sign. from 
Interpersonal Trust Score Staff 54 71.5000 7.97815 Partner* 
 Senior 92 71.4674 8.72089 Partner** 
 Manager 66 73.5000 8.60277 - 
 Partner 72 75.5278 9.22332 Staff* 
Senior** 
 Total 284 72.9754 8.76374  
Significance is indicated by asterisks: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
Table 3.5  Results of post hoc Scheffé tests for Interpersonal Trust Score by rank 
 
A Spearman’s rho correlation shows a positive significant relationship between position 
within the firm and the interpersonal trust score (the correlation is 0.194 with a two-tailed 
significance of 0.001). Although the correlation is relatively low, this result implies that on 
average the interpersonal trust score is higher at higher organizational level. A one-way 
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ANOVA reveals that there exist significant differences between organizational ranks for the 
summated Interpersonal Trust Scale (p<0.05). Results of post hoc Scheffé tests are presented 
in Table 3.5. The results for the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale show a statistically 
significant difference between the partner and senior level (p<0.05), and a marginally 
significant difference between the partner and staff level (p<0.1). These findings suggest that 
auditors’ skeptical disposition decreases with rank (i.e., higher ranked auditors show a 
significantly higher level of interpersonal trust). However, of equal importance is whether the 
lower level of skeptical disposition exhibited by higher ranking auditors such as partners also 
ultimately results in less skeptical judgments and decisions. 
  Concerning the skeptical judgments and decisions, one-way ANOVAs show 
statistically significant differences (two-tailed, p<0.01) across ranks within the firm for 3 of 
the 6 dependent variables (i.e., the number of alternative explanations, the number of error 
explanations and the weight of the error explanations). The results of post hoc Scheffé tests 
are presented in Table 3.6.76 
 
 
 
 N Mean St. dev. Differs sign. from 
Likelihood that management explanation 
is right 
Staff 53 39.6743 21.46789 - 
 Senior 91 34.6803 20.77748 - 
 Manager 64 39.5781 22.91873 - 
 Partner 68 32.9437 21.63127 - 
 Total 276 36.3472 21.70512  
      
Likelihood of fraud Staff 51 29.2941 22.06381 - 
 Senior 91 32.3407 24.81945 - 
 Manager 65 32.4615 23.34863 - 
 Partner 69 30.8696 21.65431 - 
 Total 276 31.4384 23.11677  
      
Number of alternative explanations Staff 53 2.9057 1.47106 Partner*** 
 Senior 92 3.4022 1.68418 - 
 Manager 66 3.4697 1.57108 - 
 Partner 71 4.0704 2.17993 Staff*** 
 Total 282 3.4929 1.79609  
      
                                                 
76
 The results are similar when the analyses are separately done for the strong and weak control environment 
settings. 
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 N Mean St. dev. Differs sign. from 
Number of error explanations Staff 53 0.7547 1.19141 Manager*** 
Partner*** 
 Senior 92 1.2283 1.29329 Partner*** 
 Manager 66 1.8485 1.53164 Staff*** 
 Partner 70 2.3286 2.17843 Staff*** 
Senior*** 
 Total 281 1.5587 1.68743  
      
Weight of error explanations Staff 53 16.0881 25.60725 Manager** 
Partner** 
 Senior 91 23.5698 27.44637 - 
 Manager 65 33.1248 29.90897 Staff** 
 Partner 69 32.9591 29.70014 Staff** 
 Total 278 26.7079 28.90138  
      
      
Number of budgeted hours Staff 53 127.6038 46.92684 - 
 Senior 87 125.7529 26.96831 - 
 Manager 63 132.3810 37.40037 - 
 Partner 67 134.4179 42.71794 - 
 Total 270 129.8130 37.96622  
Significance is indicated by asterisks: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01 
Table 3.6  Results of post hoc Scheffé tests for skeptical judgments and decisions 
 
Post hoc Scheffé tests show that the differences in skeptical judgments and decisions are 
mainly present between partner-staff and manager-staff (and to a lesser extent between 
partner-senior) and that auditors at higher ranks show more skeptical judgments and 
decisions.77 This is opposite to the findings of Shaub and Lawrence (1999) and Payne and 
Ramsey (2005). Shaub and Lawrence (1999) find that auditors at the staff level show higher 
levels of skeptical thoughts and behavior than seniors, managers and partners. Also Payne and 
Ramsay (2005) report that staff auditors assess a client explanation as less truthful than senior 
auditors and thus are more skeptical than senior auditors. Part of the variation in the findings 
may be caused by the fact that the skeptical judgments and decisions where rank differences 
exist in this study are particularly related to generated explanations and the weights attached 
                                                 
77
 The direction of the differences is similar when the analyses are done separately for the weak and strong 
control environment settings. 
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to the explanations. These variables are not considered by Shaub and Lawrence (1999) and 
Payne and Ramsey (2005). 
 
3.5  Discussion 
Auditor skepticism is identified in auditing standards and prior research as vital to 
ensuring audit effectiveness. This study finds that interpersonal trust factors are significantly 
related to skeptical judgments and decisions (either as main effects and/or an interaction effect 
with control environment strength). This result corroborates the expectation that interpersonal 
trust as a proxy for skeptical disposition is an important explanatory variable for skeptical 
judgments and decisions. The study shows that all three extracted interpersonal trust factors 
show predictive validity in the sense that the factors are significantly related to skeptical 
judgments and decisions.  
Furthermore, this study adds to existing research by examining the relationship of the 
extracted factors to skeptical judgments and decisions vis-à-vis the summated Interpersonal 
Trust Scale. On average it was found that the explanatory power of the models with the 
summated Interpersonal Trust Scale is the highest (i.e., higher R-squares) for four of the six 
models. Furthermore, five skeptical judgments and decisions are significantly related to the 
main and/or interaction effect concerning the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale, while four 
skeptical judgments and decisions are significantly related to the main and/or interaction 
effect concerning Exploitation. However, the main effect of Exploitation appears to be 
significant twice as many times as the summated scale (four times versus two times). This 
means that, although the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale results in better explanatory 
models overall, the main effect of Exploitation appears to be of interest. However, it should 
be noted that two of the main effects of Exploitation are in a direction that is contrary to 
expectations (which can be explained by the interaction effects present). In addition, given the 
fact that the internal reliability of the Exploitation factor is low, this finding should be 
interpreted with care. Furthermore, the patterns of the interaction effects concerning the 
derived factors do not appear to differ significantly from the patterns already found in Chapter 
2. 
As was shown, on average the interpersonal trust score is highest at the partner level. 
This may seem counterintuitive since a higher interpersonal trust score is found to be related 
to lower skeptical judgments and decisions. Apparently auditors at higher organizational 
ranks appear to compensate for higher interpersonal trust levels by utilizing greater skeptical 
judgments and decisions in three of the six models. This may be a result of increased 
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experience since the more novel the situation is the more people depend on their general 
disposition to trust (see e.g., Johnson-George and Swap, 1982; Webb and Worchel, 1986, p. 
224; Phares, 1978, p. 267). Because partners have been exposed to many client situations, it 
may be that their judgments do not depend on their general disposition to trust. Furthermore, 
in general, persons with a high level of interpersonal trust are liked more than persons with 
lower levels of interpersonal trust (see e.g., Rotter, 1980, p. 3; Wright and Tedeschi, 1975, p. 
470). Since partners are responsible for contracting new clients and for managing a part of the 
firm, ‘being liked’ may be a very productive asset for partners of audit firms. This is in line 
with the so-called ‘trusting stance’. That is, a person assumes that he will achieve better 
outcomes by ‘dealing with people as they are well-meaning and reliable’ (McKnight and 
Chervany, 2001, p. 39). A trusting stance should, however, be distinguished from ‘faith in 
humanity’, indicating that one assumes that people are usually honest, benevolent, competent 
and predictable (see e.g., McKnight and Chervany, 2001). 
Another potential explanation for the finding is the argument of some authors that trust 
and distrust are two different phenomena, i.e., one can be trusting and distrusting at the same 
time (see e.g., McKnight and Chervany, 2001; Webb and Worchel, 1986). This could imply 
that partners can still be distrusting and show skeptical behavior, while also having a high 
level of trust.  
  The results of this study have several practical implications. Given the wide range of 
responses in the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale and the derived factors, auditors differ in 
their levels of interpersonal trust which can result in different levels of skeptical judgments 
and decisions. This might be an issue audit firms want to take into consideration. For 
example, ideally it would appear that audit teams should have some members with lower 
levels of interpersonal trust. However, experience is also found to be important in explaining 
skeptical judgments and decisions which may compensate for higher levels of interpersonal 
trust. Hence, sharing experiences concerning client situations in which professional 
skepticism is imperative could be important. Furthermore, situational factors like control 
environment strength appear to be of importance. An important issue for further research is 
whether training auditors in judging situational factors can improve skeptical planning 
judgments.  
 The study has some limitations that should be considered when interpreting the results. 
First of all, based on a review of the literature, a selection was made as to what dependent 
variables depict skeptical judgments and decisions. Other variables can be identified. 
Furthermore, not all firms had a representative sample in terms of experience causing 
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difficulties in disentangling potential experience, language, and firm effects. Moreover, the 
interpretation of the results regarding the Institutional Trust and Exploitation factors should be 
done with care, since the reliability of these scales is relatively low. 
There are several suggestions for further research. The Interpersonal Trust Scale 
appears to be multidimensional and in some settings the extracted factors outperform the 
summated scale. A further study of trust constructs may advance the explanatory value of 
trust on skeptical judgments and decisions. Particularly the Exploitation factor seems to be an 
important factor. However, more reliable measures for Exploitation need to be developed. For 
example, more items need to be evaluated for inclusion. Future research may also focus more 
on both trust and distrust and not trust alone.  
Furthermore, some of the models’ R-squares were quite low. There has been a long 
lasting discussion in personality and social psychology about the explanatory power of 
attitudes in predicting specific behavior, since explanatory power of general attitudes in 
predicting specific behavior is sometimes low (e.g., Ajzen, 1991, p. 180; Ajzen and Fishbein, 
1977; Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005, p. 5). A suggested way to avoid the problem of using general 
attitudes is aggregation of specific behaviors (into a ‘behavioral index’) across occasions, 
situations, and forms of action (Ajzen, 2005). Studies have shown that general attitudes (and 
personality traits) predict behavioral aggregates better than they predict specific behaviors 
(Ajzen, 1991, p. 181; see Ajzen, 2005, for a review of empirical research on the aggregation 
principle). However, the main disadvantage of the aggregation approach is that it is unable to 
explain behavioral variability across situations and that it does not permit prediction of a 
specific behavior in a given situation (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181). Another alternative would be to 
use more situation specific measures of attitude. For interpersonal trust, for example, one 
could use the Specific Interpersonal Trust Scale (Johnson-George and Swap, 1982) or a model 
based on the Theory of Planned Behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991). 
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Chapter 4 A summary and synthesis of the two studies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the major findings and implications of the 
two studies that are the focus of the dissertation. In Section 4.2, the purpose of the two studies 
is reiterated. In Section 4.3, a summary of the findings is presented, following the research 
model that was presented in Chapter 1. The limitations are presented in Section 4.4. Finally, 
the studies’ combined contributions and suggestions for further research are assessed in 
Section 4.5.  
 
4.2 The purpose of the studies 
The objective of both empirical studies in this dissertation was to examine the 
association between auditors’ skeptical characteristics and auditors’ skeptical judgments and 
decisions. The main purpose of the first exploratory study in Chapter 2 was to examine how 
auditors’ skeptical characteristics are related to auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions. 
Three skeptical characteristics (i.e., interpersonal trust, suspension of judgment, and locus of 
control) and a comprehensive professional skepticism scale developed for the field of auditing 
were related to six skeptical judgments and decisions. In order to examine the effect of client 
risks, the influence of control environment strength on the relationship between skeptical 
characteristics and auditors’ judgments and decisions was also studied. 
The purpose of the second study in Chapter 3 was to examine Rotter’s Interpersonal 
Trust Scale (1967) in more depth by exploring the association between individual 
interpersonal trust factors (determined with factor analysis) and skeptical judgments and 
decisions, also considering interactive effects between control environment strength and 
skeptical characteristics. In particular, the relationship of the extracted factors to skeptical 
judgments and decisions was compared with the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale. Since 
individual constructs underlying interpersonal trust are more specific and focused than the 
summated scale, the expectation was that they better predict skeptical judgments and 
decisions. As an additional analysis, this study also looked at the relationship between auditor 
rank and interpersonal trust and skeptical judgments and decisions. The underlying reason 
was that it is very important to know whether, for example, partner’s skepticism is higher than 
that of the audit team members since partners have the responsibility and authority for 
determining whether the audit evidence is sufficient and what type of audit opinion to issue. 
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4.3 A summary of the findings 
In order to assess the combined contribution of the two empirical studies in this 
dissertation, the research model from Chapter 1 is repeated in Figure 4.1. The results of the 
studies will be discussed following the links (i.e., relationships) in the model. 
 
 
Figure 4.1  Research model of the determinants of skeptical judgments and decisions. 
 
Link 1: skeptical characteristics and skeptical judgments and decisions 
In Chapter 2, interpersonal trust shows the most significant main effects on judgments 
and decisions. In Chapter 3, the summated interpersonal trust scale and the derived factor 
Exploitation are the measures most significantly related to skeptical judgments and decisions 
as a main effect. 78 Although the main effect of Exploitation appears to be significant twice as 
many times as the summated scale (four times versus two times), it should be noted that two 
of the main effects of Exploitation are in a direction that is contrary to expectations. In 
addition, given the fact that the internal reliability of the Exploitation factor is low, this 
finding should be interpreted with care. 
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 Given the presence of interaction effects, the main effects should be interpreted with care. 
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Need for closure
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4
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Links 2 and 3: the influence of client risk 
Control environment strength (used as a proxy for client risk) has a significant main 
effect in a majority of the models. For example, control environment strength has a significant 
main effect for all the regression models in Chapters 2 and 3 for the dependent variables 
likelihood of fraud, number of error explanations and weight of error explanations. 
In Chapter 2 there are significant interaction effects found for the models concerning 
interpersonal trust, need for closure and locus of control. In Chapter 3 interaction effects with 
similar patterns are found for the derived interpersonal trust factors. As mentioned, the 
interaction effects are predominantly present for the likelihood of fraud, the number of error 
explanations and the weight of the error explanations. Although the interaction patterns are 
similar across most skeptical characteristics, the patterns of the interactions differ across 
skeptical judgments and decisions. For example, concerning ‘assessment of the likelihood of 
fraud’, the pattern was an almost horizontal line for the strong control environment setting and 
a downward sloping line for the weak control environment setting. Pertaining to ‘the number 
of error explanations’, the explanations generated are about equal for the low and high 
skepticism groups in the weak control environment setting, while in the strong control 
environment setting there is a difference between the mean number of total error explanations 
for the low and high skepticism groups. As discussed previously, contrary to expectations, the 
line is upward sloping which indicates that auditors with a greater skeptical disposition 
generate fewer alternative error explanations than auditors with a lower skeptical disposition. 
A potential explanation may be that skeptical auditors focus more on fewer errors. 
For the derived interpersonal trust factor Exploitation in Chapter 3, there is an 
additional significant interactive effect with the number of budgeted hours. This effect is 
similar to the effect concerning the likelihood of fraud. Overall, the patterns of the interaction 
effects concerning the derived factors do not appear to differ significantly from the patterns 
already found in Chapter 2.  
 
Link 4 and additional findings: the influence of task specific experience and rank 
Link 4 was added to the model in order to control for task specific experience, as 
measured by years of experience with conducting analytical reviews. Task specific experience 
shows a significance positive association with number of alternative explanations generated, 
number of error explanations generated, the weight attached to the error explanations, and the 
number of budgeted hours.  
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Additional analyses in Chapter 3 show a positive significant relationship between 
position within the firm and the interpersonal trust score (i.e., the higher the rank the higher 
the interpersonal trust score). This finding suggests that skeptical disposition (as measured by 
the antithesis of trust) declines as an auditor moves up in the organization. In particular, there 
is a statistically significant difference between the partner and senior level and a marginally 
significant difference between the partner and staff level. Concerning the skeptical judgments 
and decisions, there are statistically significant differences across ranks within the firm for the 
number of alternative explanations, the number of error explanations and the weight of the 
error explanations). The differences in skeptical judgments and decisions are mainly present 
between partner-staff and manager-staff (and to a lesser extent between partner-senior). 
Overall, the findings suggest that auditors at higher ranks show more skeptical judgments and 
decisions. 
 
4.4 Limitations 
The study has limitations that should be considered when interpreting the results. First 
of all, not all firms had a representative sample in terms of experience and language, causing 
difficulties in disentangling potential experience, language, and firm effects. Further, due to 
limitations of time availability, participants completed only two of the four skeptical 
measures. Hence, this precludes a complete comparison between all four measures. 
Additionally, based on a review of the literature, a selection was made as to the dependent 
variables that depict skeptical judgments and decisions. While the sources consulted identify 
these as important skeptical behaviors, there is no normative source as to the most important 
variable(s) in impacting auditing performance. Also, the interpretation of the results in 
Chapter 3 regarding the Institutional Trust and Exploitation factors should be done with care, 
since the reliability of these scales is relatively low. Finally, there exists no normative solution 
to the case problem used in the research instrument so that it is not possible to determine 
which measure is most closely related to optimal judgments and decisions. 
 
4.5 An appraisal of the combined findings, implications and suggestions for further  
research 
Both studies in this dissertation show that skeptical characteristics (and factor-
analyzed interpersonal trust dimensions) are related to skeptical judgments and decisions. 
This has not been strongly evidenced by previous studies.  
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  Overall, auditors’ skeptical judgments and decisions are more significantly associated 
with interpersonal trust, via the main and interaction effects, than any of the other three 
characteristics examined in Chapter 2. This suggests interpersonal trust is most closely 
associated with the skeptical judgments and decisions prescribed in the auditing literature and 
professional standards. The analyses in Chapter 3 showed that most significant main effects 
and interaction effects are present for the summated interpersonal trust scale as well as for the 
Exploitation factor. However, given the fact that the reliability of the Exploitation factor is 
rather low and the fact that the R-squares of the models with the summated interpersonal trust 
scale are higher, the summated interpersonal trust scale appears to be the best predictor of 
skeptical judgments and decisions from the second study in Chapter 3. 
Hence, although there exists discussion on the use of trust as a proxy for skeptical 
disposition (see e.g., Hurtt, 2007), the studies in this dissertation show that interpersonal trust 
(factors) is (are) significantly associated with skeptical judgments and decisions. Given the 
wide range of responses in the summated Interpersonal Trust Scale and the derived factors, 
auditors differ in their levels of interpersonal trust which can result in different levels of 
skeptical judgments and decisions. This might be an issue audit firms want to take into 
consideration (see e.g., Rose, 2007). For example, firms may administer trust related tests to 
their personnel in order to assess their level of interpersonal trust (cf., Nelson, 2009) and to 
adjust team planning (e.g., audit teams should have some members with lower levels of 
interpersonal trust).  
Control environment strength shows a significant main effect for all the regressions 
models concerning the dependent variables likelihood of fraud, number of error explanations 
and weight of error explanations in Chapters 2 and 3, indicating that auditors, as expected, are 
attuned to potential problems and risks associated with control environment strength. Also 
across interaction effects, although the slopes vary, the skeptical judgments and decisions are 
higher in the weak control environment setting. Apparently situational factors like control 
environment strength are related to skeptical judgments and decisions. Therefore, training 
auditors in judging situational factors can improve skeptical planning judgments. This is of 
particular importance since auditing firms use decision aids (e.g., checklists) to assess, for 
example, control environment risks. The contents and wording of these checklists influences 
auditor behaviors and may lead to omission of important situational variables (cf. Bedard and 
Graham, 2002). Therefore, auditors should never fully trust on these decision aids and need to 
be alert on client specific circumstances not captured by the decision aids. 
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  It is interesting to note that the more comprehensive and specific Hurtt Professional 
Skepticism Scale does not show the strongest association with skeptical judgments and 
decisions. When the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale in this study is factor analyzed, the 
results (not tabulated) show almost identical factors as those identified by Hurtt (2007), 
indicating that the measure is quite stable in terms of its item structure. However, none of the 
derived factors significantly predicts skeptical judgments and decisions better than the 
summated Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale. One possible explanation might be that only a 
limited number of proxies for skeptical judgments and decisions were examined. However, 
also in other settings the scale has not provided unequivocal  results. For example, Hurtt et al. 
(2008) found mixed evidence of the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale predicting skeptical 
behaviors. They used a computer simulated review task in which participants were able to 
actually consult the audit working papers. A follow up study could test whether the 
Interpersonal Trust Scale also shows higher significance than the Hurtt Professional 
Skepticism Scale in predicting skeptical behavior in a computer simulated task where, for 
example, actual searching behavior can be traced. Another explanation for the low 
associations between the Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale and the skeptical judgments and 
decisions found in this dissertation may be that the scale is not focused on the most significant 
skeptical constructs like interpersonal trust. 
  The findings of the studies in the dissertation warrant further research concerning the 
interpersonal trust construct. The interpersonal trust measure may be extended by adding 
relevant skepticism constructs. It is unclear, however, what constructs are the most 
appropriate candidates for inclusion. The study presented in Chapter 2 showed no strong 
evidence for other characteristics that strongly influence skeptical judgments and decisions.79 
Yet, as mentioned Chapter 3 showed that the Exploitation factor, in particular, seems to be an 
important factor. However, more reliable measures for Exploitation need to be developed. For 
example, more items need to be evaluated for inclusion. 
 The research model only focused on client risk (as measured by control environment 
strength) as an incentive influencing the relationship between skeptical characteristics and 
skeptical judgments and decisions. Future research could focus on other risks, as for example 
identified in ISA 315 (IFAC, 2008). Future research could also study other important auditor 
                                                 
79
 The number of observations for the Need for Closure Scale is too limited to conduct an appropriate factor 
analyses. However, if a factor analysis is conducted these factors do not show significantly better relationships to 
skeptical judgments and decisions than the summated Need for Closure Scale does (results are not tabulated). 
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incentives like budget pressure, audit quality, litigation and reputation loss (see Nelson, 2009, 
for an overview). 
 The two studies considered six skeptical judgments and decisions by auditors. It is not 
straightforward whether these judgments and decisions should be identified as a judgment or a 
decision. Some view the distinction between judgments and decisions as artificial since they 
both represent a process of making a choice among alternatives (cf. Mitchell, 2002, p.15). 
However, others find the division useful because it focuses on different facets of the decision 
making process (see e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981). Judgments are often related to 
likelihoods, probability assessments and risks, while decisions are more related to actions. 
Hence, the likelihood that the management explanation is right and the likelihood of fraud are 
of a more judgmental character and may be considered to be judgments. Number of budgeted 
hours is obviously a decision to allocate resources to the audit. The number of alternative 
explanations, the number of error explanations and the weight of the error explanations are 
somewhere in between. Concerning the summated interpersonal trust scale, all regressions 
except for the one predicting budgeted hours contain a significant main and/or interaction 
effect pertaining to interpersonal trust. If number if budgeted hours would be viewed as the 
only decision variable, apparently interpersonal trust (nor its interaction with control 
environment strength) has no effect on the budgeting decision. However, it should be noted 
that the Exploitation factor is significant in the regression with number of budgeted hours as a 
dependent variable. Across all skeptical characteristics studied there is no clear pattern of 
what skeptical judgments and decisions are most associated with skeptical characteristics. 
Future research can focus on the relationship between judgments and decisions, for example 
on the relationship between likelihood of fraud and substantive tests planned, by using 
mediation analysis (see e.g., Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
Number of error explanations is explained by three of the four skeptical characteristics 
(via the main and the interaction effects) studied in Chapter 2 and number of alternative 
explanations is explained only by one characteristic. This finding is corroborated by the 
analyses in Chapter 3. Apparently skeptical characteristics are more related to a ‘presumptive 
doubt’ variable like number of error explanations than to a ‘neutral stance’ variable like 
number of alternative explanations. Interestingly, Boritz et al. (2008) find that fraud 
specialists, who allegedly have a more presumptive doubt perspective, appear to be more 
responsive to fraud risk and increase the time budget for useful standard procedures than the 
auditors involved in the Asare and Wright (2004) study. Future research can focus on the 
influence of presumptive doubt on successfully exhibiting skeptical behaviors. 
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Also task specific experience and rank are found to be important in explaining 
skeptical judgments and decisions: the more experienced the auditor is, the more skeptical 
judgments and decisions are exhibited. Hence, sharing experiences concerning client 
situations in which professional skepticism is imperative could be important. The additional 
finding that partners score the highest on interpersonal trust and its derived factors but show 
the most skeptical judgments and decisions deserves further study. This finding contradicts 
the findings of Shaub and Lawrence (1999) and Payne and Ramsey (2005). One explanation 
may be that auditors at higher ranks possess more experience and knowledge. However, it 
may also be a result of the difference between a ‘trusting stance’ and ‘faith in humanity’ as is 
suggested in the literature (see e.g., McKnight and Chervany, 2001).80 
Another possible explanation for this paradoxical finding is the argument of some 
authors that trust and distrust are two different phenomena, i.e., one can be trusting and 
distrusting at the same time (see e.g., McKnight and Chervany, 2001; Webb and Worchel, 
1986). This would imply that partners can still be distrusting and show skeptical behavior, 
while also having a high level of trust. Future research may also focus on the different effects 
of trusting stance versus faith in humanity and trust versus distrust. 
 Some authors assume auditors’ personality traits to be stable when they start audit 
training and practice (see e.g., Libby and Luft, 1993; Nelson, 2009). However, others have 
found auditor traits to be alterable (e.g., Carpenter, 2004). For example, disposition to trust 
may develop as people mature and is altered by experiences later in life (see e.g., McKnight 
and Chervany, 2001, p. 38; Kee and Knox, 1970). Future research could focus on whether and 
to what degree professional skepticism can be trained (cf. Fullerton and Durtschi, 2004) or 
may be induced by superiors (cf. Peecher, 1996). If so, audit firms can enhance the focus on 
professional skepticism, for example during team planning events. 
The studies in this dissertation focused on the individual auditor’s professional 
skepticism. Hence, another promising avenue of research is professional skepticism in team 
settings. For instance, does the review process serve to enhance or diminish skeptical 
judgments? Do team members with varying levels of skeptical characteristics lead to a holistic 
desired level of skeptical judgments or does this vary by the hierarchical level of the various 
members? 
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 Recall that a trusting stance means that a person assumes that he will achieve better outcomes by ‘dealing with 
people as they are well-meaning and reliable’ (McKnight and Chervany, 2001, p. 39), while ‘faith in humanity’ 
indicates that one assumes that people are usually honest, benevolent, competent and predictable (see e.g., 
McKnight and Chervany, 2001). 
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Another area of research that may be fruitful concerns critical thinking. There appears 
to be little debate on the value of critical thinking for auditors. Future research could focus on 
the influence of critical thinking on skeptical behaviors. Several measurement scales have 
been developed to assess a person’s level of critical thinking. Three examples are the Watson 
Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson and Glaser, 1964), the California Critical 
Thinking Disposition Inventory (Facione and Facione, 1992) and the Ennis-Weir Critical 
Thinking Essay Test (Ennis and Weir, 1985). Future studies could focus on the relationship 
between auditors’ critical thinking, as measured by these scales and skeptical judgments and 
decisions. In all, the findings of this dissertation corroborate the idea that further study of the 
concept of professional skepticism is fruitful. 
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Appendix A: Overview of the measurement scales 
 
Interpersonal Trust Scale 
Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale consists of 25 items that are scored on a five point 
Likert Scale (varying from strongly disagree to strongly agree). Scale items of Rotter’s 
Interpersonal Trust Scale were taken from Wrightsman (1991). The items of which the scores 
should be reversed are indicated by (r). Adding up the points for each item provides the 
interpersonal trust score. Higher scores indicate higher interpersonal trust. 
 
1.  Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society. (r) 
2. In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they have provided 
evidence that they are trustworthy. (r) 
3. This country has a dark future unless we can attract better people into politics. (r) 
4. Fear and social disgrace or punishment rather than conscience prevents most people 
from breaking the law. (r) 
5.  Using the honor system of not having a teacher present during exams would probably 
result in increased cheating. (r) 
6. Parents usually can be relied on to keep their promises. 
7. The United Nations will never be an effective force in keeping world peace. (r) 
8. The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased treatment. 
9. Most people would be horrified if they knew how much news that the public hears and 
sees is distorted. (r) 
10. It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say most people are primarily 
interested in their own welfare. (r) 
11. Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio, and TV, it is hard to get objective 
accounts of public events. (r) 
12. The future seems very promising. 
13. If we really knew what was going on in international politics, the public would have 
reason to be more frightened than they now seem to be. (r) 
14. Most elected officials are really sincere in their campaign promises. 
15. Many major national sports contests are fixed in one way or another. (r) 
16. Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about the limits of their knowledge. 
17. Most parents can be relied upon to carry out their threats or punishments. 
18. Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do. 
19. In these competitive times one has to be alert or someone is likely to take advantage of 
you. (r) 
20. Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preach. 
21. Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. 
22. Most students in school would not cheat even if they sure of getting away with it. 
23. Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think you are ignorant of their 
speciality. 
24. A large share of accident claims filed against insurance companies are phony. (r) 
25. Most people answer public opinion polls honestly. 
 100 
Need for Closure 
Suspension of judgment is measured by the 42-item Need for Closure Scale (Webster 
and Kruglanski, 1994). Responses to the 42 items are obtained on a 6-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The items of which the scores should 
be reversed are indicated by (r). The summed item scores form the need for closure score. 
Higher scores indicate a higher need for closure. 
 
1.  I think that having clear rules and order at work is essential for success. 
2.  Even after I've made up my mind about something, I am always eager to consider a 
different opinion. (r) 
3.  I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
4.  I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways. 
5.  I like to have friends who are unpredictable. (r) 
6.  I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament. 
7.  I enjoy the uncertainty of going into a new situation without knowing what might 
happen. (r) 
8.  When dining out, I like to go to places where I have been before so that I know what 
to expect. 
9.  I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my 
life. 
10.  I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes. 
11. I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
12.  I would describe myself as indecisive. (r) 
13.  When I go shopping, I have difficulty deciding exactly what it is I want. (r) 
14.  When faced with a problem I usually see the one best solution very quickly. 
15.  When I am confused about an important issue, I feel very upset. 
16.  I tend to put off making important decisions until the last possible moment. (r) 
17.  I usually make important decisions quickly and confidently. 
18.  I think it is fun to change my plans at the last moment. (r) 
19.  My personal space is usually messy and disorganized. (r) 
20.  In most social conflicts, I can easily see which side is right and which is wrong. 
21.  I tend to struggle with most decisions. (r) 
22.  I believe orderliness and organization are among the most important characteristics of 
a good student. 
23.  When considering most conflict situations, I can usually see how both sides could be 
right. (r) 
24.  I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
25. I prefer to socialize with familiar friends because I know what to expect from them. 
26.  I think that I would learn best in a class that lacks clearly stated objectives and 
requirements. (r) 
27.  When thinking about a problem, I consider as many different opinions on the issue as 
possible. (r) 
28.  I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
29.  I like to know what people are thinking all the time. 
30.  I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things. 
31. It's annoying to listen to someone who cannot seem to make up his or her mind. 
32.  I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
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33. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
34.  I prefer interacting with people whose opinions are very different from my own. (r) 
35.  I like to have a plan for everything and a place for everything. 
36.  I feel uncomfortable when someone's meaning or intention is unclear to me. 
37. When trying to solve a problem I often see so many possible options that it's 
confusing. (r) 
38.  I always see many possible solutions to problems I face. (r) 
39.  I'd rather know bad news than stay in a state of uncertainty. 
40. I do not usually consult many different options before forming my own view. 
41.  I dislike unpredictable situations. 
42.  I dislike the routine aspects of my work (studies). (r) 
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Locus of Control 
Rotter’s (1966) Locus of Control scale contains 23 question pairs that are answered in 
a forced choice format (i.e., one of the two possibilities should be indicated per question). The 
total locus of control score is obtained by adding the total number of external alternatives 
chosen. The external alternatives are indicated by (e). 
 
1.  a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck. (e) 
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
2.  a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take 
enough  interest in politics. 
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them. (e) 
3.  a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world. 
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how 
hard he tries. (e) 
4.  a. The idea that superiors are unfair in assessing young managers is nonsense. 
b. Most young managers don't realize the extent to which their assessment is 
influenced by accidental happenings. (e) 
5.  a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader. (e) 
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their 
opportunities. 
6.  a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you. (e) 
b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with 
others. 
7.  a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. (e) 
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to 
take a definite course of action.  
8.  a. A hard working young manager can hardly ever receive an unsatisfactory  
assessment. 
b. Most of the time there is hardly any connection between a young manager's 
performance and his assessment, which implies that working hard is relatively 
useless. (e) 
9.  a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do  
with it. 
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.  
(e) 
10.  a.  The average citizen can have influence in government decisions. 
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little 
guy can do about it. (e) 
11.  a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work. 
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a 
matter of good or bad fortune any how. (e) 
12.   a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck. 
b. Many times we might as well decide what to do by flipping a coin. (e) 
13.  a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the  
right place first. (e) 
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or 
nothing to do with it. 
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14. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we  
can neither understand, nor control. (e) 
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control 
world events. 
15.  a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by  
accidental happenings. (e) 
b. There really is no such thing as "luck". 
16.  a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. (e) 
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are. 
17.  a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.  
(e) 
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all 
three. 
18.  a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over things politicians do in 
office. (e) 
19.  a. Sometimes I can't understand how my superiors arrive at their assessments of  
my work performance. (e) 
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I work and how well I am  
assessed by my superiors. 
20.  a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.  
(e) 
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in  
my life. 
21.   a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly. 
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they  
like you. (e) 
22.    a. What happens to me is my own doing. 
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is  
taking. (e) 
23.  a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do. (e) 
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as 
well as on a local level. 
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Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale 
The Hurtt Professional Skepticism Scale (2007) consists of 30 items scored on a 6-
point scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). The items of which the 
scores should be reversed are indicated by (r). Adding up the scores results in the degree of 
professional skepticism with higher scores indicating higher skepticism. 
 
1. I often accept other peoples’ explanations without further thought. (r) 
2. I feel good about myself.  
3. I wait to decide on issues until I can get more information. 
4. The prospect of learning excites me.  
5. I am interested in what causes people to behave the way that they do. 
6. I am confident of my abilities. 
7. I often reject statements unless I have proof that they are true. 
8. Discovering new information is fun. 
9. I take my time when making decisions.   
10. I tend to immediately accept what other people tell me. (r) 
11. Other peoples’ behavior doesn’t interest me. (r) 
12. I am self-assured. 
13. My friends tell me that I usually question things that I see or hear. 
14. I like to understand the reason for other peoples’ behavior. 
15. I think that learning is exciting. 
16. I usually accept things I see, read or hear at face value. (r) 
17. I don’t feel sure of myself. (r) 
18. I usually notice inconsistencies in explanations. 
19. Most often I agree with what the others in my group think. (r) 
20. I dislike having to make decisions quickly. 
21. I have confidence in myself. 
22. I don’t like to decide until I’ve looked at all of the readily available information. 
23. I like searching for knowledge. 
24. I frequently question things that I see or hear. 
25. It is easy for other people to convince me. (r) 
26. I seldom consider why people behave in a certain way. (r) 
27. I like to ensure that I’ve considered most available information before making a  
decision. 
28. I enjoy trying to determine if what I read or hear is true. 
29. I relish learning. 
30. The actions people take and the reasons for those actions are fascinating. 
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Appendix B:  Version of the questionnaire concerning weak control environment and  
soliciting interpersonal trust and locus of control items 
 
 
A Study on the Application of Analytical Procedures 
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 
 
 
This is a study on the application of analytical procedures. On the basis of a case-description 
you will be asked to complete a number of tasks and to answer several questions.  
 
Given the importance of this study your firm is providing time to conduct this study. Please 
complete the questionnaire carefully. 
 
Completion of the questionnaire will take about 30 minutes. 
 
I kindly ask you to write down your name. 
 
Name:  __________________________________________________ 
 
 
Some remarks in advance: 
 
• Please answer all questions (the pages are printed on both sides)! 
• Please start answering the questions from the beginning. 
• You are kindly asked to not speak to each other during the study.  
• You will find a handwritten number on the questionnaires. The sole purpose of the 
number is to match the first with the second questionnaire. 
 
Thank you very much for you participation! 
 
Luc Quadackers 
 
 
 
In the envelope you will find two smaller envelopes numbered 1 
and 2. Please open envelope 1 and start answering the 
questionnaire. 
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Part 1 of the study 
 
Introduction 
MAEdic N.V. is a fifty-year old public company that develops, manufactures and markets 
pharmaceuticals and medical instrumentation. The firm consists of three divisions. Your firm 
has audited MAEdic N.V.’s financial statements for the last three calendar years. 
 
Management control philosophy 
The management of MAEdic N.V. can be described as being aggressive in business practices 
and emphasizes speed and efficiency when implementing decisions. Management rarely hires 
external consultants because they are of the opinion that consultants are expensive and often 
follow a too conservative approach. Top management and lower management meet during 
monthly production-meetings. Management views the IT department as a necessary evil and 
considers the accountants and bookkeepers who work there to be ‘beancounters’. Because 
management has a clear preference for reporting methods that enable earnings management, 
management has frequent disputes with the external auditor. Although there are a large 
number of internal control procedures in place, they are sometimes less strictly applied if the 
progress of the work is suffering from them. 
 
Top-management mainly focuses on achieving short-term accounting-based performance 
measures when determining compensation and making promotion decisions. Productivity is 
the most important criterion in performance assessment. Directors receive a small base-salary 
and a bonus that is based on the profitability of the department in question. Management is 
convinced that this compensation system encourages healthy competition and personal 
initiatives. 
 
Results of preliminary analytical review 
It is November 2005, and you have just begun conducting a preliminary analytical review of 
MAEdic N.V.’s third quarter financial statements. Oddly, the gross margin percentage is on 
pace to increase by roughly 10% over last year’s 32.73% to 36.04%. The change is well above 
the five-year range of 32.1% to 32.8% and mean of 32.5% as well. Notably, without the 
change, this year’s total gross margin would be roughly €15.5 million lower than currently 
recorded. While MAEdic N.V.’s gross margin percentage has always been slightly better than 
industry averages, this years’ mark is well above the predicted industry-average of 33.0%. 
The tables below highlight the increase: 
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 2004 and 2005 3rd Quarter 
Total Performance 
2005 3rd Quarter Divisional Performance 
Third Quarter 
Data (in millions 
of euro’s) 
2004 3rd 
Quarter 
Totals 
2005 3rd 
Quarter Totals 
2005 3rd 
Quarter 
Prescription 
Drugs 
2005 3rd 
Quarter 
Household 
Products 
2005 3rd Quarter 
Medical 
Instrumentation 
Net Sales 
€315.0 €471.7 €245.3 €99.1 €127.3 
Cost of Goods 
sold 
€211.9 €301.7 €161.6 €69.3 €70.8 
Gross Margin 
€103.1 €170.0 €83.7 €29.8 €56.5 
Gross Margin % 32.73% 36.04% 34.12% 30.07% 44.38% 
 
 Sales mix of the divisions in 2004 en 2005 
 
 Prescription Drugs Household 
Products 
Medical 
Instrumentation 
Total 
% of sales 2005 52% 21% 27% 100% 
% of sales 2004 55% 32% 13% 100% 
 
Explanation of the CFO for the findings 
When you ask management about the increase, the CFO Gerald Smit explains: ‘Our margin is 
up, way up. But, our sales mix changed this year. In 2005, our medical instrumentation 
products have done better than ever before. Naturally, our margins will improve when we sell 
relatively more of our instrumentation products, and they have boomed this year. Fortunately, 
we are currently the most qualified firm to meet high-end users’ demands, and our clients are 
quite appreciative of our products. Prices on instrumentation sales range all over the place, 
from just over ten thousand dollars to over a million in some cases. But for the record, we 
average €53,000 per sale and can gross over 45% per sale, depending on how negotiations go 
with the client. Take that, and compare the percentage of revenue accounted for by 
instrumentation sales this year (27%) to last year’s figure (13%) and you will understand what 
caused our gross margin percentage to go up.’ 
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Task 1 
Take a moment to focus on the increase in the gross margin percentage and the explanation of 
the CFO that the increase is caused by the sales mix.  
 
Then take a few minutes to think about other possible explanations for the increase in the 
gross margin percentage in the case-description above.  
 
Write down the other possible explanations that you think of in the table below. Also briefly 
describe how it could have caused part or all the fluctuation. Be as brief and specific as 
possible. 
 
The explanation of the CFO is the first explanation in the table. If you want to add 
explanations please put them in the table and number them. 
 
After you have written down and numbered all the explanations in the table, please allocate 
100 percent to the explanations (in terms of likelihood of occurrence). You have to allocate 
the highest percentage to the explanation with the highest likelihood to cause substantially all 
(i.e., ≥ 85%) of the gross margin percentage increase. Allocate lower percentages to the 
explanations with lower likelihoods. Do not forget to allocate a percentage to the explanation 
of the CFO! 
 
 
Nr. Explanations for the increase in the gross margin percentage 
in the case-description above  
Percentage in  
terms of 
likelihood (total 
= 100 percent) 
1. The composition of the sales mix has led to the increase in the 
gross margin percentage (see explanation CFO). 
[ALSO ALLOCATE A PERCENTAGE TO THIS 
EXPLANATION! IF THIS EXPLANATION DOES NOT 
DESERVE A PERCENTAGE PLEASE WRITE DOWN A 
‘0’.] 
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Nr. Explanations for the increase in the gross margin percentage 
in the case-description above  
Percentage in  
terms of 
likelihood (total 
= 100 percent) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  Total = 100 
procent 
 
 
ATTENTION: DID YOU ALLOCATE A TOTAL OF 100 PERCENT? 
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Task 2 
 
Last year’s (2004) budget for substantive testing regarding the sales-account was 100 hours. 
Last year, there were no specific points meriting attention. Assume that the increase in the 
gross margin is the only specific issue concerning the sales-account as opposed to last year. 
Indicate how many hours you want to budget this year for substantive testing the sales-
account. 
 
Budgeted hours in 2004:  100  hours 
Budgeted hours in 2005:  ___ hours 
 
 
 
After you finished all tasks, please put this questionnaire in 
envelope number 1, seal it and put it into the large envelope. Then 
open envelope number 2 and proceed with answering the 
questionnaire from envelope number 2. 
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Part 2 of the study 
 
Questions on personality characteristics 
 
Below you will find a number of statements. We would like to know to what extent you agree 
on these statements. Therefore, we would like you to circle one of the numbers next to the 
statements. 
 
The numbers have the following meaning: 
 
1 = strongly disagree 
2 = disagree  
3 = neither agree nor disagree 
4 = agree 
5 = strongly agree 
 
Example: 
  
 Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
I like to watch soccer. 
 
1 2 3 4 5   
 
If you like to watch soccer very much, then circle number 5. If you like to watch soccer circle 
number 4. If you are indifferent circle number 3 et cetera. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers, as long as your answers reflect your own opinion. By 
giving your opinion on the statements below we can assess some of your personality 
characteristics. Sometimes the questions appear to be similar. However, these subtle 
distinctions are necessary to make a thorough assessment of your personality characteristics. 
So please stay alert and answer the questions as good and honest as possible. 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
If we really knew what was going on in international politics, the 
public would have reason to be more frightened than they now 
seem to be. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Most elected officials are really sincere in their campaign 
promises. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Most parents can be relied upon to carry out their threats or 
punishments. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Most people would be horrified if they knew how much news that 
the public hears and sees is distorted. 
1 2 3 4 5  
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 Strongly 
disagree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
 
In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious until they 
have provided evidence that they are trustworthy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Most people answer public opinion polls honestly. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
The United Nations will never be an effective force in keeping 
world peace. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they preach. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Parents usually can be relied on to keep their promises. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
This country has a dark future unless we can attract better people 
into politics. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
In these competitive times one has to be alert or someone is likely 
to take advantage of you. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
The future seems very promising. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Most people can be counted on to do what they say they will do. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about the limits of 
their knowledge. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Using the honor system of not having a teacher present during 
exams would probably result in increased cheating. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say most people 
are primarily interested in their own welfare. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
A large share of accident claims filed against insurance 
companies are phony. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Many major national sports contests are fixed in one way or 
another. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio, and TV, it is 
hard to get objective accounts of public events. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think you are 
ignorant of their speciality. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased treatment. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Fear and social disgrace or punishment rather than conscience 
prevents most people from breaking the law. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
Most students in school would not cheat even if they sure of 
getting away with it. 
 
1 2 3 4 5  
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Below you find 23 sets of 2 statements (indicated by a and b). Please choose one alternative 
by circling either a or b. In some cases you may find that both or neither of the statements 
reflect your opinion. Please make a choice anyway. Choose the statement that fits in with your 
opinion most, no matter how little. 
 
a. What happens to me is my own doing. 
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.  
 
a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work. 
b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good 
or bad fortune anyhow.  
 
a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world. 
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.  
 
a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in 
politics. 
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them. 
 
a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right place first.  
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability, luck has little or nothing to do with 
it. 
 
a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck. 
b. Many times we might as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.  
 
a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.  
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite 
course of action.  
 
a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over things politicians do in office.  
 
a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.  
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life. 
a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.  
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are. 
 
a. A hard working young manager can hardly ever receive an unsatisfactory assessment. 
b. Most of the time there is hardly any connection between a young manager's performance and 
his assessment, which implies that working hard is relatively useless.  
 
a.  The average citizen can have influence in government decisions. 
b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about 
it.  
 
a. The idea that superiors are unfair in assessing young managers is nonsense. 
b. Most young managers don't realize the extent to which their assessment is influenced by 
accidental happenings.  
 
a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck. 
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
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a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.  
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities. 
 
a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.  
b. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others. 
 
a. Sometimes I can't understand how my superiors arrive at their assessments of my work 
performance.  
b. There is a direct connection between how hard I work and how well I am assessed by my 
superiors. 
 
a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither 
understand, nor control.  
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events. 
 
a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.  
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a 
local level. 
 
a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly. 
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you.  
 
a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.  
 
a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental 
happenings.  
b. There really is no such thing as "luck". 
 
a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.  
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three. 
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Demographic questions 
 
What is your gender? (tick appropriate box): 
○ male  
○ female 
 
What ‘titles’ do you have? (tick appropriate box, more than one if appropriate): 
○ drs 
○ RA 
○ RE 
○ other, please specify: 
 
What is your position within the firm? (tick appropriate box): 
○ partner 
○ manager 
○ senior 
○ staff 
○ otherwise, please specify: _____________ 
 
How many years of audit experience do you have? 
_____ years 
 
How many years of experience do you have with conducting analytical reviews? 
_____ years 
 
In what industry are you specialized? (and how many years?): 
___________________________________________ 
 
What set of auditing standards do you work with mostly? (tick appropriate box, more than one 
if appropriate) 
○ Dutch GAAS 
○ US GAAS 
○ ISAs 
○ other: 
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Questions about the case 
 
Definition: according to the ISAs, ‘control risk’ is the risk that a misstatement that could occur in an assertion 
and that could be material, either individually or when aggregated with other misstatements, will not be 
prevented, or detected and corrected, on a timely basis by the entity’s internal control (ISA 200.20). 
 
According to you, what would be the level of overall control risk (control risk at the level of 
the organization) of MAEdic N.V., given the information available? (circle the appropriate 
number) 
 
very low        very high 
risk         risk 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Definition: according to the ISAs, the ‘control environment’ includes the governance and management functions 
and the attitudes, awareness, and actions of those charged with governance and management concerning the 
entity’s internal control and its importance in the entity (ISA 315.67). 
 
How effective do you consider the control environment of MAEdic N.V. to be? (circle the 
appropriate number) 
 
very          very 
ineffective        effective 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
What is the likelihood of fraud (0-100%) based on the results of the preliminary analytical 
review, given the case-description of the company and the management control philosophy? 
 
____% 
 
How realistic do you consider the case to be? (circle the appropriate number) 
 
highly         highly  
unrealistic        realistic 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
 
Was the description of the case-situation clear? (circle the appropriate number) 
 
very         very 
unclear        clear 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
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Remarks/suggestions 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
At what time did you finish this study?:_____________________ 
 
When you are interested in receiving a summary of the results of this study, please leave your 
email address below 
 
email-address: ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Please check whether you have answered all questions. Then put 
this questionnaire in envelope 2 and seal it. 
 
Put envelope 2 (and 1) into the large envelope and seal it. 
 
If you are ready please quietly leave the room. 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation! 
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Appendix C Interpersonal Trust Scale factor structures in factor-analytic studies 
Item 
nr. 
Item 
 
Chun and 
Campbell 
Wright and 
Tedeschi 
Hunt et al. Chapter 3 of 
this 
dissertation 
1. Hypocrisy is on the increase in our society. (r) Societal 
hypocrisy 
   
2. In dealing with strangers one is better off to be cautious 
until they have provided evidence that they are 
trustworthy. (r) 
Interpersonal 
exploitation 
Trust of 
strangers 
Exploitation Exploitation 
3. This country has a dark future unless we can attract 
better people into politics. (r) 
Political 
cynicism 
Political trust   
4. Fear and social disgrace or punishment rather than 
conscience prevents most people from breaking the law. 
(r) 
  Institutional 
trust 
 
5. Using the honor system of not having a teacher present 
during exams would probably result in increased 
cheating. (r) 
 Trust of 
strangers 
Exploitation  
6. Parents usually can be relied on to keep their promises. Reliable role-
performance 
Paternal trust   
7. The United Nations will never be an effective force in 
keeping world peace. (r) 
    
8. The judiciary is a place where we can all get unbiased 
treatment. 
Political 
cynicism 
 Institutional 
trust 
 
9. Most people would be horrified if they knew how much 
news that the public hears and sees is distorted. (r) 
 Political trust Institutional 
trust 
Institutional 
trust 
10. It is safe to believe that in spite of what people say most 
people are primarily interested in their own welfare. (r) 
Interpersonal 
exploitation 
Trust of 
strangers 
Exploitation  
11. Even though we have reports in newspapers, radio, and 
TV, it is hard to get objective accounts of public events. 
(r) 
Societal 
hypocrisy 
Political trust Institutional 
trust 
 
12. The future seems very promising.     
13. If we really knew what was going on in international 
politics, the public would have reason to be more 
frightened than they now seem to be. (r) 
Political 
cynicism 
Political trust Sincerity, 
Institutional 
trust 
Institutional 
trust 
14. Most elected officials are really sincere in their 
campaign promises. 
  Sincerity Honesty and 
Integrity 
15. Many major national sports contests are fixed in one 
way or another. (r) 
Societal 
hypocrisy 
Political trust   
16. Most experts can be relied upon to tell the truth about 
the limits of their knowledge. 
 Paternal trust   
17. Most parents can be relied upon to carry out their threats 
or punishments. 
 Paternal trust   
18. Most people can be counted on to do what they say they 
will do. 
  Sincerity Honesty and 
integrity 
19. In these competitive times one has to be alert or 
someone is likely to take advantage of you. (r) 
Interpersonal 
exploitation 
Trust of 
strangers 
Exploitation Exploitation 
20. Most idealists are sincere and usually practice what they 
preach. 
 Paternal trust Sincerity Honesty and 
Integrity 
21. Most salesmen are honest in describing their products. Reliable role-
performance 
Paternal trust Exploitation, 
Sincerity 
Honesty and 
Integrity 
22. Most students in school would not cheat even if they are 
sure of getting away with it. 
   Honesty and 
Integrity 
23. Most repairmen will not overcharge even if they think 
you are ignorant of their speciality. 
Reliable role-
performance 
  Honesty and 
Integrity 
24. A large share of accident claims filed against insurance 
companies are phony. (r) 
   Institutional 
trust 
25. Most people answer public opinion polls honestly.  Paternal trust Sincerity  
Scale items of Rotter’s Interpersonal Trust Scale (taken from Wrightsman, 1991). The items of which the scores should be 
reversed are indicated by (r). 
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Nederlandse samenvatting (summary in Dutch) 
 
Dit proefschrift is gebaseerd op twee exploratieve empirische studies naar 
‘professional skepticism’.81 Onder professional skepticism wordt de beroepsmatige attitude 
verstaan die een ‘vragende geest’ (‘questioning mind’) en een ‘kritische beoordeling van 
bewijsmateriaal’ (‘critical assessment of evidence’) omvat. 
Het belangrijkste doel van de twee studies is het onderzoeken van het verband tussen 
skeptische karakteristieken van accountants enerzijds en skeptische inschattingen en 
beslissingen van accountants anderzijds.82 De titel van dit proefschrift luidt dan ook in het 
Nederlands: ‘een studie naar de relatie tussen skeptische karakteristieken van accountants en 
hun skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen’. Beide studies in dit proefschrift maken gebruik 
van een dataset die is verzameld door het uitvoeren van een wetenschappelijk experiment bij 
376 accountants (werkzaam in het openbaar accountantsberoep). 
Het onderzoeken van professional skepticism is belangrijk. Als accountants meer 
professional skepticism hadden gebruikt dan waren de effecten van recente bedrijfsschandalen 
mogelijk minder geweest. Zo wordt bijvoorbeeld het Enron schandaal mede toegeschreven 
aan het falen van de accountant omdat deze een onvoldoende niveau van professional 
skepticism zou hebben getoond. Verder laten diverse studies van fraudegerelateerde SEC-
zaken zien dat gebreken in de accountantscontrole bij die zaken voor een belangrijk gedeelte 
liggen op het gebied van professional skepticism.83 Deze manco’s kunnen schadelijk zijn voor 
de kwaliteit van accountantscontroles en de reputatie van accountants. Inzicht in professional 
skepticism is daarom van groot belang. 
 Het belang van professional skepticism in de accountantscontrolepraktijk wordt 
algemeen onderkend. Dat blijkt onder andere uit de volgende feiten: (1) de term professional 
skepticism is een prominent onderdeel van de standaarden op het gebied van de 
accountantscontrole; (2) veel accountantskantoren schrijven het toepassen van professional 
skepticism voor in hun controlemethodologie; (3) professional skepticism is onderdeel van het 
onderwijs aan en de training van accountants; en (4) de academische en professionele 
literatuur op het gebied van de accountantscontrole benadrukt het belang van professional 
                                                 
81
 In de Nederlandse versie van de International Standards on Auditing is ‘an attitude of professional skepticism’ 
vertaald met ‘professioneel-kritische instelling’. Omdat de Engelse term ‘professional skepticism’ ook in 
Nederland meestal wordt gebruikt wordt de Nederlandse vertaling in deze samenvatting niet gehanteerd. 
82
 Indien in deze samenvatting over accountants wordt gesproken gaat het met name over accountants van 
financiële verantwoordingen.  
83
 De Securities and Exchange Commission, ofwel SEC, is de Amerikaanse ‘beurswaakhond’. 
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skepticism. Professional skepticism is dus een essentieel onderdeel van hedendaagse 
accountantscontroles. 
 Ondanks het belang van professional skepticism bestaat geen overeenstemming over 
de definitie van professional skepticism en over hoe het concept te meten is. Ook is er kritiek 
over het feit dat de standaarden op het gebied van de accountantscontrole te weinig concrete 
aanknopingspunten bieden voor de implementatie van professional skepticism. Het 
onderkende belang van professional skepticism, het gebrek aan helderheid omtrent de 
definitie en meting en de wens tot meer sturing over implementatie, rechtvaardigen onderzoek 
naar professional skepticism. Tot op heden heeft slechts beperkt onderzoek plaatsgevonden 
naar dit begrip. Dit proefschrift tracht bij te dragen aan het invullen van deze leemte. 
Het proefschrift bestaat uit vier hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 1 is een overzichtshoofdstuk 
waarin verschillende perspectieven op (professional) skepticism worden geschetst en waarin 
het onderzoeksmodel van professional skepticism bij accountants wordt beschreven. 
Hoofdstuk 1 geeft tevens een overzicht van de structuur van het proefschrift. De twee 
empirische hoofdstukken zijn respectievelijk opgenomen in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3. In Hoofdstuk 4 
worden de twee studies samengevat, gevolgd door een uiteenzetting van de implicaties van de 
bevindingen voor toekomstig onderzoek en voor de accountantspraktijk. De beperkingen van 
het onderzoek worden ook in dit hoofdstuk geïdentificeerd. 
 De bedoeling van de eerste studie (opgenomen in Hoofdstuk 2) is het onderzoeken van 
de samenhang van vier skeptische karakteristieken met zes skeptische inschattingen en 
beslissingen. De vier onderzochte skeptische karakteristieken zijn ‘intermenselijk vertrouwen’ 
(‘interpersonal trust’), ‘uitstel van oordelen’ (‘suspension of judgment’), ‘plaats van 
beheersing’ (‘locus of control’)84 en een overkoepelende professional skepticism meetschaal, 
speciaal ontwikkeld voor accountants. De eerste hypothese in deze studie is dat skeptische 
karakteristieken van accountants samenhangen met skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen. 
De specifieke verwachting is dat meer skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen samenhangen 
met een lagere mate van interpersonal trust, meer suspension of judgment, een meer interne 
locus of control en een hogere score op de overkoepelende professional skepticism 
meetschaal. Om deze samenhang te kunnen onderzoeken is een experiment uitgevoerd bij 376 
accountants werkzaam bij de vier grootste accountantskantoren (de ‘Big Four’). Aan deze 
accountants werd een korte casus voorgelegd. De casus gaat over het uitvoeren van een 
cijferbeoordeling (‘analytical procedures’) in de planningsfase van de jaarrekeningcontrole 
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 Een persoon met een zogenaamde externe locus of control gelooft dat dingen die hem overkomen niet kunnen 
worden beïnvloed door hemzelf, terwijl een persoon met een interne locus of control dat wel gelooft. 
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van een beursgenoteerde onderneming. In de casus word beschreven dat sprake is van een 
onverwachte materiële stijging in de behaalde brutomarge. In dit soort situaties vraagt de 
accountant meestal eerst informatie aan de cliënt zelf. De ‘Chief Financial Officer’ (CFO) 
geeft een verklaring waarin hij zegt dat de fluctuatie logisch verklaarbaar is (en dus niet op 
een fout berust). Hij zegt dat de fluctuatie in de brutomarge is ontstaan door een wijziging in 
de zogenaamde ‘sales-mix’ (de samenstelling van de verkopen). Het bedrijf heeft veel meer 
medische instrumenten verkocht dan de jaren daarvoor en die hebben een grotere brutomarge 
dan de overige producten in het assortiment. 
Aangezien het management mogelijk niet onafhankelijk is, moeten accountants 
professional skepticism gebruiken in het evalueren van verklaringen die door het management 
worden gegeven voor onverwachte fluctuaties. Dit is in de ene situatie meer van belang dan in 
de andere. Daarom is in het experiment tevens de kwaliteit van de beheersingsomgeving 
gemanipuleerd door gebruik te maken van twee verschillende beschrijvingen van de 
beheersingsomgeving. In de sterke variant van de beheersingsomgeving is het management 
conservatief, bestaan geen ernstige conflicten tussen management en accountant, heeft het 
bedrijf strikte richtlijnen voor het volgen van interne beheersingsmaatregelen, en is de 
bezoldiging van het management gebaseerd op een evenwichtige set van financiële en niet-
financiële beoordelingscriteria. In de zwakke variant is het management agressief in het 
zakendoen, komen veelvuldig onenigheden voor tussen management en accountant, worden 
interne beheersingsmaatregelen minder strikt gehanteerd indien de voortgang van het werk 
erdoor wordt belemmerd, en is de bezoldiging van het management vooral gebaseerd op het 
behalen van korte termijn beoordelingscriteria die voornamelijk zijn gekoppeld aan financiële 
resultaten. De achterliggende gedachte is dat in de zwakke variant van de 
beheersingsomgeving meer vraagtekens kunnen worden gezet bij de verklaring van de CFO 
dan in de sterke variant. De tweede hypothese in de studie luidt dan ook dat accountants meer 
skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen laten zien als de beheersingsomgeving zwak is.  
 Naast deze twee hypothesen is tevens gekeken naar de invloed van de kwaliteit van de 
beheersingsomgeving op de relatie tussen de skeptische karakteristieken van accountants en 
de skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen van accountants (een zogenaamd ‘interactie-
effect’). Voor de aard en richting van de interactie-effecten was vooraf geen duidelijke 
verwachting te formuleren.  
De resultaten van de eerste studie worden zo meteen besproken tezamen met de 
resultaten van de tweede studie. Nu volgt allereerst het doel van de tweede studie. Het doel 
van de tweede studie (opgenomen in Hoofdstuk 3) is om de Interpersonal Trust meetschaal 
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meer diepgaand te onderzoeken.85 Door middel van een factoranalyse worden factoren 
afgeleid die ten grondslag liggen aan de Interpersonal Trust meetschaal. Op deze manier 
wordt onderzocht of aspecten van interpersonal trust zijn te onderscheiden die mogelijk beter 
in staat zijn om skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen te verklaren. Daartoe wordt 
onderzocht welke samenhang de afgeleide interpersonal trust factoren vertonen met 
skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen, waarbij ook de interactie tussen de kwaliteit van de 
beheersingsomgeving en de skeptische karakteristieken in ogenschouw wordt genomen. De 
samenhang tussen de afgeleide factoren en de skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen wordt 
vergeleken met de samenhang tussen de Interpersonal Trust schaal als geheel en de skeptische 
inschattingen en beslissingen. Omdat individuele constructen die ten grondslag liggen aan 
interpersonal trust meer specifiek en toegespitst zijn dan de gehele meetschaal is de 
verwachting dat de individuele factoren de skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen beter 
kunnen voorspellen. In een aanvullende analyse wordt in de tweede studie ook de relatie 
tussen functieniveau van de accountant en interpersonal trust en skeptische inschattingen en 
beslissingen geanalyseerd. De reden hiervoor is dat het belangrijk is om te weten of 
bijvoorbeeld het professional skepticism van een accountant op partner niveau hoger is dan 
het professional skepticism van de rest van het teamleden op de lagere functieniveaus. Dit is 
van belang omdat partners de verantwoordelijkheid en bevoegdheid hebben om te bepalen of 
voldoende bewijs is verzameld om een accountantsverklaring te kunnen verstrekken. 
Bovendien bepaalt de partner, na overweging van al het relevante bewijsmateriaal, 
uiteindelijk welke strekking de accountantsverklaring zal hebben.  
Beide studies in dit proefschrift laten zien dat skeptische karakteristieken 
samenhangen met skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen.86 Dit is slechts in beperkte mate 
aangetoond in eerdere studies. Van de vier onderzochte karakteristieken in Hoofdstuk 2 zijn 
de skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen van accountants het meest gerelateerd aan 
interpersonal trust, hetzij via de directe effecten van interpersonal trust, hetzij via de 
interactie-effecten van interpersonal trust met de kwaliteit van de beheersingsomgeving. Deze 
bevinding suggereert dat van de vier onderzochte karakteristieken interpersonal trust het 
nauwst samenhangt met skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen die worden genoemd in de 
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 De studie in Hoofdstuk 3 maakt gebruik van een gedeelte van de gegevens die zijn verzameld voor de studie in 
Hoofdstuk 2 en omvat 291 accountants. 
86
 De onderzochte skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen zijn: (1) de waarschijnlijkheid dat de verklaring die 
door de CFO is gegeven juist is; (2) de waarschijnlijkheid dat sprake is van fraude; (3) het aantal alternatieve 
verklaringen voor de onverwachte fluctuatie in de brutomarge; (4) het aantal verklaringen dat aangeeft dat de 
fluctuatie van de brutomarge op een al dan niet bewuste fout berust; (5) de kans die wordt toegekend aan de 
verklaringen die aangeven dat de fluctuatie van de brutomarge op een fout berust; (6) het aantal gebudgetteerde 
uren voor gegevensgerichte controles met betrekking tot de post omzet. 
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literatuur over accountantscontrole en in de professionele standaarden. De analyses in 
Hoofdstuk 3 laten de meeste significante directe en interactie-effecten zien voor de 
interpersonal trust schaal als geheel en voor de factor Exploitation.87 Het feit dat de 
betrouwbaarheid van de factor Exploitation nogal laag is, opgeteld bij het feit dat de 
verklarende waarde van de modellen met de gehele interpersonal trust schaal hoger is, leidt tot 
de conclusie dat de interpersonal trust schaal als geheel de beste voorspeller van skeptische 
inschattingen en beslissingen vormt. 
De variabele ‘kwaliteit van beheersingsomgeving’ laat in Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 een 
significant direct effect zien voor alle regressiemodellen met betrekking tot de volgende 
afhankelijke variabelen: de waarschijnlijkheid van fraude; het aantal foutverklaringen; en het 
gewicht van de foutverklaringen. Dit geeft aan dat accountants, zoals verwacht, hun oordelen 
afstemmen op potentiële problemen en risico’s die samenhangen met de kwaliteit van de 
beheersingsomgeving. Ook de interactie-effecten van de skeptische karakteristieken met de 
kwaliteit van de beheersingsomgeving laten zien dat de inschattingen en beslissingen 
skeptischer zijn bij de zwakke beheersingsomgeving. Dit suggereert dat situationele factoren, 
zoals kwaliteit van de beheersingsomgeving, samenhangen met skeptische inschattingen en 
beslissingen. 
De studies in dit proefschrift hebben beperkingen die in aanmerking moeten worden 
genomen bij het interpreteren van de resultaten. Ten eerste is niet voor alle deelnemende 
accountantkantoren een representatieve steekproef beschikbaar in termen van ervaring en taal, 
hetgeen problemen veroorzaakt bij het ontwarren van potentiële invloeden van ervaring, taal 
en kantooreffecten. Een tweede beperking betreft de beperkt beschikbare tijd voor het 
experiment. Als gevolg hiervan hebben deelnemers aan het experiment slechts twee van de 
vier meetschalen voor skeptische karakteristieken ingevuld. Dit verhindert een gelijktijdige 
vergelijking van alle vier de maatstaven. Ten derde is op basis van de bestaande relevante 
literatuur een keuze gemaakt van de afhankelijke variabelen die skeptische inschattingen en 
beslissingen weergeven. Hoewel de geraadpleegde bronnen deze variabelen als belangrijke 
skeptische gedragingen definiëren bestaat geen normatieve bron die aangeeft welke variabele 
het meest belangrijk is in het verbeteren van de kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole. Verder 
dient de interpretatie van de resultaten in Hoofdstuk 3 met betrekking tot de Institutional Trust 
en Exploitation factoren zorgvuldig te gebeuren omdat de betrouwbaarheid van deze schalen 
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 Uit de factoranalyse van interpersonal trust in Hoofdstuk 3 komen in totaal drie factoren naar voren. Deze zijn 
gelabeld als ‘eerlijkheid en integriteit’ (‘Honesty and Integrity’), ‘institutioneel vertrouwen’ (‘Institutional 
Trust’) en ‘uitbuiting’ (‘Exploitation’).  
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betrekkelijk laag is. Ten slotte bestaat geen normatieve oplossing voor de casus die is gebruikt 
in het experiment. Daardoor is het niet mogelijk om vast te stellen welke maatstaf het nauwst 
samenhangt met optimale inschattingen en beslissingen. 
  De bevindingen in dit proefschrift leiden tot aanbevelingen voor theorie en praktijk. 
Die worden hierna uiteen gezet. Alhoewel in de literatuur discussie bestaat over het gebruik 
van (interpersonal) trust als benadering voor skeptische houding, laten de studies in dit 
proefschrift zien dat interpersonal trust (factoren) significant samenhangen met skeptische 
inschattingen en beslissingen. Deze bevinding kan van belang zijn voor accountantskantoren. 
Kantoren kunnen bijvoorbeeld tests uitvoeren die de mate van interpersonal trust van 
accountants meten. Deze informatie kan worden gebruikt bij het samenstellen van 
controleteams. Zo kan bijvoorbeeld worden besloten dat ieder controleteam enkele mensen 
met lagere niveaus van interpersonal trust moet bevatten. 
  De bevindingen suggereren verder dat situationele factoren, zoals kwaliteit van de 
beheersingsomgeving, samenhangen met skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen. Daarom 
kan het trainen van accountants in het beoordelen van situationele factoren skeptische 
inschattingen en beslissingen verbeteren. Dit is van belang omdat accountantskantoren 
beslissingshulpmiddelen (zoals checklists) gebruiken bij het inschatten van bijvoorbeeld 
risico’s die samenhangen met de beheersingsomgeving. De inhoud en formulering van deze 
checklists beïnvloedt sterk de gedragingen van de accountant en kan dus in potentie leiden tot 
het over het hoofd zien van belangrijke situationele variabelen. Daarom moeten accountants 
nooit volledig vertrouwen op beslissingshulpmiddelen en moeten ze alert blijven op 
cliëntspecifieke omstandigheden die niet worden afgedekt door bijvoorbeeld de gebruikte 
checklists. 
  Het is interessant dat de speciaal voor accountants ontwikkelde professional 
skepticism meetschaal niet de sterkste relatie vertoont met de skeptische inschattingen en 
beslissingen. Ook in andere studies heeft de overkoepelende schaal geen sterke resultaten 
opgeleverd. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is dat de schaal niet genoeg focust op de meest 
significante skeptische constructen zoals interpersonal trust. 
  Toekomstig onderzoek kan zich richten op het verder onderzoeken van de 
interpersonal trust maatstaf en interpersonal trust factoren. Een kandidaat die voor nader 
onderzoek in aanmerking komt is de Exploitation factor, waarvoor meer betrouwbare 
maatstaven moeten worden ontwikkeld. Het toevoegen van meer relevante items aan het 
instrument, bijvoorbeeld, kan de betrouwbaarheid in belangrijke mate vergroten. 
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  Het onderzoek heeft zich met name gericht op cliëntrisico (benaderd door kwaliteit 
van de beheersingsomgeving) als prikkel die de relatie tussen skeptische karakteristieken en 
skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen beïnvloedt. Toekomstig studies kunnen andere 
belangrijke prikkels onderzoeken zoals budgetdruk, kwaliteit van de accountantscontrole, 
rechtszaken en verlies van reputatie. 
Het aantal foutverklaringen wordt verklaard door drie van de vier onderzochte 
skeptische karakteristieken in Hoofdstuk 2 (via de directe en de interactie-effecten) en het 
aantal alternatieve verklaringen wordt slechts door één karakteristiek verklaard. Deze 
bevindingen worden bevestigd in Hoofdstuk 3. Dit suggereert dat gedrag dat is gericht op het 
genereren van verklaringen die veronderstellen dat zich een fout in de financiële 
verantwoording bevindt (het zogenaamde ‘presumptive doubt’ perspectief) beter wordt 
verklaard dan gedrag dat is gericht op het genereren van verklaringen die veronderstellen dat 
fluctuaties kunnen worden verklaard door zowel fouten als ‘natuurlijke’ oorzaken (de 
zogenaamde ‘neutral stance’). Toekomstige studies kunnen het effect van presumptive doubt 
op het succesvol tonen van skeptisch gedrag onderzoeken. 
 Taakspecifieke ervaring en functieniveau binnen het accountantskantoor blijken 
belangrijk te zijn in het verklaren van skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen: hoe meer 
ervaren de accountant is in het uitvoeren van cijferbeoordelingen, hoe meer skeptische 
inschattingen en beslissingen hij laat zien. Daarom is het belangrijk dat ervaringen op het 
gebied van professional skepticism binnen de accountantskantoren worden gedeeld. De 
aanvullende bevinding dat partners het hoogste scoren op de interpersonal trust meetschaal en 
de afgeleide factoren en tevens de meest skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen laten zien 
verdient verder onderzoek. Het is immers op het eerste gezicht onverwacht dat personen die 
meer skeptische inschattingen en beslissingen laten zien tevens de grootste mate van 
interpersonal trust bezitten, aangezien interpersonal trust als tegenhanger van professional 
skepticism wordt gezien. Een verklaring voor deze bevinding is dat accountants in hogere 
rangen meer ervaring en kennis hebben en op basis daarvan meer skeptisch handelen, ook al 
hebben ze een hoog niveau van interpersonal trust. Mogelijk leidt de vertrouwende houding 
aan de zijde van de accountant ook tot betere (financiële) resultaten omdat cliënten die 
houding op prijs stellen. Bovendien wordt in de meer recente literatuur gesuggereerd dat 
‘trust’ en ‘distrust’ misschien twee verschillende fenomenen zijn en naast elkaar kunnen 
bestaan. Dan kunnen partners dus nog steeds ‘distrusting’ zijn als ze tevens en grote mate van 
interpersonal trust bezitten. Toekomstig onderzoek kan zich richten op deze aspecten. 
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 Het is nog onduidelijk in hoeverre professional skepticism kan worden getraind of kan 
worden geëffectueerd door superieuren. Indien dit mogelijk is kunnen accountantskantoren de 
aandacht voor professional skepticism uitbreiden tijdens de planningsbijeenkomsten van de 
controleopdrachten. 
 Een laatste suggestie voor toekomstig onderzoek ligt op het gebied van kritisch denken 
(‘critical thinking’). Het mag duidelijk zijn dat kritisch denken waardevol is voor acountants. 
Toekomstige studies kunnen zich richten op de invloed van kritisch denken op skeptische 
gedragingen. Hierbij kan gebruik worden gemaakt van reeds bestaande meetschalen op het 
gebied van kritisch denken. 
Samenvattend versterken de resultaten van dit proefschrift het idee dat verder 
onderzoek naar het concept van professional skepticism vruchtbaar is. 
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